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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the debates surrounding the grand strategy of United States in the 
decade after the Cold War.  ‗Bookended‘ by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001, it assesses the strategic ideas that were 
advanced to conceptualise American foreign policy, grouping these thematically 
under the headings of primacy, neoisolationism and liberal multilateralism.  To this 
end the thesis introduces a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation, in 
which ideas are considered in conjunction with considerations of power in the 
international system.   
The thesis makes the case that the ideas of each strategic school-of-thought reflect 
both a distinctive theoretical understanding of international relations and a particular 
tradition in United States foreign policy.  Furthermore, it makes the more general 
structural claim that under conditions of limited threat such as the apparent 
unipolarity of the post-Cold War years, great power strategies are less determined by 
the imperatives of international structure and more by the ideas at the domestic level 
influencing the foreign policy executive.  As a result, grand strategy formation 
becomes highly ideologically contested, and the geopolitical science of strategic 
assessment and response becomes unpredictable. 
The thesis argues that after the Cold War the strategic debate is best understood in 
conjunction with the contemporaneous idea that the United States held a functionally 
imperial position in the international system.  In the absence of agreed threats, 
competition between strategic ideas resulted in the United States pursuing a foreign 
policy that selectively incorporated elements of each strategic alternative.  Although 
this ‗uni-multilateralism‘ had as its aim the management of the international system, 
its diverse sources of ideas and support meant that in security matters in particular 
American foreign policy was inconsistent and unpredictable.  It was therefore not 
until the events of 9-11 provided a unified threat around which to coordinate strategy 
that America adopted a more coherent imperial grand strategy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
―When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who 
‗they‘ were.  It was us versus them.  And it was clear who ‗them‘ was.  Today, 
we‘re not so sure who the ‗they‘ are, but we know they‘re there.‖   
Governor George W. Bush, at a campaign stop in Iowa, January 2000.
1
 
―How about this for foreign policy vision?‖ remarked the new President as he 
reviewed a selection of his own misspeaks and malapropisms for a light-hearted 
Washington dinner in March 2001.  Yet perhaps unwittingly, beneath the humour 
the 43
rd
 President of the United States had revealed a deeper uncertainty 
undercutting US foreign policy and summed up the overriding problem that had 
faced both his own father and the man he had replaced in the White House – how to 
think about the nature of international order and the United States‘ role in it 
following the collapse of the Cold War.  
A cartoon by James Borgman in the Cincinatti Enquirer captured the peculiar 
challenges of 1989 and after.  It showed a bewildered President George H.W. Bush 
sat at his desk, thinking: ―Communism is dead, the Wall is down, Apartheid is 
falling, Mandela is free, the Sandanistas are ousted, Germany is reunited, the Cold 
War is over, I‘ve returned all my calls, and, heck, it‘s not even lunchtime.‖
2
   
The subject of this study is what happened that afternoon, once the immediate crises 
precipitated by the end of the Cold War order had waned.  It is loosely bookended 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of September 
11
th
 2001, to cover the debate about the nature and form of American grand strategy 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Anne E. Kornblut, "Campaign Trail a Trip of the Tongue Bush Bedeviled by Spoken 
Word", The Boston Globe, 23/1/2000. 
2
 Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), 1. 
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in a new era.  The first bookend is the looser of the two: although it is only after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union that the end of bipolarity is confirmed and the debate 
surrounding American grand strategy takes on its distinctive form, the period after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 does constitute the beginnings of the process of 
strategic reassessment.  At the same time, using the later date for the ‗end‘ of the 
Cold War is justified by the continued preoccupation of American policymakers 
with the Soviet Union before its collapse, a preoccupation that reflected the fact that 
the systemic change it represented was unconfirmed.
3
   
If there was unanimity after 1991 that international politics had undergone a massive 
structural change, and that this required the United States to reconsider its national 
security policy, there was also general agreement about the questions that needed to 
be answered.  What was the nature of the post-Cold War international system?  
Within it, what were the United States‘ interests and objectives, and what were the 
threats to those aims?  What were the appropriate strategic responses to those 
threats?  What principles should guide American policy?  As one survey of the 
alternatives asked, ―in short, what should be the new grand strategy of the United 
States?‖
4
 
These questions, directed as they were to the sole remaining superpower, presented 
the United States with a wide range of potential answers.  While Soviet-American 
rivalry had not entirely dictated American policy – there had been vigorous 
political and academic debates over the previous forty-five years – Americans, 
Robert Jervis noted, ―had at least agreed on the crucial questions most of the time: 
                                                 
3
 1989-1992 was a period of contingency management for the Bush administration, which cautiously 
and largely successfully managed the transistion from communism to democracy in Eastern Europe, 
oversaw the peaceful reunification of Germany and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, intervened 
militarily to oust General Noriega in Panama and repelled Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait.  See Steven 
Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (New York: 
Pinter, 1999). 
4
 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy", International Security 
21, no. 3 (1996-7), 5. 
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American security needs were the core of its national interest; the Soviet Union was 
the greatest threat; the United States had no choice but to be actively engaged in the 
world to protect itself.‖
5
  The United States had poured $11 trillion of treasure into 
the Cold War, the bulk of its military, scientific and ideological resources, and an 
incalculable amount of its collective psychological energy.
6
  Absent the Soviet 
Union, the fundamental rationale for American foreign policy had been lost, the 
importance of foreign policy was in question, and the level of public support for 
foreign-policy actions uncertain.
7
 
Leaving the Cold War behind meant that the United States‘ most sacred concepts of 
internationalism were legitimate objects of reassessment.  The structural shock 
produced by the end of bipolarity therefore went to the very foundations of 
American foreign policy, breaking up old coalitions and redefining the very 
vocabulary of foreign affairs.  As one regular commentator noted: 
―In foreign affairs, the old dividing lines are blurring or being ignored, and with 
good reason.  As is clear from any recent op-ed page, familiar classifications 
such as interventionist and isolationist, hawk and dove, realist and idealist, and 
multilateralist and unilateralist (at least as they have been used since the end of 
World War II) no longer make much sense, in the absence of the Cold War's 
defining conditions…  Even ideas as basic to modern politics as Left and Right 
are undergoing redefinition.‖
8
  
Such a deep reconceptualising of American foreign affairs was reflected in a 
profound sense of confusion about the nature of the emergent international order.  
                                                 
5
 Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?", International Security 16, 
no. 3 (1991), 61. 
6
 Haynes Bonner Johnson, The Best of Times: America in the Clinton Years (New York: Harcourt, 
2001), 2-3. 
7
 James M. McCormick, "Clinton and Foreign Policy: Some Legacies for a New Century", in The 
Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics, ed. Steven E. Schier (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 62. 
8
 Alan Tonelson, "Beyond Left and Right", The National Interest 34 (1993). 
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Despite having a greater range of strategic choice than it had enjoyed since Pearl 
Harbor, the United States was unsure of its footing: convinced of the importance of 
its decisions but lacking a compass to direct them.
9
  In the absence of any sense of 
existential threat, the process of defining a new strategy lacked urgency, and meant 
that despite its victory in the Cold War the United States was a rudderless and 
unsure power.  As the Economist noted ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall: 
―The United States bestrides the globe like colossus. It dominates business, 
commerce and communications; its economy is the world's most successful, its 
military might second to none. Yet, for all that, the colossus is uncertain. Having 
so much power, it does not know how to behave. Should it act alone and 
unhindered on the world stage, since it can? Or should it willingly dilute its 
power in cooperation with others?‖
10
 
 Invited in 1995 to name the era in which they were living, the responses of readers 
of the New York Times expressed both doubt and disillusion, the more popular labels 
including the ‗Age of Anxiety‘, ‗Age of Uncertainty‘, ‗Age of Fragmentation‘, ‗Age 
of (Great and Failed) Expectations‘, and ‗Age of Disillusion (and Dissolution)‘.
11
  
Academics were no more able to adequately conceptualise the age, indeed, the best 
they could do, it seemed, was to characterise the new era not so much in terms of 
what it was but in terms of what it was not, or what it came after.  Thus the last 
decade of the twentieth century was a post-Cold War era, a post-socialist order, a 
post-Westphalian age or even a postmodern world.
12
  September the 11
th
 seemed to 
confirm the status of the 1990s as historical void between two more distinct eras, 
defined and constructed around ‗wars‘ that were never clearly such, proving correct 
                                                 
9
 Robert E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s", in U.S. Foreign Policy after 
the Cold War, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992). 
10
 "America's World", Economist 353, no. 8142 (1999). 
11
 Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, America between the Wars, from 11/9 to 9/11: The 
Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2008). 
12
 Michael Cox, "Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New 
United States Hegemony", New Political Economy 6, no. 3 (2001), 311. 
 9 
one European observer‘s suggestion that this was ―the era of the Interregnum, an age 
that cannot last.‖
13
 
This thesis is, in part, an effort to allay that perception, and to make the case that the 
period between the Cold War and the War on Terror, far from being an interlude 
between eras, was actually a fundamentally important period in both United States 
foreign policy and the evolution of the international system more generally.  Its 
subject of analysis is grand strategy, or rather the grand strategic proposals that 
formed the debate about the United States‘ role in the world following the end of the 
Cold War.  As such it is a study of ideas, of the process of rethinking American 
grand strategy within the United States‘ foreign policy establishment, broadly 
defined, that was precipitated by the end of the Cold War.   
In drawing together both secondary literature and primary sources this thesis first 
seeks to map the strategic debate that took place in the United States during the 
1990s and so offer a contribution to the history of the period in question.
14
  The 
result is the construction of three ‗ideal-type‘ grand strategies: retrenchment, liberal 
multilateralism and primacy, the ideas of which broadly correlate with the ideas of 
the defensive realist, liberal and offensive realist schools of International Relations 
theory respectively.  This charting of the domestic ideas about the direction of 
American grand strategy employs as its evidence the recommendations contained in 
the plethora of books about America‘s role in the post-Cold War world, the output of 
think-tanks and government departments, the speeches of politicians, and newspaper 
                                                 
13
 Christoph Bertram, "Interregnum", Foreign Policy, no. 119 (2000), 44.   
14
 A few shorter studies have presented typologies of United States grand strategy in the post-Cold 
War period, but these are either superficial or historically incomplete.  Perhaps the most thorough 
analysis is Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy".  See also Colin Dueck, 
"Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004", Review of International Studies 30 
(2004); John J. Kohout et al., "Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States", 
Comparative Strategy 14, no. 4 (1995); Alexander Nacht, "US Foreign Policy Strategies", The 
Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1995).  A collection of articles from the journal International 
Security are organised into four ideal-type strategies in the first and revised editions of Michael E. 
Brown, America's Strategic Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997, 2000).  
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and magazine op-eds and comment pieces.  The analysis of this evidence spotlights 
the contributions of both foreign policy elites and broader public discourse to the 
construction of these three grand strategic narratives.   
In taking this approach, the thesis represents a work of both International Relations 
and History, or at least a work of International Relations that uses the study of 
History as it central methodological tool.  Whilst History has always played a central 
role in the study of International Relations, much neorealist thought has been 
considered ahistoricist, and has cast History solely in the role of testing the validity 
of theoretical positions.
15
  The theoretical underpinning of the thesis therefore 
reflects the need to treat History seriously in International Relations, to respect the 
contingencies of History and the importance of how foreign policy is actually 
conducted.
16
  Whilst international historians may embed their causal arguments 
within narratives, and political scientists may seek to identify recurring patterns and 
make generalisations and read a particular events as instances of wider phenomena, 
their analysis and explanations are not mutually exclusive, quite the opposite.
17
  In 
doing so it embraces the epistemological and methodological premises of 
neoclassical realism, which emphasises problem-focused research and employs a 
case-study approach to explain cases and generate hypotheses.
18
  Neoclassical 
realism therefore uses History to illuminate states‘ foreign policies, integrating 
systemic and domestic influences in an attempt to draw out which aspects of foreign 
                                                 
15
 John M. Hobson and George Lawson, "What Is History in International Relations?", Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008), 417-20. 
16
 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", World Politics 51, no. 1 
(1998), 171. 
17
 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Role of History in International Relations", 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008), 358.  On the commensurability of 
History and International Relations see the collection of essays in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius 
Elman, Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
18
 Randall L. Schweller, "The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: Why a Concert Didn't Arise", in 
Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, ed. 
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 184. 
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policy outcomes can be explained by which factors.
19
  Therefore, this thesis does not 
set out a specific theoretical hypothesis for testing, but rather seeks to draw some 
theoretical conclusions from the study of a historical period.   
Therefore, the thesis‘ second primary aim is to make a contribution to neoclassical 
realism as a school of international relations thought.  This school draws on the 
insights of the classical realist tradition to emphasise the variables that intervene at 
the domestic level between system structure and foreign policy outcomes.  Although 
a number of recent neoclassical realist works have focused on the historical 
evolution of American grand strategy, none has specifically addressed the post-Cold 
War debate or focused on the specific role of strategic ideas in foreign policy elites‘ 
responses to changed international structure.
20
  To that end the thesis introduces a 
neoclassical realist model of the role of ideas in grand strategy formation.   
The relevance of grand strategy is sometimes disputed by professional diplomats, 
who regard thinking strategically about foreign policy as a waste of time since each 
challenge is different and has to be addressed on its own merits.  Yet if a state‘s 
diplomacy is to be successful it requires an intellectual underpinning, a strategic 
concept to which the problems of the day can be referred.
21
  So whilst diplomacy is 
surely a process that is full of contingencies and particularities, strategy describes a 
general approach of a state towards all of its international relations – setting out its 
goals and prescribing the means to achieve them, whilst diplomacy and foreign 
policy is a narrative of the day-to-day victories, defeats and compromises along the 
course that national strategy has set out.   
                                                 
19
 Fareed Zakaria, "Review: Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay", International Security 
17, no. 1 (1992), 198.  For a full justification of the integration of domestic political process into a 
systemic approach see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and 
Domestic-Level Variables", International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997). 
20
 Colin Dueck, "New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy", International Security 28, no. 4 
(2004); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the 
Present (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
21
 Jonathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of US Foreign Policy", The Atlantic, September. 
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It should be noted therefore that the thesis does not represent an argument that state 
foreign policies are strictly and accurately predictable on the basis of strategic ideas.  
Grand strategy is not an outcome that entails specific responses in specific 
situations: rather it represents a general posture of a state that distinguishes it from 
other states.  Neoclassical realism therefore reunites international relations and 
foreign policy analysis, two sides of the same discipline that should never have been 
divorced.  The question of how states behave cannot be divorced from the questions 
of why they behave as they do; outcomes cannot be analytically separate from the 
processes that produce them. 
In this sense a neoclassical realist focus on states‘ grand strategies is analogous to, 
and a replacement for, neorealism‘s conception of the state as a black box.  Where 
neorealism predicts by stating the nature of the systemic imperatives that impel like 
states, neoclassical realism seeks to understand how systemic imperatives are 
mediated through state strategies.  The subject of this thesis is therefore less the 
minutiae of US foreign policy during the 1990s than it is the attempt to create and 
sustain a set of ideas and interpretations that underpin and inform America‘s 
interactions with the world.   
Overview and Structure of the Argument 
The thesis begins by setting out the theoretical and methodological approach to the 
thesis.  Chapter 1 therefore aims to introduce and justify both the neoclassical realist 
approach and the need to understand the ideas that intervene between system 
structure and foreign policy outcomes in the making of grand strategy.  The 
integration of ideas within an ostensibly realist framework is not an uncontroversial 
project, but the notion that the process of making strategy involves ideas and 
interpretation is not one that is new to realism, as evidenced by the focus of classical 
realists on the importance of statecraft and the avoidance of idealism.  International 
 13 
Relations has struggled to integrate the role of nebulous ideas into a systematic form 
of analysis that recognises the interrelation between the material and the ideational 
in IR.  The chapter therefore sets out a positivist conception of ideas that details how 
they intervene at the unit level in the process of strategy formation. 
In line with neoclassical realism‘s prioritising of the study of history, the thesis then 
proceeds in Chapter 2 to identify historical trends in the strategic ideas of American 
foreign policy.  Since the neoclassical realist model recognises that ideas may be 
embedded historically within the institutions and culture of societies, this chapter 
‗sets the scene‘ for the post-Cold War period in question by tracing the evolution of 
ideas within US grand strategy, arguing that the United States, as a result of its 
ideological identity, has consistently oscillated between the desire to remain 
internationally detached in order to protect the purity of American liberty and the 
impulse to project liberty‘s universal principles abroad.  Although the stresses of 
these twin impulses were suspended by the Cold War‘s zero-sum dynamic, this 
tension would resurface in the profound sense of loss that accompanied the end of 
containment, and which is the starting point of the new US strategic debate. 
Chapters 3-5 are case studies of each ideal-type grand strategy.  Chapter 3 discusses 
the calls for retrenchment or disengagement that accompanied the disappearance of 
the strategic competitor that had justified American internationalism.  With its 
historical antecedents in the foreign policies of the early republic and the interwar 
years, it argues that neoisolationism is a fair characterisation of this set of strategic 
ideas, which focus on the United States‘ strategic immunity and argues for foreign 
policy to give way to domestic concerns. This chapter argues that retrenchment 
corresponds to the theoretical ideas of defensive or minimal realism in its zero-based 
balancing approach to the strategic assessment that sees security as the sole 
motivation of the state and regards foreign adventurism as inherently dangerous.  
Retrenchment therefore seeks to return the United States to the position of a ‗normal 
country‘ by dismantling America‘s Cold War infrastructure both at home and 
overseas.   
 14 
Chapter 4 discusses the liberal ideas that lie behind the strategy of liberal 
multilateralism, and which draws on Wilsonian idealism to argue for the creation of 
a new world order based around the principles of democratic peace theory, 
international cooperation and collectivised security provision.  Characterised by 
distinctive ideas surrounding the indivisibility of peace and security in a globalised 
world, liberal multilateralism is simultaneously an idealist grand strategy and a 
realistic one that locates the US national interest in the content of America‘s liberal 
values. 
Chapter 5 considers the arguments for American primacy which go far further than 
the multilateral leadership envisioned by liberals.  Undergirded by American 
exceptionalism and predicated on the ideas of offensive realism and hegemonic 
stability theory, this school believes at once both that the international system 
creates imperatives for expansion and that unipolarity is a sustainable form of 
international order.  This chapter assesses primacists‘ focus on the military means of 
strategy and the willingness of both neoconservatives and nationalists to employ it 
for the achievement of systemic aims. 
Chapter 6 assesses the three ideal-type grand strategies in the context of the post-
Cold War international system.  From an extensive analysis of the debates 
surrounding the analytical utility of ‗empire‘ in International Relations, it argues that 
all three are best understood as imperial strategies, and that the United States‘ 
international position since 1945 is best understood with reference to empire.  It 
proceeds to argue that in drawing on all three strategies during the 1990s the United 
States set about establishing the terms of the second American Empire, by means of 
an integrative approach that can be characterised as ‗uni-multilateralism‘. 
The final chapter seeks to draw from the historical argument the theoretical 
implications of the American strategic experience following the end of the Cold 
War.  It warns that while America‘s imperial moment may have passed with the 
demise of the Bush Doctrine, the United States retains the structural form of empire 
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which makes it vulnerable to idealism in its grand strategy, and argues that 
neoclassical realists have a responsibility to highlight this and caution against it. 
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CHAPTER 1:  A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST MODEL OF 
GRAND STRATEGY FORMATION 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical and methodological approach to the thesis, by 
first introducing neoclassical realist thought and expanding upon the nature of grand 
strategy.  It then discusses how strategic ideas have been approached by existing 
realist and constructivist theories, and concludes that neither can account for the 
interrelation between the material and the ideational in IR.  The chapter therefore 
sets out a positivist conception of ideas that details how they intervene at the unit 
level.  The subsequent parts of the chapter draws on this conception to articulate a 
neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation that treats strategic ideas as an 
intervening variable between system structure and foreign policy outcomes, both to 
assess how states identify their strategic priorities and to point to why they might 
change.  A number of implications of this approach for understanding international 
relations are outlined in the conclusion. 
Neoclassical Realism – A Theory Of Foreign Policy 
This thesis details how one state – the United States of America – reacted to a 
change in its external environment – the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Having emerged from a ‗war‘ that had defined its strategic 
engagement for almost half a century, the United States was faced with the task of 
restructuring its relationship with the world.  How did it assess the new environment 
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in which it now found itself?  On what basis did it identify threats to its security?  
What were its foreign policy alternatives and how might it decide between them?   
In examining the debate within the United States that sought to provide answers to 
these questions, this thesis is concerned with the effect of ideas on states in the 
context of their reactions to the international system.  In order to do so it utilises an 
approach to International Relations (IR) that prioritises systemic imperatives whilst 
recognising that their translation into policy outcomes is a process that takes place 
within states, mediated by individuals and the ideas they hold.  This attempt to 
integrate domestic-level variables within a broadly realist theoretical framework is 
sited within a school of International Relations thought known as ‗neoclassical 
realism‘, a term coined by Gideon Rose in a 1998 World Politics review article, 
which argued that neoclassical realism 
―explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents 
argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and 
foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative 
material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, 
however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect 
and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.‖
1
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Neoclassical realism remains an immature and undeveloped child in the discipline of 
International Relations.  In many cases the neo- prefix indicates a work of classical 
realism done again, a revival of that particular brand of approach to historical study 
that had been consigned to a footnote in the textbooks by the promise of a clean, 
predictive social science offered by realism‘s structural progeny.  We should guard 
against this tendency, both for descriptive accuracy‘s own sake, but also to recognise 
the richness of understanding history that classical realism itself offers. 
In contrast, what makes neoclassical realist theory ‗new‘ is its attempt to systematise 
the wide and varied insights of classical realists within parsimonious theory, or to 
put it in reverse, to identify the appropriate intervening variables that can imbue 
realism‘s structural variant with a greater explanatory richness.  In this sense, ‗post-
structural realism‘ could be as apt a designation for this area of IR that values theory 
and seeks at least some kind of predictive capacity, whilst at the same time 
recognising that the world is complex, and that events in international politics reflect 
the interaction of multifarious factors. 
Having said that, it is first and foremost through a reengagement with classical 
realism that neoclassical realism must proceed.  Classical realism presents us with a 
highly complex and interdependent picture of the relationship between the 
individual, the state and society; between the national and the international; between 
the study of international politics and its practice; between power and ideas.  It 
illuminates the richness present in realist thought before the stripped-out determinist 
model of structural realism took hold of the discipline in the superpower-centric 
zero-sum world of the Cold War – a world now nearly twenty years lost.  At the 
same time, an understanding of that classical tradition allows neoclassical realists to 
rebut the accusation that neoclassical realism, by allowing for intervening domestic 
or non-material factors, is not realism at all.  That charge rests on an understanding 
of realist thought that erroneously identifies realism with only a cursory reading of 
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the work of Kenneth Waltz, and part of neoclassical realism‘s purpose should be to 
dispel that particular myth.
2
 
Yet classical realism‘s weakness – and the reason for its being superseded in the 
1970s by its more elegant and scientific structural variant – resides in its lack of a 
rigorous theoretical framework, and therefore the task for neoclassical realism has 
been to attempt to integrate the ―rich but scattered ideas and untested assertions of 
early realist works‖ within a more systematic theoretical structure.
3
  So whilst ―there 
is no evidence, and it is hard to imagine that any might exist, that any remotely 
respectable Realist does not understand that policy is the outcome of a complex 
political process,‖
4
 the challenge for neoclassical realist explanations is to emphasis 
structural factors whilst allowing for their mediation through domestic political 
processes, to ―move beyond the relatively spare world of neorealist theory and 
incorporate unit-level factors as well.‖
5
  In this endeavour, neoclassical realists are 
therefore prepared to examine questions of innenpolitik, those ―first and second-
image variables‖ including domestic politics, state power and processes, leaders‘ 
perceptions and the impact of ideas to explain how states react to the international 
environment.
6
  In line with its realist heritage however, domestic-level variables are 
considered analytically subordinate to systemic factors, the limits and opportunities 
of which states cannot escape in the long run.  However, to understand how states 
respond to an attempt to shape their external environment, scholars of international 
                                                 
2
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relations need to analyse how system pressures are translated through intervening 
unit-level variables.
7 
  
For Stephen Walt the neoclassical realist endeavour is a fruitless one.  Noting 
neoclassical realism‘s particular suitability (and tendency) towards the construction 
of historical narratives, he contends that the discipline‘s ―open-minded eclecticism is 
also its chief limitation… where neorealism sacrificed precision in order to gain 
parsimony and generality, neoclassical realism has given up generality and 
predictive power in an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy and policy relevance.‖
8
 
It is true that to date ‗neoclassical realism‘ has referred more to works whose focus 
is essentially diplomatic history than it has to any established theoretical structure.  
Furthermore, the range of intervening unit-level variables that neoclassical realists 
have been prepared to consider have varied with the historical case in hand.
9
  At the 
same time this critique highlights a corollary point, that parsimony and 
generalisability are qualities that have long been overrated in IR theory.  It is 
something of a false hope to expect there to be a simple, unifying grand theory of 
international politics.
10
  In the murky world of relations between states, parsimony is 
only occasionally appropriate, and we should rarely insist upon it as a principle of 
designing theories.
11
  Therefore, ―valid empirical tests require a sophisticated 
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understanding of the historical record‖,
12
 an approach to the discipline embraced by 
neoclassical realist works, which ―sacrifice ‗rigor‘ for richness‖.
13 
  
Having said all that, the process of systematising the insights of classical realism and 
these neoclassical accounts is very much in its infancy.  By specifying and analysing 
intervening variables between structure and policy outcomes, neoclassical realism is 
able to account for ―outlier‖ cases that appear to defy the predictions of balance-of-
power theory.
14
  This thesis argues that far from being mere history in disguise, a 
neoclassical realist approach has the potential to integrate non-systemic and non-
material factors in a systematic way that will allow for greater parsimony and 
predictive capacity.   
To that end I employ an approach which seeks to reduce the unit-level variables of 
the various neoclassical realist theories to a single intervening variable through 
which the realities of power capabilities are mediated, that being the role of strategic 
ideas in the grand strategies of states.  This hopes to constitute the beginnings of a 
defined, systematic neoclassical realist approach that views states‘ grand strategies 
as its primary analyte.  Such an approach is able to specify the domestic ideational 
variables that intervene between system structure and foreign policy outcomes, and 
to assess the interaction of the international system with the internal dynamics of 
states in seeking to explain the grand strategic outcomes that result from systemic 
change.  What follows sets out this approach by formulating a neoclassical realist 
model of grand strategy formation with specific reference to the role of ideas.   
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What Is „Grand Strategy‟? 
Like many of the key notions of International Relations, ‗grand strategy‘ is both 
commonly used and instinctively understood, yet at the same time the concept 
evades unanimous agreement as to its precise meaning.  Indeed, it often appears that 
there are as many differing definitions as there are authors on the subject, each 
incorporating for their own purposes various nuances.
15
  Since grand strategy resists 
a single, rigid definition there seems little need to attempt yet another one here.
16
  
Instead what follows is an overview of the historical progress of the concept, as 
much to separate it from what it is not as to affirm what it is, and from which we 
may derive some general insights about the nature of grand strategy in the 
international system. 
Historically, statesmen used certain principles to guide their actions in the often 
uncertain and anarchic world of the international system, developing identities and 
postures for their nations in often violent competition with others.  These strategies, 
rather than setting out day-to-day operational matters, governed the overall course to 
which those operations were directed.  The early history of strategy is therefore 
concerned solely with military campaigns, and was distinguished by Clausewitz 
from tactics, which  ―is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using 
battles to win the war.‖
17
 
Just as tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, military strategy was an 
application on a lower plane of grand strategy, which encompassed not only military 
means and ends, but the means and ends of politics, economics and ideology, in 
short all the aspects of power and influence at a nation‘s – and therefore, a 
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statesman‘s – disposal.
18
  Drawing on its Clausewitzian heritage, the focus of grand 
strategy continued to be the conduct of war.  Yet true to its status as the highest form 
of strategy and the most crucial task of statecraft, there developed an understanding 
that grand strategy was a complex and multilayered undertaking, involving much 
more than just fighting and winning wars.
19
  In an observation that was critical to the 
expansion of the concept, Basil Liddel Hart insisted that since ―the object in war is a 
better state of peace… it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace 
you desire‖.
20
  Since military ends are solely means to broader political ends, grand 
strategy required assessment and consideration of the political context both before 
and during conflict.  To be successful, grand strategy therefore needed to integrate 
―the politics and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either rendered 
unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.‖
21
 
The trend in the development of the concept of grand strategy was therefore towards 
both the integration of more multifarious objects than solely military ones and the 
extension of its scope beyond simply the conduct of war.  Grand strategy was to 
involve ―the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or 
even centuries‖ in order to balance means and ends both in peacetime and wartime.  
Such a broad remit for grand strategy required it to take into consideration factors as 
diverse as managing national resources; diplomacy; national morale and political 
culture.
22
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―The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the 
nation‘s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-
military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation‘s long-term (that is, 
in wartime and peacetime) best interests.‖
23
 
The extension of the concept reflected a trend in IR more generally that condemned 
neorealism‘s definition of security as too narrow and its characterisation of those 
elements of power with which security could be achieved as too capabilities-centred.  
Since realist thought, by focusing on the systemic level, ―tended to neglect patterns 
of domestic support and economic strength that might affect long term commitment 
to a deterrent, containment, or balance of power strategy‖, the theoretical 
understanding of grand strategy needed to be modified to take account of those 
factors.
24
  The peaceful end of the Cold War reinforced the idea that grand strategy 
need not ultimately rely on recourse to war, and that economic and ‗soft-power‘ 
means were as important elements as military power.
25
 
Inevitably, realist authors countered that if the concept was to retain its analytical 
usefulness, it needed to focus on specific threats to the survival of the state and the 
military means to counter them.
26
  Yet in the post-Cold War world it had become 
clear that both the range of threats and interests and the variety of strategic tools 
used to meet them were far broader than such restrictive definitions.  Indeed, realist 
accounts focused solely on what Posen instead described as military doctrine, which 
in his view represented just one subset of grand strategy that sets priorities among 
military forces and prescribes how they should be structured to achieve the ends in 
view.  Realism‘s narrow focus on military threats, hard power and systemic 
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imperatives failed to understand the extent to which a state‘s grand strategy 
represents ―a political-military means-ends chain, a state‘s theory about how it can 
best ―cause‖ security for itself.‖
27
   
Undeterred, some authors (and it is implicit in Posen‘s political-military 
characterisation above) require that grand strategy must include at least the 
possibility of the use of force.
28
  Yet few would deny that it is possible to have a 
grand strategy of neutrality that is explicitly focused around a refusal to use force 
internationally.  Similarly, states living under a security umbrella are surely able to 
pursue their own grand-strategic goals quite separately from the military force that 
remains their ultimate security.  So whilst in most cases military policy instruments 
will be important elements of a state‘s grand strategy, they are by no means 
necessarily so. 
An alternative route of attack on the multifaceted conception of grand strategy holds 
that non-military instruments, whilst undoubtedly important to statecraft, should not 
be treated as elements of grand strategy in order to preserve the ―useful distinction‖ 
between grand strategy and foreign policy, which includes all of the goals and all of 
the instruments of statecraft.
29
  This however, is to misconceive of where the 
distinction, or certainly the usefulness, lies.  Grand strategy is public policy, but it is 
a normative process, one that is theoretical and idealised in nature.
30
  Foreign policy 
is the practical medium through which the stated ends of grand strategy are pursued 
using the means prescribed.  It is contingent, a process of very real diplomacy, 
debate and compromise.  Therefore, one can consider foreign policy successful to 
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the extent that it manages to achieve in practice the ideals set out in theory by grand 
strategy.  Grand strategy and foreign policy are therefore flip-sides of the same coin: 
one is assessed in terms of the big picture, the other in terms of nitty-gritty detail; 
one makes judgements based on ceteris paribus, the other in ever-shifting 
circumstances; where one marks out the field, decides the object of the game and 
sets the rules, and the other takes to the field to play ball.  It is in this sense that 
foreign policy begins where grand strategy stops, and it is a distinction that is far 
more useful than arguing over which instruments belong to which concept. 
Of course, the realities and contingencies of foreign policy necessitate a process of 
continuing strategic reassessment.  Foreign policy contingencies and shifting 
international conditions constitute a feedback loop in which both the validity of 
strategic assumptions, the desirability of strategic goals and the suitability of 
strategic means are continually reconsidered.  So although the formulation of grand 
strategy itself is essentially a theoretical and normative activity, it is an activity that 
is constantly being informed by empirical facts.  This presents some difficulties for 
scholars of International Relations, in particular concerning how we identify what 
really is grand strategy.  If the day-to-day ―stuff‖ of foreign policy only sometimes 
achieves its strategic goals it cannot be thought of as an especially reliable indicator 
of the prevailing strategy.  Similarly, it is difficult to be sure whether normative 
documentary evidence represents strategic thinking when foreign policy 
contingencies may require compromise.  Thus scholars face the dilemma that the 
study of grand strategy is a study of intentions that cannot necessarily be expected to 
be reflected in a coherence of outcomes. 
However, whilst the day-to-day contingencies of foreign policy may obscure and 
confuse, over time consistencies become evident which betray strategy.  Indeed, 
even if states do not actually have a plan, they act as if they do.
31
  Similarly there is 
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no shortage of normative material both internal and external to the state debating 
what strategy the state should adopt.  It would seem unreasonable to assume that 
despite this desire for strategy the policies that states actually pursue are universally 
ad hoc.  Indeed, the congruence of that normative material with the evolving 
historical record lends further weight to the identification of grand strategy.  And if 
we understand that grand strategy and foreign policy exist in a feedback loop, grand 
strategy becomes something we must infer from the record of the past, ―a project of 
historical scholarship and deductive reasoning, doing our best to connect the dots to 
see what kind of pictures are made.‖
32
  So whilst the causal link between a 
theoretical grand strategy and a state‘s foreign policy may not be logically necessary 
and IR scholars should caution against assigning strategic goals where there may be 
none, sound research and historical analysis should be able to establish the 
connection.   
From this overview of the history of the concept of grand strategy a number of 
conclusions may be drawn.  When we speak of grand strategy as an analytical 
concept, we are speaking of that considered set of national policies in peace and war 
that aim to set the goals of the state in the international environment.  These policies 
also set out how a broad range of national resources should be utilised in pursuit of 
those goals.  The study of grand strategy is therefore the study of states‘ preferred 
ends and means of foreign policy, of their attitude to international politics – it deals 
with how states mobilise which elements of their power in pursuit of which causes in 
global politics. 
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Theorising Strategic Ideas 
Historians have always known that ideas matter in the conduct of international 
politics.  The rich descriptions of diplomatic historians tell of statesmen agonising 
over choices in their own minds, and how the advocacy of thinkers impacted on 
events.
33
  The difficulty for IR has been to describe just how ideas come to matter, to 
devise theories that isolate amorphous ideas from discrete facts and define the 
relations between the two.  However, the tendency of International Relations to 
construct itself as a social science along the more definite lines of economics has 
profoundly hindered attempts to integrate ideas.  As Dahl notes, ―because of their 
concern with rigor and their dissatisfaction with the ‗softness‘ of historical 
description, generalization, and explanation, most social scientists have turned away 
from the historical movement of ideas.  As a result their own theories, however 
‗rigorous‘ they may be, leave out an important explanatory variable and often lead to 
naïve reductionism.‖
34
 
Since the end of the Cold War however, a renewed interest in the role of ideas in IR 
has begun to redress that failing, through both the work of constructivist scholars 
and neoclassical realists.  The following section considers realism‘s prioritising of 
the material over the ideational before considering constructivism‘s approach to 
ideas, concluding that neither has adequately conceptualised the interaction of the 
material and the ideational in international relations.  It then sets out a positivist 
understanding of ideas that justifies underpins a neoclassical realist approach to the 
role of ideas in grand strategy formation. 
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Realism and Ideas 
Realism‘s dominance of international relations theory during the Cold War was 
highly prejudicial to the analysis of the role of ideas, yet this stemmed from a 
misreading of the works of classical realists, and Hans Morgenthau in particular.  
Realism is first and foremost a philosophical position, with modern variants of 
realist theory tracing their lineage from the writings of Thucydides through to 
Hobbes and Machiavelli.
35
  Whilst we might admit that, as Frankel argues, ―there is 
no single realist theory of international relations‖ and that rather ―there is a family of 
realist theories and explanations, differing from each other in the importance they 
assign to different variables‖, there are key assumptions that characterise realist 
philosophy and so realist International Relations theory.
36
  This philosophy is 
pessimistic about the human condition, rejects teleological notions of political 
progress and regards ethics and morality as largely products of power.  From its 
assessment of humans in the state of nature realism identifies competition for 
resources among tribal groups as the most basic feature of social organisation, which 
is therefore defined by the facts of power.
37
  Classical realists therefore build upon 
the foundations of this attitude towards human nature to derive a set of principles 
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about the nature of international politics, to argue that ―politics, like society in 
general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.‖
38
  The 
state in the international system is analogous to man in the state of nature; thus 
international politics is most fundamentally about power, which is accrued, defended 
and wielded only in pursuit of the national interest defined as national security, the 
nature of which can be identified and assessed in terms of material capabilities.  The 
international system has no sovereign and is therefore anarchic, and so state action 
within it can be reduced to the national interest: thus the security of the nation-state 
is the sole determinant of foreign policy.
39
   
Classical realist works are therefore not in any sense congested with enthusiastic 
championing of the ability of ideas to shape international politics.  Indeed, the 
original title for EH Carr‘s Twenty Years Crisis was Utopia and Reality, and Carr‘s 
project was to demolish the idea that international politics could be subjugated to the 
force of human reason.
40
  Yet at the same time classical realists see realism as a 
necessary corrective to the dangerous naivety of idealism, not as a replacement for 
it; indeed it is because the classical realists saw the impact ideas can have on 
international politics that they cautioned statesmen to abide by the more stable 
maxims of power.  The realist‘s task then, is to balance those imperatives of power 
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with the demands of ideas and ethics.
41
  Thus Machiavelli spoke of the virtù of the 
statesman himself, and both Morgenthau and Carr saw moral precepts in basic 
international norms, amongst domestic populations and as goals of states.  Classical 
realists therefore understood that ideas and culture could have ―a profound effect on 
the strategic behaviour of states.‖
42
   
At the individual level, Morgenthau identifies ideas as sources of change, since 
―when people see things in a new light, they may act in a new way.‖
43
  Indeed, 
Morgenthau‘s Aristotelian conception of human agency and his emphasis on both 
the virtue of prudence and diplomacy suggests a more complex picture of the role of 
ideas in international politics than he is often credited with having held.
44
  Politics 
Among Nations offers numerous examples of states with incongruous political power 
and material capabilities, a gap deriving from the abilities of their leaders, for whom 
the strategies and tactics used to convert the potential attributes power into influence 
are as important as the attributes themselves.
45
  The role of the statesmen was 
therefore to mitigate the more turbulent forces of anarchy through wise leadership, 
to moderate power and pursue peace.  As Morgenthau writes, diplomacy is the 
instrument of peace through accommodation: 
―Of all the factors which make for the power of a nation, the most important, 
and the more unstable, is the quality of diplomacy.  All the other factors which 
determine national power are, as it were, the raw material out of which the 
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power of a nation is fashioned.  The quality of a nation‘s diplomacy combines 
those different factors into an integrated whole, gives them direction and weight, 
and awakens their slumbering potentialities by giving them the breadth of actual 
power.  The conduct of a nation‘s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national 
power in peace what military strategy and tactics are for national power in war.  
It is the art of bringing the different elements of the national power to bear with 
the maximum effect upon those points in the international situation that concern 
that national interest most directly.‖
46
 
EH Carr too, recognised the ability of statesmen to mediate anarchy through 
normative power, or what he called the power over opinion, and saw that rhetoric – 
―the art of persuasion‖ – has always been ―part of the equipment of a political 
leader‖ in mobilising the minds of men alongside the material elements of military 
and economic might.
47
  Carr therefore offers the hope that not only is ―there is 
something which man ought to think and do, but that there is something which he 
can think and do, and that his thought and action are neither mechanical nor 
meaningless.‖
48
  Carr sees a role for ideas at the domestic level in the use of 
propaganda and the education of the nation: ―the state which provides the education 
necessarily determines its content.  No state will allow its future citizens to imbibe in 
its schools teaching subversive of the principles on which it is based.‖
49
  Ideas, 
classical realists knew, are powerful things, and power over them is one of the 
greatest assets a state can procure for itself.  Indeed, the basic moral ideas that 
statesmen themselves hold precludes them from even considering certain means and 
ends, a process which could ―tame‖ the national interest and moderate self-interest 
and conflict.
50
  Morgenthau therefore argues that beyond the irreducible minimum of 
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the survival of the state, statesmen would take into account the cultural and moral 
ideas of their people to pursue goals which could ―run the whole gamut of objectives 
any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.‖
51
 
Carr‘s analysis that the most influential ideas have been based on professedly 
universal principles also allows that ideas may operate at the international level, 
moving across borders as tools or effects of foreign policy, but only successfully 
when backed in some way by national political power.
52
  In addition, Carr identifies 
a ―general sense of obligation‖, a norm that operates between states, thus rendering 
treaties and agreements useful elements of international politics.
53
  Similarly, both 
Kissinger and Morgenthau grant a role to the generation of legitimacy, and wrote 
approvingly of the international society of the European royal families, whose 
aristocratic ideals moderated competition.
54
  So conceptions of justice do matter in 
international politics, and the production of peaceful change in that arena involves a 
compromise between utopian ideas of common right and realist adjustments to shifts 
in the balance of power.
55
  In this sense, the international environment is composed 
not just of the distribution of power but also a climate of ideas, which contains 
certain moral values with enough force to delimit ―the sphere of possible political 
interests itself‖.
56
 
Thus even the most strident classical realists do not regard the accumulation of 
power for the purposes of national survival as the only logic of realism.  
Machiavelli, for example, is emphatically not a determinist who views power as 
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impelling action, instead insisting that necessity narrows the range of alternatives to 
which statesmen may apply their wisdom and exercise choice.
57
  Niebuhr also 
admits the possibility that states may ―do justice to wider interests than their own, 
while they pursue their own.‖
58
  Although in the international order ―the role of 
power is greater and that of morality less‖, Carr accepts that in some cases ideas of 
morality can trump concerns of power to result in ―self-sacrifice‖ on the part of the 
state.
59
  As Barkin notes: 
―The classical realists argued quite explicitly that moral ideals are a necessary 
part of the practice of international politics and that political realism in the 
absence of morality, in the absence of a vision of utopia, is both sterile and 
pointless.‖
60
   
For classical realists then, what happens at the levels of the state and the individual, 
what Waltz called the first and second images, matters.
61
  It is for this reason that 
classical realists are political advocates, whose critical role is to ―speak truth to 
power‖ and unmask relations of domination that are concealed by the moral rhetoric 
of statesmen.
62
 
There is therefore the theoretical space within classical realism for the integration of 
ideas, first at the unit level as part of its stress on political judgement, and 
secondarily between states as a product of the interactions of those judgements.  
Michael Williams has attempted to emphasise the impact of ideas within 
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Morgenthau‘s writings, with particular focus on the role of ideas in identity 
formation and the construction of the national interest.
63
  Similarly, Smith notes that 
how a statesman ―defines the national interest depends on the values he espouses 
and the way he ranks them.‖
64
  Yet Williams stretches the point when he regard the 
role of ideas in classical realist thought as ―crucial‖.
65
  Morgenthau repeatedly 
argued against the ―sentimental illusion‖ that America‘s Cold War rivalry was a 
struggle between good and evil, and regarded such ideologising of the national 
interest as potentially hazardous to its effective construction and pursuit.  Whilst 
Morgenthau doesn‘t regard the national interest as a fixed, impenetrable entity, and 
requires political actors to make difficult choices in order to identify and pursue it, 
he like other classical realists is concerned to make the point that the task of the 
statesman is to discover and act upon the national interest defined as material 
power.
66
  That ideas may impact upon international relations is not in doubt, but the 
extent that they do, Aron notes, creates dangerous utopias that serve ―as an excuse, 
not an inspiration‖ for wilful leaders who ―desired power as an instrument of their 
own glory.‖
67
  Morgenthau‘s rejoinder that ―all politics is power politics‖
68
 therefore 
remains an accurate summary of classical realist thought, affirming that the object of 
all politics is power whilst nevertheless implying that power is not the only feature 
of politics.   
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Neorealist theory or structural realism in contrast, prioritises the third image above 
all others, attributing security competition to the absence of any overarching 
authority in the international system and regarding the distribution of power between 
states as the only object of analysis in international politics.  For neorealists, 
international politics consists of ‗like units‘ – states – duplicating one another‘s 
activities – their functional similarity rendering variations between states at the unit 
level irrelevant to explaining the international outcomes of interaction between 
them.  It is solely the nature and structure of the system within which those units 
coexist that determines their behaviour and mediates outcomes.
69
  Thus ―wars occur 
because there is nothing to prevent them.‖
70
  So although classical realists held a 
healthy scepticism of the rhetoric of statesmen, believing that ―the true nature of the 
policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalisations‖, neorealists on 
the other hand consider the politics of states to be fundamentally irrelevant.
71
  
Dismissing ―ideology, form of government, peacefulness, bellicosity or whatever‖, 
what makes international relations tick is nothing more than the ―distribution of 
capabilities‖.
72
 
Such a rigid view of state motivation coincided neatly with the apparently zero-sum 
nature of Cold War bipolarity and is distinguished from classical realism in an 
important sense by its relinquishing of the critical responsibility of scholarship.  
Indeed, the logic of this pure form of realism is so highly determined that it entails 
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that policy choice can only arise ever in two scenarios.  First, in situations where 
calculations of particular considerations balance equally, presenting alternatives with 
identical impacts on the security of the state, in which case the choice is arbitrary; 
and second where imperfect information creates gaps in the assessment of the 
national interest which are filled by competing sets of conjecture and supposition, in 
which case the choice is unwelcome, being a function of ignorance rather than 
knowledge.   
This determinism of structural realism, its prioritising of the third image and 
material interest and its assumption that power is both the means and end of political 
action effectively renders ideas ―impotent if they depart from the interest that 
polities have in power.‖
73
  Thus the dominant realist view throughout the twentieth 
century regarded ideology as nothing more than ―pretexts and false fronts behind 
which the element of power, inherent in all politics, can be concealed.‖
74
   
However, realism‘s insistence on the perpetual priority of the pursuit of power and 
the divorce of political rhetoric from empirical reality faced difficulties in the shape 
of important historical anomalies.  Stephen Krasner isolated a number of cases in 
American foreign policy that could not be explained in terms of strategic interests, 
that is, protecting the territorial and political integrity of the state, and saw instead a 
‗politics of ideology‘ that drove American leaders to go beyond pursuing interests 
and to attempt instead to impose their vision upon the world.
75
  ―A belief in how 
society ought to be ordered was more powerful than material concerns.  In Pareto‘s 
terminology, American policy was nonlogical.‖
76
  Similarly, IR approached 
obviously and explicitly ideological foreign policies as anomalous results to which 
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explanatory theory had no applicability. In the case of Nazi Germany, ―ideology was 
victorious over other considerations‖
77
 and as such its foreign policy ―must always 
be analysed in the light of Hitler's inflexible Weltanschauung.‖
78
  Similar analysis 
was applied to the ideological nature of the Soviet Union, where foreign policy 
―reflected ideology in ways that resist alternative explanations.‖
79
  Yet rather than 
take seriously the role of ideas in policy formulation, the idiosyncrasies of these 
cases were accounted for by their failure to comply with the rational actor model.  
Hence for Gaddis, 
―there seems to have been something about authoritarians that caused them to 
lose touch with reality.  Being a communist provided no greater safeguard 
against tilting at windmills than being a fascist.  The explanation is not difficult 
to discern: autocratic systems reinforce, while discouraging attempts to 
puncture, whatever quixotic illusions may exist at the top.‖
80
   
Essentially, the argument was that realism, in making the reasonable and necessary 
assumption that actors are rational, couldn‘t be expected to account for madmen 
gaining control of countries, and so its general explanatory power wasn‘t 
compromised by the policies of a Hitler or a Stalin.  However, this type of analysis 
begs the question.  At what point do actors cease to be non-rational, and just start 
being different?  The danger is that rational action is defined as political realism, so 
that foreign policy that does not conform to realist tenets is a priori non-rational.  
Realism can‘t explain ideological foreign policy because it is not realist.   
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Moreover, neorealism‘s attitude towards the force of ideas is condemned by aspects 
of the self-image of the doctrine itself.  For classical realists, realism is not only the 
theory that best explains international politics, it is also the best guide for 
policymakers.  For Morgenthau, ―political realism contains not only a theoretical but 
also a normative element.... [it] considers a rational foreign policy to be a good 
foreign policy… [it] wants the photographic picture of the political world to 
resemble as much as possible its painted portrait.‖
81
  Realism then, is both an 
explanatory theory and a normative theory.  The ideas contained within realism not 
only explain international politics, but should also inform the decision-making of 
policymakers. 
The paradox of neorealism‘s treatment of ideas is that as an explanatory theory it 
cannot account for the normative influence of its own doctrine on the actions of 
states.  This is the crux of Krasner‘s complaint that social scientists were offering 
policy advice to decision-makers ―when there was nothing in their theories that 
would [lead them to believe they could] do any good‖.
82
  If ideas are merely for 
rhetorical purposes, then why urge statesmen to adhere to the ideas of realism?  If, 
on the other hand, the ideas contained in realism‘s foreign policy prescriptions can 
shape the world so that it more perfectly resembles the theoretical image, how can 
those ideas be dismissed as lacking the power to affect international affairs?  Thus 
the explicit expression of a normative element in realism necessarily undermines its 
explanatory power so long as the influence of ideas is denied. 
Kenneth Waltz, for his part, has always maintained that it is logically inappropriate 
to ask structural realism to account for foreign policy outcomes.
83
  For Waltz, 
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structure affects behaviour in the system only indirectly, through pervasive (i.e. 
systemic) processes of socialisation and competition.  Thus it is improper to expect 
to find direct causal links from international structure to state behaviour in the day-
to-day deliberations of foreign policy elites.
84
  Neorealism for Waltz is concerned 
with explaining common patterns of international behaviour over time – it aims to 
explain broad patterns of systemic outcomes rather than the individual outcomes of 
the units within the system. 
This distinction may be conceptually neat, but the application of such system-unit 
theoretical incompatibility to international relations is far from the clear-cut case that 
the relatively unchallenged nature of Waltz‘s assertion suggests.  In order for 
theories of system to be logically distinct from theories of the behaviour of units 
within the system, the system must contain its own theoretical logic, that is, for there 
to be logical interrelations between systemic features that are independent from the 
units themselves.  But the only logical claim that neorealism makes for the 
international system revolves around the nature of international anarchy, a concept 
which is hardly uncontested, and which the units within the system mediate, or at 
least attempt to.  Thus the separation of system logic and unit logic is at best 
unproven, and we should not allow it to obstruct opportunities for further advances 
in knowledge that attempt to specify the causal linkages between environmental 
conditions and the behaviour of units making up that system.
85
 
A neoclassical realist theory of ideas therefore seeks to revive the insights of 
classical realism about the first and second images of international politics in order 
to treat domestic political ideas as intervening variables between systemic 
imperatives and unit-level behaviour.  Before considering how such a theory can be 
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constructed it is important to establish why the other major theoretical approach that 
attempts to integrate ideas into a systemic theory is unsatisfactory. 
The False Promise of Constructivism 
The end of the Cold War served to bring the role of ideas in international relations to 
the forefront of the discipline of international relations.  The failure to predict the 
demise of bipolarity, and moreover the fact that the Cold War‘s end was peaceful 
rather than violent, left realism questioning its core insights and explanatory power, 
and raised questions about the methods that international relations scholars had 
developed for understanding world politics.
86
  The explanations for why ―we‖ got 
the end of the Cold War wrong might have been internal to the nature of Soviet 
studies in the West, but the intellectual blame was directed most obviously at 
realism‘s failures to account for processes within states.
87
  During the 1980s, 
although there had been little change in the capabilities indexes proposed by Waltz, 
there had, according to some analysts, been ―an important change in ideas as the 
Soviet Union abandoned its threatening expansionary ideology.‖
88
  Realists were 
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slow to defend themselves against this raft of new literature that regarded its 
theoretical power as flawed, and as a result, alternative approaches to the discipline 
began to take hold in the contemporary debate.
89
  The foremost approach invigorated 
in the early 1990s by the debate over the end of the Cold War was social 
constructivism, which began to discard the positivist, materialist philosophical 
assumptions of realist approaches to international relations altogether to conclude 
that the very meaning of power and the content of interests are functions of ideas.
90
   
Perhaps the most important contribution to understanding the role of ideas in IR that 
constructivism makes is its emphasis on the importance of identities alongside 
interests in establishing durable expectations of behaviour between states.
91
  The 
interests of a particular state can only be properly understood as products of that 
state‘s identity, and both state identities and interests are in important part 
constructed by the social structures between states.
92
  Thus the interaction with other 
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states that constitutes those social structures is constantly shaping states‘ social 
identities and consequent interests.   
Ideas also play a role in the definition and establishment of norms and rules that 
regulate the structure of international society.  Rather than enmity, competition and 
security dilemmas being inevitable features of the anarchic condition of international 
order, shared ideas are the building blocks of interaction that transforms anarchy into 
―what states make of it‖.
93
  Rules are central to that interaction, which is responsible 
for the co-constitution of people and society.  Rules ―define agents in terms of 
structures, and structures in terms of agents… as rules change in number, kind, 
relation and content, they constantly redefine agents and structures, always in terms 
of each other.‖
94
   
For constructivists then, it is the complex interrelations of agents, rules and structure 
that constitute international society.  In that society, ―notions of what is right or 
wrong, feasible or infeasible, indeed possible or impossible, are all part of an actor‘s 
social context, and it is these ideas that shape what actors want, who actors are, and 
how actors behave‖.
95
  Ideas define the identities of agents and the rules of structure, 
and agents and structure are mutually constitutive.  Thus the ―key structures of the 
international system are intersubjective; rather than material‖.  The result is a form 
of structural idealism or ―idea-ism‖ that stands in direct opposition to the core 
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structural claims of realism.
96
  This dichotomy resides in the two approaches‘ 
competing epistemological and ontological perspectives. 
Constructivism‘s critical focus on the limitations of prevailing empiricist 
epistemology and materialist ontology has certainly widened the theoretical scope of 
IR.
97
  Significantly, realists were forced to defend their core assumptions.  However, 
representatives of the two schools were unable to agree upon the terms of debate.  
For Mearsheimer, the two approaches ―have fundamentally different epistemologies 
and ontologies, which are the most basic levels at which theories can be compared… 
where realists see a fixed and knowable world, critical theorists see the possibility of 
endless interpretations of the world before them.‖
98
  In response, Wendt described 
the requirement to make a clean distinction between subject and object as a ―naïve 
epistemology‖ rejected by ―almost all philosophers of science today.‖
99
  Essentially 
Mearsheimer and Wendt, serving as representatives of realism and constructivism, 
were arguing past each other; since their core disagreement derives from their 
incommensurable epistemologies neither of their theories was in a logical position 
from which it could legitimately critique the other.   
Constructivism then appears to have provided a total alternative to realism rather 
than superseding it.  Indeed, constructivism has regularly been listed alongside 
postpositivist approaches as an example of reflectivism or interpretivism in the 
discipline, viewing issues from a totally different angle to the rationalism of 
positivist theories such as realism.
100
  Against this, some have argued that 
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constructivism holds an objectivist ontology and that much constructivist work, far 
from rejecting the belief that we can gain objective knowledge of that world, 
actually maintains a wholly conventional epistemology.
101
  Such a position suggests 
that constructivism has the potential to bridge the chasm that separates mainstream 
International Relations from postmodernist scholarship.
102
  
However, it is difficult to reconcile Wendt‘s claim that when IR scholars explain 
―state action by reference to interests, they are actually explaining it by reference to 
a certain kind of idea‖ with any kind of conventional epistemology, for this position 
appears to deny that there are empirically knowable material facts per se.  Further, if 
material interests are actually explained by ideas, it is difficult to comprehend 
exactly how ―the true ‗material base‘ can still have independent effects‖.
103
  Indeed, 
the use of the word ‗true‘ implies a two-tiered epistemological approach to the 
empirical world, one where some material facts can be known and others can be 
known only by means of the ideas that constitute them. 
If ideas are ―inextricably involved in the production of interests‖
104
 it is futile to 
distinguish between the two.  Indeed, it is tempting to agree with one critic that 
Wendt is ―seeking a synthesis of rationalism and constructivism on his own 
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antimaterialist and holist terms‖.
105
  Constructivism‘s fundamental rejection of the 
positivist ―conceptual tool kit‖
106
 leads to the same problem of reductionism as pure 
realism suffers in mirror-image – where structural realism reduces all ideas to 
interest, constructivism reduces material interests to ideas.   
There have been attempts to integrate the undoubted insights of constructivist 
scholarship with realist thought.
107
  However, the epistemological basis for doing so 
has not been established, and although constructivism can help us understand that 
identities, norms and rules are endogenous to system structure, in doing so it is 
compelled to regard the distribution of material capabilities as an essentially 
exogenous factor.  Where realism states that ideas don‘t matter, constructivism tells 
us that material capabilities aren‘t important.  Neither can capture the sense in which 
both ideas and interests play roles – sometimes competing, sometimes 
complementary – in formulating the direction of states‘ foreign policy and the 
structure of the international system.  In order to do so, what is required is an 
epistemological approach to ideas that allows their influence to be assessed 
alongside the force of material capabilities. 
A Positivist Conception Of Ideas 
This thesis proposes that a neoclassical realist approach to the study of grand 
strategy can integrate the impact of ideas alongside the imperatives of material 
power in the making of foreign policy, rejecting the notion that either ideas or 
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material factors are somehow ‗most fundamental‘ and therefore deserving of 
analytic focus to the exclusion of the other.  As Keohane puts it, ―creating this 
dichotomy is a bit like arguing whether the heart or the brain is most fundamental to 
life.‖
108
  However, both the definitional status and conceptual implications of the 
term ‗idea‘ are, to put it mildly, the subject of some debate.  To date, no single 
definition has emerged, nor is there agreement on the causal roles ideas play in 
political processes.
109
  Unfortunately, in much of the literature the necessity of clear 
definition is either ignored and the assumption of definitional transparency 
erroneously made; or the term is confusingly equated and used interchangeably with, 
variously, ‗belief‘, ‗ideology‘, ‗theory‘, ‗models‘, ‗schools of thought‘ and even 
‗intellectual idiosyncrasies‘.
110
  In order to integrate ideas into a neoclassical 
approach that focuses on grand strategy we need to construct a rationalist, positivist 
approach that is both clear about how it defines its terms and rigorous about the 
accuracy of their application.   
First, and contrary to what some have suggested, it is important that ideas and 
interests are maintained as conceptually distinct phenomena.
111
  Although many 
ideas that people hold reflect their interests, and it may even be the case that an 
individual holds an idea because it is in their interest to do so, these are not reasons 
to logically conflate ideas with interests.  There is no logical impediment to our 
holding ideas that directly contradict our interests, and that therefore the two should 
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remain conceptually distinct.
112
  Indeed, in rejecting the subjectivism underpinning 
constructivist approaches, it is crucial that neoclassical realists require that interests, 
in contrast to ideas, are those things that we can know as material facts about the 
world and which constitute power relations between states.  They are those things 
that a state must secure if it is to maintain its place in the balance-of-power.   
The idea that there is an independent reality directly available to state officials and 
analysts is not an uncontroversial one.  It has been suggested that even the 
identification of a state‘s material interests is a process that requires ―significant 
interpretive labour‖.
113
  Certainly there is something to this criticism, yet even were 
this always the case, and it is by no means clear that it is, we should not derive the 
conclusion that material interests are unknowable, that the concept is not a useful 
one.  Instead we should seek to isolate the material from the ideational, to identify 
how particular ideas provide context within which states pursue their paramount 
objective of securing those things they identify as key material interests. 
The second mistake that rationalist approaches have tended to make to date is that 
they identify ideas with beliefs, a definition that confuses far more than it 
clarifies.
114
  The same authors that define ideas as ―beliefs held by individuals‖ 
claim that ―ideas can have an impact even when no one genuinely believes in 
them.‖
115
  Such thinking invites the criticism that for this to be the case, ‗ideas‘ must 
be distinct from the ‗beliefs‘ without which they can still have impact.
116
  This 
                                                 
112
 The philosophy of human altruism makes this case.  See Samir Okasha, "Biological Altruism", in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003). 
113
 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 7. 
114
 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993), 11. 
115
 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", 
in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca : Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 3, 20. 
116
 Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief", 206. 
 49 
critique erroneously assumes that for something to be a belief, at least someone 
needs to believe in it.  This is transparently not the case.  To say that one does not 
believe x is to say that one does believe x‘s negation.  Yet it makes little sense to 
say, even on the basis of universal disbelief, that a statement is not a belief but it‘s 
negation is.  Despite the failure of this critique however, the shared belief 
characterisation is fundamentally weakened by the fact that by defining ideas as 
beliefs we remove their power.  A rationalist approach to ideas envisages ideas as 
having force alongside material interests, but by defining ideas as mere beliefs it 
becomes difficult to see them as (effective) weapons in policy debates.
117 
  
Insisting on the distinctions between ideas and interests on the one hand and ideas 
and beliefs on the other does not however entail that each may not interact with or 
influence the others.  Ideas may fill gaps in policymakers‘ knowledge of interests.
118
  
Ideas can establish the framework within which interests are pursued and resolve 
uncertainty about how to pursue them.  Thus, for Weber, ―not ideas, but material and 
ideal interests, directly govern men‘s conduct.  Yet very frequently the ‗world 
images‘ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks  
along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.‖
119
  Similarly, 
Goldstein and Keohane‘s ‗typology of belief‘ provides us with an indication of how 
individuals‘ worldviews and ethical ideas may prioritise certain ideas over others or 
lead them to particular ideas.
120 
  
Phenomenological separation of ideas, beliefs and interests allows us to isolate three 
very specific types of ideas involved in policy formulation.  The first, scientific 
ideas, tell us about how the world works.  Scientific ideas establish the relations 
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between things in the international environment.  Examples might include the 
stopping power of water, or the idea that liberal democracies will not go to war with 
each other.  These ideas establish the boundaries of possibility for state strategies by 
describing and interpreting the relations of empirical realities in the international 
system. 
Second, what one might call intentional ideas, are normative suggestions that seek to 
establish goals for foreign policy.  These types of ideas reflect ethical prejudices on 
the part of their proponents.  They articulate in the realm of foreign policy what the 
nation should seek to do, simply because it is the right thing to do.  For example, a 
state may seek to use its foreign policy to advance the cause of human rights.  It 
should be noted that this is not the same as it being in that state‘s interests to 
promote human rights.  Whilst intentional ideas that run counter to the national 
interest are less likely to gain support among either elites, bureaucracies or the 
national public, there is nothing inherent in the concept that says that they may not – 
the separation of ideas and interests renders this a contingent rather than logical 
relation.  So rather than seeing, for example, financial aid to impoverished countries 
in terms of powerful countries wielding economic power for their own ends, or 
alternatively as part of a process that constitutes the social identities of rich and poor 
countries, a neoclassical realist approach allows us to view aid as an intentional idea 
translated into policy because it is simply considered by a state‘s foreign policy 
executive as the right thing to do. 
Third are what one might call operational ideas.  These may be scientific or 
normative statements that recommend the means by which a certain end should be 
pursued.  As in the case of intentional ideas they may be based on ethical 
judgements, but they more often arise from the holding of a particular causal belief 
about how which policies produce which outcomes.  A neoclassical realist account 
might therefore explain the differing approaches of states towards similar threat by 
reference to differing operational ideas as much as differing coercive capabilities.   
 51 
Apart from creating a typology of what ideas are, the other question that neoclassical 
realism must address if it is to properly integrate ideas is how ideas work in the 
process of foreign policy to mediate structural pressures.  Why are some ideas 
adopted as policy where others founder?  What precipitates changes in prevailing 
ideas? 
The Intervening Variable: Ideas Within Nations 
A neoclassical realist approach might usefully require that ideas are treated as 
objects with force, that is, as elements of power.  However, it should be obvious that 
the relationship between ideas and power is rather different from the relationship 
between, say, money and power, or military hardware and power.  Whereas material 
capabilities‘ power is largely intrinsic and fixed, the power of an idea is both 
dependent and variable.  Therefore I suggest locations at which ideas may intervene 
at the unit level: through the specific individuals that hold them; through institutions 
in which they may become embedded; and through the broader culture of the state. 
Fundamentally the state is made up of individuals.  Individuals construct systems, 
institutions and bureaucracies; individuals lead and follow; individuals make 
decisions.  On what basis do individuals decide between competing ideas?  The first 
is the quality of the idea itself – it‘s internal coherence, it‘s congruence with known 
realities.  The second key to success resides in the speaker himself – his intellectual 
status, his eloquence of advocacy.  The power of an idea to persuade others at any 
one moment in history resides both in itself, and in the power of those who hold it.  
The causal effect of ideas on policies has tended to be displaced onto the political 
effects of individuals in IR theory.  The persuasiveness of ideas is assumed rather 
than examined, and treated as constant.
121
  It is however, important to recognise that 
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some ideas are ‗better‘ than others, and are more likely to progress into the 
policymaking arena, where institutional factors may then come into play.   
This however, is not to deny the crucial role of forces exogenous to them that push 
certain ideas to heart of policymaking.  Whilst the degree to which ideas generate 
popular support may provide them with power mediated through public opinion, 
ideas can take a shortcut to policy success if they have the backing of individuals 
and institutions that themselves have power.  The character of the ‗couriers‘ of ideas 
that may be as important, if not more so, than anything intrinsic to the idea itself.
122
  
At the individual level then, neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by 
powerful actors within the state matter.  Whilst the intrinsic power of a particular 
idea makes its progress into such positions more likely, the ideas that will impact 
most upon foreign policy are those held by those in decision-making positions in the 
state and those who directly advise them.  Thus as Mead notes, ―It matters who the 
President is.  If Theodore Roosevelt and not Woodrow Wilson had been President 
when World War I broke out, American and world history might have taken a very 
different turn.‖
123
  
The second location at which ideas may impact at the unit level occurs when 
individuals with shared ideas coalesce into groups, organisations, and common 
practices within the state to form institutions that operate in both formal and 
informal sectors of the policymaking process.  The formation of institutions reflects 
the fact that ideas that are somehow embedded in particular structures are possessed 
of greater power.  Institutions can act as couriers for ideas in three ways.
124
  
‗Epistemic communities‘ of experts have the policy-relevant knowledge to exert 
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influence on the positions adopted by a wide range of actors.  The extent of the 
influence of such groups is dependent on their ability to occupy influential positions 
within bureaucracies from where they may consolidate their power, thereby 
institutionalising the influence of the community.
125
  However, their ability to 
infiltrate bureaucratic posts will depend – at least in part – on the receptiveness of 
the existing bureaucratic order to their ideas.
126
 
A second means by which institutions act as couriers is by the encasing of ideas in 
formal rules and procedures at the creation of the institution itself.  Once they have 
become embedded in this way, those ideas with which the institution was founded 
can continue to influence policy even though the interests or ideas of their creators 
may have changed.  Thus, ―when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas can be 
prolonged for decades or even generations.‖
127
   
In both of these ways, ―ideas acquire force when they find organizational means of 
expression‖.
128
  The third way in which ideas can impact is through the structural 
arrangements institutions create.  These structures set up road-blocks and through-
routes which determine the ease with which ideas can gain access to the policy 
process.  Indeed, the structure of the institutional framework may determine the 
political and administrative ‗viability‘ of particular ideas, that is, their ability to 
appeal to current conditions.  Institutional structure therefore ensures that 
policymakers only have access to a limited set of ideas, whether those are percolated 
up to them or searched for by them.
129
  In this way, the ideas that form what some 
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refer to as ‗strategic culture‘ may provide a reliable guide to a state‘s likely reaction 
to shifts in the structure of the international system.
130
 
Underlying both individuals and institutions are the ideas contained in the broader 
cultural context within which the state is located.  Ideas that are embedded in social 
norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities become accepted, ―instinctual‖ 
parts of the social world and are experienced as part of a natural objective reality.
131
  
In this way cultural variables subconsciously set the limits and terms of debate for 
both individuals and institutions, and so have ―a profound effect on the strategic 
behaviour of states.‖
132
  Mediated through institutions and individuals who are 
blinded to potential alternatives, ideas embedded in national culture therefore has the 
potential to explain ―why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the 
international system.‖
133
   
The power of ideas therefore rests on ―the ability of believers in ideas to alter the 
costs and benefits facing those who are in a position to promote or hinder the 
policies that the ideas demand.‖
134
  In the process of foreign policy ‗engineering‘, 
organisations and the ideas they espouse or represent vie with one another for 
dominance and autonomy.
135
  Decisions taken reflect the process of formulating the 
choices to be presented.
136
  Throughout the process of making foreign policy 
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powerful ideas – whether that power resides in their couriers or is internal to the 
ideas themselves – are  prevailing over weaker ideas.
137
 
This conception fits with other neoclassical works that focus on the machinations of 
domestic politics as the intervening variable between systemic pressures and the 
production of unit-level responses.  Randall Schweller has been prominent in 
identifying the constraints that domestic political processes impose on states that 
cause them to ‗underbalance‘ in the face of external threats.
138
  Schweller‘s 
argument, although arguably more sophisticated, is similar to Zakaria‘s concept of 
‗state power‘ and Taliaferro‘s resource extraction model, in that they focus on the 
way in which domestic political processes affect the ability of the state to act in 
international politics.
139
  The implication of these types of account is that states with 
similar internal bureaucratic structures will address similar threats in similar ways.  
A theory of ideas however, whilst incorporating these insights about the character of 
domestic politics, focuses on how prevailing ideas influence the type of foreign 
policy response to structural imperatives.  It can therefore explain how similarly 
structured states may respond in different ways to similar threats by reference to 
differing prevailing ideas within the state, whether that be as a result of the particular 
individuals advocating the ideas, broader cultural preferences, national history or 
whatever.  The response as understood through the prism of ideas can then account 
for both overreaction and underreaction, as well as for the pursuit of goals unrelated 
to the notion of threat. 
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A Neoclassical Realist Model Of Grand Strategy Formation 
We have now set out both the scope of grand strategy and the way neoclassical 
realism should conceptualise the role of ideas in policymaking.  What follows is an 
analysis of the making of grand strategy.  How does grand strategy operate?  What‘s 
involved in the process of its formulation?  What determines the outcome of that 
process?  Why does it change?  These questions and the answers to them may serve 
to constitute the beginnings of a defined, systematic neoclassical realist approach 
that views states‘ grand strategies as its primary analyte and is able to specify the 
domestic ideational variables that intervene between system structure and foreign 
policy outcomes. 
Grand strategy involves a number of processes that take place within states, ―defined 
as the central decision-making institutions and roles [that] can be treated as unified 
actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest.‖
140
  Neoclassical 
realists do admit that the identities and scope of those central decision-making actors 
depends on the specific characteristics of a country‘s political system, but they retain 
a ‗top-down‘ conception of the state in which systemic forces are mediated by a 
national security or foreign policy executive.
141
  That executive may however be 
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influenced in their thinking by the cumulative actions of actors as diverse as policy 
makers, lobbyists, citizens‘ groups and businesses, and by the process of bargaining 
with them.
142
  Thus ―leaders define the ‗national interest‘ and conduct foreign policy 
based on their assessment of relative power and other states‘ intentions, but always 
subject to domestic constraints.‖
143
  Thus by using a plural definition of the state 
neoclassical realism recognises that processes within states are influenced not only 
by exogenous systemic factors and considerations of power and security, but also by 
cultural and ideological bias, domestic political considerations and prevailing ideas. 
The Strategic Assessment – Detecting National Security Threats 
The first, and most significant task of grand strategy formation involves the 
identification of threats to the security of the state.
144
  Neoclassical realism begins 
with a traditionally realist assessment of the strategic context of the state, that 
considers the geopolitical structure of the international system and identifies the 
material balance of power that defines and prioritises national interests and the 
threats to those interests.
145
  It should be remembered that such an assessment is by 
no means a fait accompli, and that different assessments may follow from particular 
historical, ideological, political or ideational biases.
146
  Clausewitz recognised that 
perfect information was rarely a feature of war and therefore required that officers 
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―possess a standard of judgement‖ and be ―guided by the laws of probability‖.
147
  
Morgenthau too, noted that: 
―uncertainty of power calculations is inherent in the nature of national power 
itself.  It will therefore come into play even in the most simple pattern of 
balance of power; that is, when one nation opposes another.  This uncertainty is, 
however, immeasurably magnified when [the balance of power] is composed 
not of single units but of alliances.‖
148
 
Thus uncertainty deriving from imperfect intelligence and the machinations of 
structure, plus the sheer volume of information involved, may create an imbalance 
between complexity and the analytic capacity of individuals involved in strategic 
planning.
149
  Such an imbalance creates a void that can only be filled by the 
scientific ideas held by decision-makers, so that ―the greater the ambiguity, the 
greater the impact of preconceptions.‖
150
  Having said all that, it should be clear that 
many features of the international system can be known with a satisfactory degree of 
certainty, and therefore a consensus on a strategic assessment is more likely to 
derive from clear facts than any collective cognitive bias.  Still, it remains important 
to recognise that ideas may intervene to fill the knowledge gaps between the actual 
strategic situation and the conclusions of a strategic assessment.
151
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A consideration of the empirical facts of the balance of power is not on its own 
enough to identify a threat to a state.
152
  Threats come to be identified on the basis of 
both capability and intent, and in this latter category assessments are more 
vulnerable to be profoundly affected by perceptions of other states‘ strategy, culture, 
ideology and history.
153
  Even where threats are agreed upon, different operational 
ideas may contest the ranking of those threats in terms of imminence and scale.  
Further, particular intentional ideas may consider some features of individual states 
or of the international system itself as simply threatening per se, even in the absence 
of targeted capability or intent.
154  
 
The Means of Strategy – Power and Appropriateness 
The second element in the formulation of grand strategy is the selection of means to 
address identified threats.  This process involves consideration of both what means 
are available, which will work most effectively, and whether their use can be 
justified. 
Neoclassical realism understands that states have a choice of means with which they 
may pursue strategic goals, since they have access to differing aspects of power 
which they can mobilise against threats.  Distinctions between soft and hard power 
are common in international relations, yet may be too crude for a careful analysis of 
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a state‘s grand strategic preferences.  In his discussion of the United States‘ grand 
strategic options, Walter Russell Mead usefully isolates four tools of strategy.  Sharp 
Power is the military and intelligence capabilities of a state.  These tools are purely 
coercive, in that they provide a state with the ability to force another state into a 
course of action they would not have otherwise chosen.  It is the reality of sharp 
power that is the ultimate broker of disputes, should a state involved consider the 
strategic goal in view important enough to justify its use.
155
  Sticky Power is the 
ability to makes others‘ economies dependent upon one‘s own.  For example, if state 
A can engineer a situation where state B is dependent on the import of particular 
resources, state B may become ‗stuck‘ to state A and therefore more likely to 
comply with the strategic preferences of state A.  On a global scale, an economic 
system controlled by and run to the advantage of one power provides that state with 
a great amount of sticky power as the ―consumer of last resort‖.
156
  Sweet Power is 
the power of attraction of one state‘s ideals, culture and values, that make other 
states more likely to acquiesce to its strategic preferences.  In the twentieth century, 
American anti-imperialism, political democracy and commitment to human rights, 
plus the popularity of her popular culture, gave the United States reserves of sweet 
power.  One of the effects of that power is to attract immigration, which can then be 
further responsible for reinforcing sweet power in a positive feedback loop.
157
  
Following Gramsci, Mead isolates Hegemonic Power as the power of setting the 
agenda and determining the terms of debate.
158
  People consent to hegemonic power 
because they see it as inevitable.  Hegemonic power is mutually constituted by other 
strengths, for example military, technological and economic, that appear 
unchallengeable.  It may allow a hegemon to provide certain international public 
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goods, thus reinforcing its own hegemonic power and potentially providing a 
corollary increase in its sweet power.
159
 
Different states have access to these tools of power to varying degrees.  Hegemonic 
power is by definition available to a select few, sharp power has heavy costs in terms 
of resources and sticky power may take generations to develop.  Sweet power is 
easier to generate but requires history and position to give it real credibility and 
force.  However, whilst a state‘s endowment may not change rapidly, grand strategy 
is long-term policy-making and key decisions of grand strategy involve which 
aspects of power to cultivate, and how best to do so.  Will joining a regional free-
trade area be an investment in pooled hegemonic power to counter nearby 
threatening states or will it deny the freedom of action to act in other ways?  Should 
finite resources be invested in military hardware or policies for economic growth?   
Actors within states may hold competing operational ideas about which means are 
most appropriate to address particular threats.  For example, within militaries the 
different forces tend to hold competing ideas about the effectiveness of their 
respective methods.  Elsewhere within the state, some actors may consider that 
particular goals require the use of economic sanctions and military ‗sticks‘, whereas 
other actors prefer to rely on the ‗carrots‘ of trade and softer elements of power.  
Within states, not only do actors hold different ideas about which means will work, 
there exists a competition of ideas concerning which means are ethically acceptable, 
which may reflect both long-standing cultural factors and prevailing domestic 
political attitudes.  Should condom distribution or abstinence programs be used to 
address the African HIV epidemic?  Are sanctions justifiable if they hurt the people 
as well as their despotic government?  Is the use of torture justified to extract 
information that will prevent a devastating terrorist attack? 
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Auxiliary Goals – Strategy Beyond the National Interest 
Once threats have been identified, ranked and the means to address them decided, 
the third, tertiary element of grand strategy identifies auxiliary goals and selects the 
appropriate means to attain them.  In an anarchic system with uncertainty of 
intentions, the primary purpose of the state is to ensure its own survival using the 
resources available to it.  The scope of these goals will be constrained by the 
availability of resources, and so some states in the system may not have auxiliary 
goals at all, preferring instead to engage all their available resources in the pursuit of 
security.  On the other hand, some states may not have enough resources to provide 
a guarantee of security and will consider the attempt fruitless and may therefore 
instead devote the resources they have entirely towards auxiliary goals.  Strong 
states have excess resources that will allow them to both guarantee their security and 
pursue auxiliary international goals.  Auxiliary goals may be expansionist in terms 
of territory or economic power; they may create interests for a state based on historic 
or cultural ties; they may seek to further ethical concerns or political ideas; they may 
be directed towards ‗global‘ interests.  The choice of which auxiliary goals to pursue 
and with which resources to pursue them will always be the result of ideational 
debate within the state, since systemic imperatives have already been addressed in 
one form or another.   
It could be countered here that the free resources of states are illusory, in that they 
find their security needs grow with their disposable power.  This critique fails on 
two counts: first, in order for power to be disposable it must by definition be a free 
resource.  Indeed, the logic of this claim is that at all times the resources of the state 
are equal to or less than the state‘s security requirements, which seems dubious.  
Second, and more empirically, rather than new threats instantaneously appearing to 
occupy resources as states expand it seems more likely that states use ‗national 
security‘ as a justification for other goals that require expanded resources. 
Thus grand strategy emerges through these processes of empirical assessment and 
ideational competition within the state.  Although in most cases the primary 
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requirement is for security from threats, placing a systemic analysis of the 
distribution of power at the heart of grand-strategic decision-making, grand strategy 
involves much more than simply the identification of, and response to, threats.  At 
the heart of the process, strategic ideas provide policymakers with guidance in 
conditions of uncertainty, reflecting the considerable autonomy and scope for 
creativity on the part of the state to shape grand strategy in response to external 
pressures.
160 
 
The conceptual framework of neo-realism can therefore only have a constraining, 
rather than determining, effect on grand strategic outcomes.  Conversely, the insights 
of neoclassical realism fit well with a process of grand strategy formation that is 
plural, constrained by systemic imperatives and yet determined by ideational factors 
at unit level.  Neoclassical realism allows us to understand the choices made 
between the wide range of grand-strategic options that typically remain following 
the strategic assessment, choices that are determined by the preferences, actions and 
relative positions of individuals and groups that comprise the state. 
Accounting For Grand Strategic Change 
Neoclassical realism therefore points us towards the processes by which grand 
strategy comes to be made.  However, it is equally important to be able to trace how 
shifting factors affect strategic thinking, and to understand what is sufficient for that 
to be significant, that is to say, what is required for grand strategy to change?  How 
and why does strategic adjustment take place? 
The first question here is what constitutes ‗change‘.  Efforts to create typologies of 
strategy have had mixed success.  Although we may recognise and contrast 
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―expansionist‖ and ―status quo‖ strategies
161
; or ―compellent‖, ―deterrent‖ and 
―accomodationist‖ strategies,
162
 it seems unlikely that states‘ grand strategies fit 
neatly into these few typologies, or that significant change in grand strategy would 
necessarily be reflected by a move from one typology to another. 
Rather than seeking to identify strategic adjustment in terms of moves from one 
defined typology to another, Dueck has suggested that we measure change by 
reference to the policy instruments typically associated with strategic decision-
making.  Thus we should look for shifts in areas such as military deployments and 
spending; alliance commitments; foreign aid; and willingness to commit to 
diplomatic initiatives as well as considering the overall tone of a state‘s stance 
towards its adversaries and the international in general.
163
   
Of course, minor alterations of policy need not indicate strategic adjustment.  As 
noted in emphasising the distinction between the idealised nature of strategy and the 
real-world of foreign policy, minor changes in foreign policy may just be the result 
of contingency and compromise, of a state faced with the realities of international 
politics picking where and when to fight its battles.  Strategic change on the other 
hand is likely to combine policy change with a rhetorical shift.  Whilst foreign 
policy contingency will be accompanied by a defence of both the ends in sight and 
the means to achieve them, strategic adjustment means a shift in the goals and/or the 
methods of the state in international relations. 
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Dueck therefore rightly identifies that ‗tinkering‘ takes place within a strategic 
approach without constituting strategic adjustment.  He identifies two levels of 
strategic adjustment – first-order changes entail a ―massive shift in the extent of 
strategic commitments‖ and second-order changes are ―less fundamental‖.
164
  
Although Dueck rightly points us in the direction of policy instruments (he wrongly 
neglects rhetoric) as our variable factors, there is little to judge how much change in 
which factors should determine whether a shift is ―massive‖ or ―less fundamental‖. 
To address the issue of the significance of any policy change, we need to consider 
first the goals of the state and second the means used in pursuit of those goals.  We 
might propose that a first-order change should involve a significant shift in the goals 
of the state, that is, the identification of a new threat; a change in the ranking of 
serious threats; or the addition or removal of a significant auxiliary goal.  It may also 
involve, though need not involve, a shift in the means used to pursue those goals.  
By contrast, a second-order change should involve only a significant shift in the 
primary means by which to pursue existing goals, that is to say, a shift from a focus 
on one form of power to another. 
It is noted that this distinction may be over-simplistic, and that it is by no means 
certain that first order changes will have greater systemic impact than second order 
changes.  A state which moves from a grand strategy of democratic enlargement by 
economic and diplomatic means to the same strategy achieved through the use of 
military force will clearly have a greater impact on the grand-strategic reactions of 
others than a state that gives up an auxiliary goal that was supported by little power.  
If one were able to specify the relation between different elements of power in terms 
of their coercive impact, one could rank the goals of the state in terms of the power 
allocated to them and so better specify the impact of a grand strategic shift.  But for 
our purposes here it is enough to distinguish between shifts in goals and shifts in 
means. 
                                                 
164
 Ibid., 12-13. 
 66 
What factors can account for a grand strategic change in ends or means on the part 
of a state?  The neorealist position focuses on shifts in international system, that is, 
shifts in national security doctrine stem from shifts in the international distribution 
of power that alter the state‘s relative position.
165
  Patterns of strategic adjustment 
are determined by structural pressures at the systemic level, and the pressure of 
competition is such that states become ―undifferentiated‖ in their strategic 
behaviour.
166
  However, neorealist approaches are unspecific regarding the causal 
processes that turn systemic change into unit-level strategic shifts.  Unless the 
international environment is especially highly constrained, that is, external threats to 
national interests and values are particularly high, it is difficult to deduce security 
postures directly from the balance of material capabilities.
167 
  
Waltz himself therefore admits that ―in the absence of counterweights, a country‘s 
internal impulses prevail‖.
168
  The neoclassical realist position takes that admission 
further, arguing that variables at the unit-level – in the ideas and perceptions of 
actors within the state – actually ―play an important, indeed, a pivotal, role in the 
selection of a grand strategy.‖
169
  For neoclassical realists then, grand strategic 
change can result from changes at both the unit and systemic level.  Since the most 
important element in international relations remains the balance of power between 
states, changes in the international distribution of power encourage strategic 
adjustment.  At the same time, it is essential to understand the nature of the states in 
that balance of power in order to understand the structure of relations between them.  
States do not necessarily regard power as threatening, it is the combination of power 
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and nature that defines enmity in the international environment.  Therefore, it is 
shifts in the level of external threat that are the most likely cause of strategic 
adjustment.
170 
  
Of secondary importance, the introduction of intervening ideational variables means 
that neoclassical realism is able to account for grand strategic change in an 
unchanging systemic environment, in that shifts at the unit level may drive strategic 
adjustment.  These shifts may occur within the state, or in the wider populous.
171
  
Within the state, shifts in personnel, institutional power, or the popularity of 
particular ideas may precipitate changes in goals themselves or encourage 
reassessment of the most appropriate means by which to pursue them.  Such shifts 
may be driven from the bottom up, by electoral results or by the use of bureaucratic 
leverage; or from the top down, in the form of the executive‘s power of patronage 
and final decision.  
Conclusion: The Implications Of A Neoclassical Realist Approach To Grand 
Strategy Formation 
Neoclassical realism then remains a structural theory of international relations.  It 
prioritises and stresses ―power, interests and coalition making as the central elements 
in a theory of politics‖ but seeks to recapture classical realists‘ appreciation that we 
need to look within societies as well as between them, to deny that states are simple, 
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―irreducible atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed.‖
172
  Understanding 
how and when ideas may intervene in the unit-level processes of grand strategy 
formation allows us to posit three hypothetical scenarios where states are likely to be 
more influenced by their ideas than their interests in the international environment.   
First, states that are very powerful are the most likely to pursue ideas-based policies.  
We see this in the tendency of great powers with a surfeit of material capabilities to 
attempt visionary world-making.  With their territorial and political integrity 
secured, interests offer few constraints to check the progress of grand ideas in the 
policymaking process, and the international system poses few constraints on a state 
whose material power and ideational dominance largely defines international 
structure.  The question ‗what must we do?‘ is replaced by ‗what shall we do?‘  
Hegemonic or imperial states therefore have power that can be used for objectives 
that are not associated with clearly definable needs, and in such situations, a foreign 
policy based on intentional ideas is the likely course, in which ideological goals 
become ends in themselves.
173
  As Jeffrey Legro notes, ―great power ideas matter 
because they guide foreign policy and are a building block of international life‖ and 
when they change they do so with ―earthquake-like effects‖ that make as well as 
unmake the prevailing international order.
174
  A neoclassical realist theory of the role 
of ideas in grand strategy understands that the more power is centralised within the 
international system, the more we should expect the grand strategy of the dominant 
states to be defined by their strategic ideas, and can account for the fact that those 
great power strategies may change for internal as well as external reasons. 
The second scenario involves states where particular ideas are highly 
institutionalised or culturally embedded.  In this scenario the impact of ideas is likely 
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to be strong and consistent throughout the policy process.  Ideas that form a strong 
component of national identity or strategic culture are likely to be almost 
unconsciously shared among ruling elites and foreign policy institutions.  These 
ideas filter and limit options, ruling out policies that fail to resonate with the national 
political culture.
175
   
Third, states where decision-making power is highly concentrated in one, or a few 
individuals, or in a particular institution in which particular ideas are embedded.  
Where power is highly centralised the rationality of numbers does not have a chance 
to operate, and so the potential for particular ideas to be placed centrally within the 
state‘s policy is increased.  It is this that accounts for the unpredictability of 
dictatorial regimes.
176
   
Furthermore, neoclassical realism as a structural theory provides us with a number 
of insights about the composition of the international system.  In this sense 
neoclassical realism can be viewed as a logical extension of neorealism.
177
  First, 
neoclassical realism should be able to recognise that most of what are described by 
realists as system changes are actually shifts in the grand strategies of the units that 
make up that system.  The balance of the system itself is made up of, in the main, the 
alignments of the grand strategies of states: not a balance of power by itself, but a 
balance of power and posture, a balance of goals and the means that have been 
placed in pursuit of them.  A purely structural realist explanation cannot offer a 
comprehensive account of why a state‘s capabilities may decline in relation to a 
strategic competitor.
178
  To do so, we must take into account both the grand-strategic 
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choices of the state, and the strength of the state, that is its ability to bring those 
choices to bear.
179
 
It follows that neoclassical realism considers the occurrence of structural change that 
is unrelated to one or more states‘ grand-strategic behaviour to be very rare.  
Important change can of course derive from long term changes in geography, 
resource availability and the availability of technology.
180
  But such change is 
systemic rather than structural, in that it defines the rules by which interaction takes 
place.  Most structural change should actually be understood as a reflection of a 
grand-strategic choice by one or more states that changes the pattern of interaction 
between them.  Although neorealist theory defines a system as composed of 
structure and of interacting units, as Barry Buzan has pointed out, Waltz‘s emphatic 
distinction between unit-level theories and systemic theories ―and his usage of terms 
such as ‗systems theory‘ and ‗systems level‘ makes the term system effectively a 
synonym for structure.‖
181
  Neoclassical realism, on the other hand, recognises as 
classical realism did before it that the international system is composed of units, 
their interactions, and structure.  The system has structure, but the system defines 
structure only in as much as it creates imperatives for the interactions of states that 
constitute structure.  Interaction, therefore, ―is crucial to the concept of system, for 
without it, the term system has no meaning‖.
182
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Since the structure of the system creates constraints for states‘ grand strategies, then 
in a very fundamental way, states‘ grand strategies and the international system are 
mutually constituted.  The nature of the units and the character of their interactions 
both create and are informed by structure.  That is to say, the structure that informs 
and constrains states‘ grand strategic choices is itself constituted by the grand 
strategic choices of states.   
Thus, in this vision of the international system, and true to the primacy neoclassical 
realism places on the imperatives of power, the most important states remain those 
that have the greatest resources or that hold the balance of power.  However, it is not 
only the amount of power resources that determines structure, but the purpose to 
which the strongest states put their resources.  Thus by reviving classical realism‘s 
insights about the state, neoclassical realism is better able to explain first and second 
order changes in grand strategy that are not wholly derived from a shift in 
international structure. 
The recognition of intervening ideational variables in neoclassical realism is 
particularly important when considering their impact on the strongest states.  Since 
the interaction of states‘ grand strategies constitutes structure, the grand strategic 
choices of the strongest states are crucial to an understanding of the international 
system at any given moment.  A neoclassical realist approach is all the more 
appropriate given that the strongest states have the greatest degree of strategic choice 
because they possess more power than is required to meet their basic security 
requirements.  Looking inside the strongest states to understand the mechanisms 
driving their choices of auxiliary goals is necessary to provide a proper 
understanding of the international system itself. 
To date, most neoclassical realist approaches have attempted to explain deviations 
from the expectations of structural realism with reference to the limited authority of 
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the state to conduct foreign policy.
183
  An approach that assesses the role of ideas at 
the unit level in grand strategy formation explains deviation in terms of states 
preferences, that is, when states choose to act in ways which structural realism 
would not expect.  For neoclassical realists then, the international system is not the 
determining monolith that neorealism envisioned, a vision coloured by the 
admittedly highly restrictive bipolarity of the Cold War.  Rather neoclassical realists 
regard the structure of the international system as providing states with information 
about the costs and benefits of particular courses of action, but how that information 
is processed and weighed depends on the way states understand the world, their 
preferences, their ideas and their ethics.  It is in this sense that neoclassical realism 
resuscitates the ‗political‘ element of political realism, and in doing so revives the 
role of realism in fulfilling Morgenthau‘s dictum that the role of political scientists is 
to ‗speak truth to power‘.
184
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CHAPTER 2:  IDEAS IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
As chapter one demonstrated, the neoclassical realist approach to the impact of ideas 
in grand strategy formation implies that the historical embedding of ideas within a 
state through its institutions and strategic culture sets the boundaries of debate at 
moments of strategic reassessment.  This chapter therefore provides an overview of 
the role of ideas in constituting the historical narrative of the United States to 
establish the ideational constraints within which the United States‘ foreign policy 
executive would face the task of reassessing its grand strategic priorities at the end 
of the Cold War.  It argues that the United States derives its identity in a very 
fundamental way from a set of ideas about liberty in a way that states with shared 
ethnic and historical experience do not.  Those ideas of liberty have therefore 
consistently informed American conceptions of their national interest and the 
content of United States grand strategy.  This chapter therefore traces the 
development of American strategic ideas alongside the growth of American 
capabilities, emphasising the persistent tension between the need to protect 
American liberty by avoiding constraints on the freedom of action of the United 
States, and the need to maintain a commitment to the universal ideas of American 
identity by promoting liberty abroad.  These tensions having been temporarily 
resolved by the Cold War consensus around a grand strategy of containment, the 
chapter concludes with the sense of loss that the end of the Cold War generated 
within the United States and which serves as the starting point for a new US 
strategic debate. 
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Inventing America 
 ―Picture yourself… if you can, a society which comprises all the nations of the 
world… people differing from one another in language, in beliefs, in opinions; 
in a word a society possessing no roots, no memories, no prejudices, no routine, 
no common ideas, no national character, yet with a happiness a hundred times 
greater than our own… This then is our starting point!  What is the connecting 
link between these so different elements?  How are they welded into one 
people?‖
1
 
It was a French aristocrat with the aim of discovering the sources of American 
democratic success to contrast with the failure of his own country‘s revolution who 
first described America as ‗exceptional‘, qualitatively different from other nations.
2
  
Different, because in the American experience, the state preceded the nation.  An 
immigrant colonial community having rebelled against their forebears, America was 
in the truest sense an ‗imagined community‘ with no common ethnic or historical 
experience.
3
  America had legal status, the recognition of others, before it recognised 
what it was to be itself.  As David Campbell notes in his seminal study of American 
identity, as America progressed and grew, the radical separation of its history and 
geography left the United States with neither a fixed territory nor a single people to 
serve as its foundational referent.
4
  More than any other state, ―Americans had to 
invent what Europeans inherited: a sense of solidarity, a repertoire of national 
symbols, a quickening of political passions.‖
5
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Yet a decade prior to the Revolution, few believed the colonies could ever be bought 
to unite.  Benjamin Franklin noted that, in addition to the colonies cultural, political 
and legal differences,  
―their jealousy of each other is so great that, however necessary a union of the 
colonies has long been for their common defence… they have never been able to 
effect such a union among themselves or even agree in requesting the mother 
country to establish it for them… In short I will venture to say, a union amongst 
them for such a purpose is not merely improbable, it is impossible.‖
6
 
The diversity of America was not as great as Franklin supposed or Tocqueville later 
believed.  The colonists held common opinions that derived from their common 
heritage, so that whilst each may have defined their identity first and foremost in 
terms of their colony, it is equally true that most of them thought of themselves as 
Englishmen.  The early colonists largely shared a language, a history and a religion, 
although these commonalities were to be increasingly diluted by migration from 
across Europe.  What united the later colonists was the vision of America as a land 
of opportunity and a refuge from persecution, and they shared with their Anglo-
Saxon contemporaries an admiration for the English constitutional protection of 
liberties.  Indeed, in the decade prior to the Declaration of Independence there was a 
widespread conviction in America and Britain that those liberties were far from 
secure in Great Britain.  Following on from reports of decaying liberty in the mother 
country, colonists increasingly believed that America had become the heir of Britain 
as the trustee of liberty.
7
   
The invention of America proceeded along these lines by binding the citizenry 
together in support of a few ideas.  The Declaration of Independence is both a list of 
material grievances with British rule, implying a new, less authoritarian form of 
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government, and most importantly, it is an assertion of shared values: the universal 
rights to ‗Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness‘ engendered by the salient fact 
that ‗all men are created equal‘.
8
  America therefore justifies itself, not through self-
determination of peoples or right to territory, but through an ideology of liberty.  The 
declaration of independence is just that – a declaration that ‗we‘ are different, but 
that difference is intellectual rather than biological or cultural.  It could only be that 
way – at the time of the declaration the European ancestry of most of the subjects of 
the thirteen colonies constituted the bulk of their identity.  Only shared ideas could 
form the platform on which to build a nation out of the new state.  Thus for Richard 
Hofstadter, ―it has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.‖
9
  
The Declaration of Independence – together with the other formative documents of 
the new nation, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights – reflected the fact that in the 
Hegelian sense there was no state in the United States, no unified, rational will, only 
individual self-interest and a passion for liberty.  Embracing this, the idea was that 
rather than constructing a state to rule over society – the European model – there 
should instead be built a government, drawn from society for its benefit, of, by and 
for the people.  In this sense the Constitution is a social contract between the people 
and their government.
10
 
The stark libertarianism of the founding of the American nation quickly developed 
into what has been termed the American Creed – a set of interrelated ideas, 
entrenched in the national consciousness, an ideology of a nation.
11
  Different 
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scholars describe the elements of this national thesis in different ways, but the 
elements they suggest boil down to two intimately related ideologies: political 
organisation underpinned by liberty and economic organisation by means of 
capitalism.
12
   
The basic content of American liberty flowed from the English traditions of civil and 
religious liberty, those two mutually dependent necessities and rights of free men.  
Central to this kind of thinking is the philosophy of John Locke, for whom an 
individual‘s right to liberty is based upon the ―property in his own person‖, that is, 
the idea that humans are naturally pre-contractual beings.  Locke sees the logical 
progression of this basic political idea as being the force that drove economic 
modernisation: from one‘s own subsistence labour to bartering; from bartering to 
money; from money to land ownership and from land ownership to statehood.   Thus 
―at the heart of liberal theory lies the claim that individuals are free and therefore 
establish government by consent whose main function is protection of private 
property as the basis of individual freedom.‖
13
  In this understanding, political 
liberalism and capitalism are more than just mutually constituted, they are logically 
inseparable.  In this relationship, capitalism both relies upon the individual‘s 
freedom to pursue his own happiness and legitimises that quest.
14
  The moral 
imperative of human freedom, it turns out, is an economic imperative too.  From the 
very birth of the United States in the Declaration of Independence, liberty and 
capitalism were placed together as the founding features of American ideology, the 
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inalienable rights of men, and in America they would quickly come to constitute an 
entire way of life, ―a pervasive, quasi-religious entity‖.
15
   
Yet liberty had far greater symbolic overtones than simply the political ideas that 
would become the central tenets of free-market liberal-democracy.  Around the War 
of Independence, most Americans shared the assumption that liberty was a gift from 
God.  They may have disagreed about whether it derived from the cross or from 
natural law, but ―Puritans, Anglicans, Quakers, Unitarians and deists were all 
prepared to name the deity, not some human agency, as the author of freedom.  
Liberty‘s light was not only dazzling but holy, and Americans called upon God to 
protect them, because He – not George III – was their king.‖
16
 
Indeed, religion provided the bedrock upon which the American idea of liberty was 
constructed.
17
  Thomas Jefferson even proposed that the seal of the United States 
should have on one side ―the children of Israel in the wilderness led by a cloud by 
day and a pillar by night‖ and on the other side ―Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon 
chiefs, from whom we claim the honour of being descended and whose political 
principles and form of government we have assumed.‖
18
  The idea of America itself 
was thus a fusion of Old Testament theology and English liberty. 
Liberty so conceived was specifically a gift from God to America, a holy land that 
was set apart from the rest of the world, both in its geographical isolation and in its 
doctrines of self-government.  Preachers, politicians, intellectuals and laymen 
invoked the hand of divine Providence in both the quest for and as an explanation of 
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American independence.  ―What great things has the God of Providence done for our 
race!  By the revolution we this day celebrate, he has provided asylum for the 
oppressed in all nations of the Earth.‖
19
  In that role, America was destined to grow 
under the watchful eye of God, so that ―the Lord shall have made his American 
Israel ‗high above all nations which he hath made‘‖.
20
  For McDougall, the evidence 
that Americans saw themselves as inhabitants of a holy land ―is so abundant as to be 
trite… Americans were a chosen people delivered from bondage to a Promised 
Land, and you can‘t get more exceptional than that.‖
21
 
Thus those early Americans created for themselves a nationalism, founded on the 
myth of divine Providence having bestowed liberty upon their people, the fulfilment 
of biblical prophecy.
22
  Indeed, by the mid-twentieth century this national myth had 
become so entrenched in the American consciousness that one author was able to 
refer to a ―civil religion‖ with ―its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred 
events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.‖
23
  In America, 
citizenship was the only criterion that made the individual a member of the nation, 
and that meant loyalty to the notions of liberty; loyalty that engendered a distinctly 
American way of life, identifiable by the certain social-behaviour pattern and value 
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system that is the American creed.
24
  The American national ideology of liberty 
implied two things; that America was unique, and that America was exceptional.   
The National Interests Of Universal Liberty 
What implications did the definition of America as liberty have upon its foreign 
policy?  The first thing to recognise is that, early in its development as a nation-state, 
America was primarily concerned with political and economic freedom at home.  
Yet sovereignty as a nation – the liberty of the state – is essential to the liberty of the 
individual.
25
  So early debates about the institutionalisation of liberty concerned the 
need to protect the liberties of Americans from foreigners, and central to this was the 
paradox of government power: ―would not any federal government powerful enough 
to stare down Britain or France ipso facto threaten the freedom of its own constituent 
states and citizens?‖
26
  This tension led to a constitution that bestowed upon the 
executive branch the minimum of foreign policy powers, whilst establishing a 
government capable of deterring and, if necessary, fighting threats to American 
liberty. 
Although Americans believed themselves exceptional, and were under no illusions 
about the vulnerability of their young nation, from the very birth of the United States 
there was a sense in which the blessings of liberty were not to be confined to 
America alone.  The most striking feature of the American creed in terms of 
international relations is the assumed universalisability of the values it expresses.  
The truth of these values is ‗self-evident‘, their application is to ‗all men‘.  Yet at the 
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same time these values are explicitly linked to the American nation – they are after 
all its defining features.  This tension in maintaining universal values for the end of 
singular identity – on the one hand uniqueness, on the other universality – is a 
recurrent theme in American foreign policy.
27
 
The debate did not take long to surface in the young nation‘s history.  The occasion 
of the French Revolution and the subsequent war in Europe, despite Washington‘s 
policy of neutrality, sparked a national debate.  Should America‘s attachment to 
democracy as a universal idea trump America‘s national security interest in 
remaining detached from the power-politics of the European system which most of 
her citizens had consciously abandoned?  In short, did the aspirations for liberty of 
the French confer an obligation upon America, and how far was the United States 
prepared to meet that responsibility? 
Federalists argued that Robespierre‘s Reign of Terror provided all the justification 
needed for America to stay out of European struggles.
28
  On the other hand, 
Jefferson felt that the prospects for liberty in the whole world hung on the success of 
the French Revolution, and rather than have it fail he ―would have seen half the earth 
desolated; were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it 
would be better than it now is.‖
29
  Yet for all the debate and the idealism of many 
American thinkers the truth was that the debate was largely academic:  America was 
simply not yet materially strong enough to become involved in European affairs.   
Thus in the early stages of the nation‘s history American policy was constrained by 
the realities of power.  Yet that so fierce a debate about the nature of foreign policy 
could arise so early in the nation‘s development shows the impact of the founding 
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myth upon the national psyche.  For many, the very notion of ‗America‘ in the world 
meant little if it would not support the concept of liberty by which it defined herself.  
And yet at the same time, there existed the fear that support for the liberty of other 
peoples might erode liberty in America itself.  As Washington warned the young 
nation in his farewell address: 
―Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or very remote 
relation… Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a 
different course… Why forgo the advantages of so peculiar a situation?  Why 
quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny 
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?‖
30
   
Washington went on to state that the policy of the United States would be to avoid 
foreign engagements.  Although it would fulfil existing obligations in good faith, 
and accepted the need to enter into temporary alliances in emergencies, the United 
States should not enter into permanent alliances, because to do so could restrict her 
freedom to act.  It should be noted here that this was not a policy of total 
isolationism – both Washington and Jefferson sought to increase American contact 
with the outside world
31
 – but rather a means of maintaining liberty of policy, the 
idea being that binding alliances, rather than strengthening America, threatened the 
very liberal foundation of America itself. 
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American Separation, American Expansion 
Washington‘s extrapolation of liberty into the international arena established a ‗great 
rule‘ that had such a profound impact that it was to guide American foreign policy 
for over a century.
32
  It inculcated a tradition of American diplomacy that eschewed, 
in Jefferson‘s phrase, ―entangling alliances‖ by showing that such a policy flowed 
naturally from America‘s geopolitical constitution.
33
  America would interact with 
the world through commerce and in particular through the flows of people and ideas 
associated with immigration, but politically American independence required that it 
retain the power to act unilaterally, without the constraints of alliance 
considerations, remaining ―firmly neutral regarding European conflicts.  In this 
sense only was it outside the Atlantic community.‖
34
  What is often termed 
American isolationism relied on the tools of unilateralism and neutrality to enable 
the United States to protect its cherished liberty at home by safeguarding freedom of 
action in the international sphere.  Only when its liberty was directly threatened 
would compromising alliances be considered.  Thus, even when both the United 
States and France were at war with Britain, America stubbornly remained neutral in 
its relations with Napoleon, and the US steadfastly steered clear of foreign 
engagements, must less alliances, for the whole of the nineteenth century.
35
  George 
Washington‘s dictum, expressing the causal idea that the preservation of liberty at 
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home required unilateralism and neutrality abroad, had become what historian 
George Tucker called a ―test of orthodoxy to American patriots.‖
36
 
Yet liberty at home also required the freedom of Americans to go forth and seek 
their fortunes.  Thus exceptionalism, particularly in its religious understanding of 
America as a ‗promised land‘, justified expansion across the continent of North 
America.   
―We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our 
onward march?  We point to the everlasting truth on the first page of our 
national declaration, and we proclaim to the millions of other lands, that… the 
nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of 
divine principles.‖
37
 
The manifest destiny argument therefore held that continental expansion followed 
from the central American idea of liberty.  If the United States was to remain free 
and independent, then it needed to pursue a unilateral foreign policy and avoid 
European entanglements, and to achieve this, the United States had to pre-empt 
European bids for influence over unclaimed land in the American continent.
38
  Thus 
the United States ―entered the nineteenth century not with cloistered modesty but 
with grand dreams of national expansion.‖
39
 
Alongside territorial expansionism in North America came an increasingly 
expansive view of their role in the world, or at least in the Western hemisphere, 
summed up by the Monroe Doctrine‘s declaration that the United States would 
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consider the Americas off-limits to new colonisation.  Often mischaracterised as a 
claim to an American sphere of influence over Latin America,
40
 the Monroe 
Doctrine is better understood as a commitment to defend whatever vital interests it 
might identify in the Western hemisphere, in order that her liberty might not be 
threatened by European powers at her door.
41
  Despite American material 
capabilities rendering it ―little more than a Yankee bluff‖,
42
 the Monroe doctrine 
confirmed the United States‘ commitment to what it could not yet accomplish – an 
extension of principles of liberty internationally.  
Yet the tensions are all too clear.  Liberty applied to Americans, but not to the native 
peoples who already inhabited the ‗unclaimed‘ land in North America.  Liberty 
applied to whites, but not to their black slaves who powered the expanding 
American economy.  Westward expansion, although presented as the rightful 
inheritance of a fabled empty continent was actually an emptying of it by the 
presence and policies of white Americans.
43
  So whilst ―geography invited it [and] 
demography compelled it‖,
44
 American expansionism was a deeply racist 
undertaking that sits uncomfortably with the idea of universal human liberty that 
defined the American nation.
45
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The prevailing social Darwinist beliefs of the time were both popularised by and a 
cause of the ease by which Manifest Destiny justified expansion.
46
  Manifest Destiny 
was envisaged as natural, peaceful process, validated by self-determination and, 
importantly, with the implication that subsumed peoples needed only to be educated 
to share in the blessings of liberty.
47
  Some Manifest Destinarians went further, as on 
Boston journal argued for the annexation of Mexico by force: 
―The ‗conquest‘ which carries peace into a land of where the sword has always 
been the sole arbiter… must necessarily be a great blessing to the conquered.  It 
is a work worthy of… a people who are about to regenerate the world by 
asserting the supremacy of humanity over the accidents of birth and fortune.‖
48
 
By the turn of the twentieth century the fusion of exceptionalism, manifest destiny 
and notions of genetic superiority had combined with the material aspects of 
America‘s growth to bring a new dimension to US foreign policy.  In the thirty-five 
years after the end of the Civil War, the population of the United States doubled as 
reconstruction attracted European immigrants at the rate of nearly 400,000 per 
year.
49
  This ‗Gilded Age‘ following the Civil War saw American GDP overtake the 
United Kingdom‘s in 1872, and more than triple by 1900,
50
 making the United 
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States the world‘s dominant industrial power, whose dominance of the Western 
hemisphere was accepted as a fait accompli by the other great powers.
51
   
A New Consciousness Of Strength:  The United States As A Great Power 
The United States‘ arrival as a great power bought with it a predictable desire for the 
United States to throw off the shackles of Washington and Jefferson‘s cautious 
husbandry of the American ideal.  As a Washington Post editorial put it:  
―a new consciousness seems to have come upon us – the consciousness of 
strength – and with it a new appetite, the yearning to show our strength... the 
taste of Empire is in the mouth of the people‖.
52
  
The United States was now in a position of power that not only allowed it to sustain 
the Monroe doctrine but to extend it.
53
  This expansion of American foreign policy 
interests may have been facilitated by the growth of American power but it was 
justified by the same ideas of the protection of liberty upon which those early 
Presidents‘ fears of entangling alliances had been based.  By the late-1890s the 
Spanish-American war had resulted in the United States taking on the role of 
imperial overlord in strategic territories of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii and the 
Philippines.  Yet these takeovers did not seem to arise from a new imperial 
consciousness, a yearning for the rightful trappings of regional hegemony.  Instead, 
the rationale for engaging in a war with a European colonial power – something that 
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most would have thought inconceivable just twenty years before – was one of noble 
intervention to free the Cuban people from tyranny.
54
   
This was a ‗progressive imperialism‘, a pursuit of a universal liberal enlightenment, 
and much of the energy and drive for such policies came from the twin engines of 
religion and social Darwinism.  Characterised by a missionary zeal to bring the 
blessings of liberty to foreigners who were not so intractably inferior that they could 
not be educated by philanthropic Americans to understand liberty, President 
McKinley knew full well the Methodist constituency to which he was speaking 
when he justified the annexation of the Philippines thus:  
―I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance.  
And one night late it came to me... that there was nothing left for us to do but 
take them all, and educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize 
them, and by God‘s grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow men 
for whom Christ also died.‖
55
 
America‘s rise to global power meant that from the same basic ideological roots 
America‘s twentieth-century foreign policy was destined from the outset to have a 
very different character to the previous hundred years.  The Monroe Doctrine could 
now not only be enforced but expanded, in Theodore Roosevelt‘s ‗corollary‘ which 
justified ―the exercise of an international peace power‖ by a civilised United States 
in Latin America to protect ―our interests and those of our southern neighbours that 
are in reality identical.‖
56
  Securing liberty at home had ceased to be the central 
principle of US foreign policy.  Rather, a strong proud nation had begun to measure 
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the fulfilment of its founding ideology by the progressiveness of what it did in the 
world, by its extension of liberty to others rather than the husbanding of liberty for 
the chosen few.  In the words of Henry Cabot Lodge, the American people ―had 
begun to turn their eyes to those interests of the United States that lie beyond our 
borders‖.
57
  The Spanish American war therefore represents both a departure and a 
conclusion in the historical logic of America.  As Robert Kagan sums up: 
―It was the product of a universalist ideology as articulated in the Declaration of 
Independence.  It reflected Americans‘ view of themselves, stretching back to 
before the nation‘s founding, as the advance guard of civilization, leading the 
way against backward and barbaric nations and empires...  [It] was, in short, and 
expression of who the American people were and what they had made of their 
nation.‖
58
 
Whereas in the past the end of foreign policy had been to accrue the strength to 
make America safe for liberty, by the turn of the century that liberty, now secured, 
compelled the exercise of American strength abroad as a moral duty.
59
  Failure to 
defend the values of liberty wherever they were threatened would shame and corrupt 
the very principles on which the United States had been founded, threatening to 
undermine American identity.  Overseas adventurism was now justified in the same 
imperial terms that had rationalised the oppression of Indians at home – the need and 
moral duty, to ―civilise, educate and look after ‗primitive‘ peoples, and the anarchy, 
barbarism and danger that would flourish if the United States did not act.‖
60
  
American strength had enabled it; American exceptionalism compelled it:  the 
United States had picked up ‗the White Man‘s Burden‘. 
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A Distinctly American Tension: Liberal Universalism, Exceptional Isolationism 
By the time of the Great War, the United States had elected a President who believed 
whole-heartedly in the exceptional moral character of the American nation and in the 
need for its foreign policy to reflect that character.  Yet the reality, as Archibald 
Cary Coolidge pointed out, was that the United States was now a world power, one 
of a select few nations ―directly interested in all parts of the world and whose voices 
must be listened to everywhere‖.
61
  For Wilson however, it would be ―a very 
perilous thing‖ to behave as other great powers and ―determine the foreign policy of 
a nation in terms of material interest.  It is not only unfair to those with whom you 
are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions.‖
62
  So when America 
entered the First World War, seemingly repudiating once and for all the tradition of 
isolating itself from European entanglements that had formed the bulk the United 
States‘ foreign policy history, it did so for ―the vindication of right, of human right, 
of which we are the only single champion‖ because ―the world must be made safe 
for democracy.‖
63
   
By then, what would become the perennial critique of American imperialism had 
already become well established.  Behind the universalism of freedom, it stated, lay 
not a desire for the liberty of peoples, but an unquenchable capitalist thirst for 
foreign markets.
64
  American foreign policy ―for all its high-minded statements of 
intent... boiled down to a Wall Street racket.‖
65
  There is certainly much to this 
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ongoing critique of American foreign policy, and no doubt the structure of 
America‘s loans to Europe had helped convince some of the importance of 
intervention on the side of the Allies.
66
  But to regard gold as the overarching driver 
of American imperialism is to invert the linkages between the liberty of peoples and 
capital which are the centrepiece of American ideology and identity.  The liberal 
developmentalism
67
 that characterises American expansionism is not an ideology of 
crude economic exploitation dressed up in the progressive clothes of liberty and 
freedom.  Rather it is the political idea of individual liberty that impels private 
enterprise and consumerism; and it is the universal nature of that liberty that drives 
open markets, free trade and the belief that others‘ development should mirror that 
of the United States.   
Wilson exemplified the intellectual primacy of political liberalism over economic 
capitalism.
68
  He held deep suspicions that the plunderous nature of the profit motive 
might threaten his vision of an open liberal political order made up of democratic 
states of free self-determining peoples.  Where Rosenberg sees in Wilson‘s 
encouragement of American entrepreneurs to secure markets against domination – at 
the expense of private profits – a commitment to an American-led economic order in 
the long run, she inverts the causal linkage between the political and economic 
ideas.
69
  Political liberty may well breed capitalism and open markets, but Wilson 
saw that emphasising the freedom of business over the freedom of peoples could 
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only threaten the liberty for which the United States stood, and upon which its 
identity relied. 
Certainly exploitative economic imperialism cannot explain the drive to build the 
League of Nations, that great idealistic tool for a world of liberal nations to settle 
their disputes peacefully, without recourse to war or Old World balances of power.
70
  
That the treaty was rejected too, and American foreign policy reverted for a time to 
the detached neutrality that Washington had extolled, demonstrates that something 
deeper than pure commercial interest was motivating American attitudes to the 
world.  What drove the isolationism of the interwar years were the same ideas that 
had informed the progressive imperialism of the previous two decades – American 
liberty, and American exceptionalism.   
Although the failure to ratify the League Treaty was primarily due to Wilson‘s 
intransigence rather than the implacability of congressional opposition, opposition to 
the treaty – and the reservations and amendments proposed by the Senate – rested on 
some very clear and familiar ideas about the nature of America, and what it meant to 
be America in the world at large.
71
  Opposition to the League was in the main based 
on a fear of world government, which would restrict the freedom of the United 
States to determine its own polity, its own interests and its own commitments, and 
would place American citizens at the mercy of the Old World‘s discredited interests.  
America was exceptional, and could not put its liberty at risk by ceding the rights to 
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impose duties upon the United States to nations that could not meet its standards.  In 
the words of one ‗irreconcilable‘, Lawrence Sherman (D., Il.): 
―If we cut the cables of constitutional government here we are caught in the 
irresistible tides that sweep us up into the maelstrom of the Old World‘s bloody 
current flowing from every shore.  The feuds and spoliations of a thousand years 
become our daily chart of action… The Old World simply harvested the 
destruction she sowed.  Her heritage has been war and ours peace.  We are asked 
to abandon our own and adopt another‘s… We are invited to become knight-
errant of the world.  A nation‘s first duty is to its own people.  Its government is 
for them… If this supersovereignty is created, conscription will take from all, 
and we will bear the white man‘s burden in every quarter of the world.‖
72
 
America would not, of course, ever return to a truly isolationist position, if indeed it 
had ever had one.
73
  The United States remained a great power, and when forced to 
re-enter the international political arena in 1941 it did so with the force of a 
superpower-in-waiting.  Yet led by European-American ethnic groups,
74
 a 
significant proportion of Congress and the American public at large believed 
strongly that whilst one the one hand no other nation could threaten the United 
States, it was also true that involvement in another major war might destroy 
American liberty at home.
75
  As a result, in the 1920s and 1930s the United States 
came to adopt a policy of neutrality and non-intervention that saw it remain 
disengaged from the dishonourable nitty-gritty of international diplomacy, preferring 
to conduct what diplomacy it had to through international economics.
76
  In what 
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would become a persistent and internationalised feature of American foreign policy, 
‗dollar diplomacy‘ substituted for the backroom dealings that characterised 
European power politics, taking on a particularly salient developmental role in Latin 
America, as the United States substituted globalism for a Good Neighbour Policy 
that looked back to Monroe‘s first principles.  Further afield, the United States was 
the world‘s banker, administering German reparations and Allied debt.
77
  Yet despite 
this crucial role as a stabiliser of world order, the United States lacked a vital 
security interest in the health of the world economy and remained unwilling to 
commit American economic power fully to alleviate the Depression.
78
  The balance 
of highly divided Congressional opinion thus refused to recognise the interrelations 
of politics and economics or to commit the United States to a political role beyond 
high-minded neutrality that would have the United States set a shining example to 
the world.  America therefore exercised something of an ―awkward dominion‖ in 
Europe, reluctantly helping to rebuild the continent whilst refusing to bail it out, and 
all without exercising political hegemony.
79
 
That the United States was committed once more to the avoidance of foreign 
entanglements undoubtedly played a part in the breakdown in the stability of the 
international order in the 1930s.  Hamstrung by Congress, Franklin Roosevelt 
nevertheless sought to back the Allies by turning the United States into the ‗arsenal 
of democracy‘, seeking revisions of the neutrality acts and circumventing them by 
sometimes underhand means.
80
  Yet for all Roosevelt‘s financial backing of the 
                                                 
77
 Frank A. Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), 84-95. 
78
 The United States‘ failure to engage in policies to revive global trade reflected the fact that 
although the US was the world‘s largest exporter, those exports only accounted for 6.3% of national 
income.  David Reynolds, "Power and Superpower: The Impact of Two World Wars on America's 
International Role", in America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower, ed. Warren 
F. Kimball (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 17-18. 
79
 Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with 
Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
80
 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 199-268. 
 95 
Allies in the early period of the Second World War it took the attack on Pearl 
Harbour to finally lay to rest the great debate in American society concerning how 
far internationally liberty needed to be protected.  That Japan could attack the 
American navy showed that the impregnability of the American continent, for so 
long ensured by the stopping power of water, was at an end, and that American 
liberty depended on events beyond its shores.  The liberal exceptionalist split 
between neutrality and interventionism was over, as summed up by one of the 
leading isolationists of the 1930s: 
―My convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for 
peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack.  That day 
ended isolationism for any realist.‖
81
 
Rise To Globalism: American Ideas Of World Order 
America‘s second reluctant entry into a European war would not be to restore the 
status quo.  Instead, the United States ―clambered back to Wilson‘s tent with the zeal 
of repentant sinners‖,
82
 and from the very start began to sketch an image of postwar 
order that revolved around open markets, a modified gold standard in which the 
dollar would be the reserve currency, a collective security organisation and the 
dismantling of the European colonial possessions.  As Life declared in October 1942, 
‗of one thing we are sure, Americans are not fighting to protect the British Empire‘.  
Quite the opposite, the United States was seeking not just to defeat Germany and 
Japan, but to ―knock Britain from its great power perch‖ and put itself at the very 
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heart of the international order, ―thereby completing the interwar period‘s unfinished 
geopolitical transition from British to American global hegemony.‖
83
 
Even so, it was postwar destruction and bankruptcy as much as American 
anticolonialism that eventually extinguished the colonial European empires.
84
  
America might have arrived late as a superpower as a result of its ideological 
disinclination to great power status, but when it did arrive it did so with an 
astonishing degree of dominance.
85
  The United States emerged from the Second 
World War with a preponderance of power on all major indices, economic, financial 
and military.
86
  As Mikael Gorbachev would later lament, in 1945 the United States 
―found itself to be the only big country that had waxed fabulously rich on the war.‖
87
   
American planners were very well aware of the strategic situation that the United 
States would find itself in after the war, and had approached the end of the war with 
a vision of order-building that embedded its power in a system of institutions – 
multilateral in membership but American in form – that established the rules of the 
American Century.
88
  This was the ultimate attempt to reconcile America‘s strategic 
dilemma – to protect liberty at home by institutionalising the protection of liberty in 
the very logic of the international system itself.  Yet before the global American 
system that the reinvigorated Wilsonian internationalists had envisaged could pick 
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up the baton from the European empires, a new empire rose from the ashes of the 
Second World War, a former ally with a political and economic system implacably 
opposed to American liberalism, with enormous military might and the distinct 
impression of expansionist tendencies.  
No doubt the Soviet Union viewed the United States in the same way, and historical 
accounts of the causes of the Cold War have swung to and fro on the question of 
assigning blame.
89
  Indeed the irony at the heart of the Cold War is that the Soviet 
move from ‗Socialism in one country‘ to a more expansionist communist ideology 
was a mirror image of the United States‘ move from liberty at home to a global 
liberal worldview.
90
  That the expansion of these two states‘ power capabilities 
moves largely in time with these shifts in strategic ideology is no coincidence, and 
the combination of two ideologically driven superpowers produced a conflict that 
was nothing short of a struggle for history, for the very organising principles of 
human life on Earth.  For the United States, once the nature of the Soviet Union had 
been established in the first months of 1946 the position was clear.
91
  Pearl Harbour 
had proved that American liberty could not be protected by disengaging from the 
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international system.
92
  Hereafter the United States would have to stand for liberty 
wherever it might be threatened.   
The strategy that emerged from this acknowledgement that American liberty did not 
exist in vacuo was one that once again balanced the defence of America‘s liberal 
identity with suspicion of foreign entanglements.  Containment was a pledge to 
defend liberty where Soviet expansion threatened to deprive people of it, to accept 
the status quo but refuse to brook any attempts to revise it in ways that diminished 
the twin poles of democracy and capitalism.  Moreover, it was a policy based upon 
and which reinforced American identity defined as liberty, an identity to which 
communism was a logically necessary threat independent of the Soviet Union‘s 
military capabilities.
93
 
Containment was therefore an expression of the universal nature of American values 
as much as it represented the zero-sum logic of a security dilemma.
94
  It also 
demonstrates how ―the cross-currents of uniqueness and universality‖ could be 
simultaneously integrated into American grand strategy.
95
  Containment resulted 
from domestic coalition-forming that tacked together Dean Acheson‘s Europe-first 
internationalists with the Asia-first school of Robert Taft in order to sustain general 
support for American internationalism, particularly among Congressional opinion.  
Driven by the likes of John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk, the strategy therefore 
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became a globalist anticommunist consensus, rooted in strategic ideas such as 
domino theory and monolithic communist expansionism.
96
   
For over forty years containment would swing between activism and détente, 
between imperialism and realism, reflecting the balance of ideas amongst hawks and 
doves, between universalists and exceptionalists.
97
  The experience of Vietnam in 
particular raised doubts about American ideals on the one hand and American 
capabilities on the other.  Vietnam ignited the containment debate, animating 
American politics from the Presidential candidacy of George McGovern to the 
songwriting of Bob Dylan, and from the revisionist history of William Appleman 
Williams to Henry Kissinger‘s concerns about overextension that underpinned his 
policy of détente.
98
  In response to what they saw as a collective failure of nerve by 
the Nixon and Carter administrations, neoconservatives argued for a revival of moral 
purpose and the assertive use of material power in American foreign policy.
99
  These 
arguments were heated, and produced very real changes in the rhetoric and policies 
used in pursuit of containment in the 1970s and 1980s under first Nixon, then Carter 
and then Reagan.
100
  But although these were significant strategic shifts, they were 
shifts of degree, questions of strategic means rather than ends.  The rationale for 
American internationalism – the threat to liberty represented by the Soviet Union – 
remained constant. 
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Beneath the minutiae of the operational ideas of containment as a military, political 
and economic strategy, the intentional idea of containing the Soviet Union became a 
basic assumption of American political life, a bipartisan consensus that allowed the 
realist and idealist conceptions of securing American liberty to coexist, ―without 
policymakers having to worry too much about whether we were containing the 
USSR for geopolitical balance of power considerations or for moral ideological 
reasons.‖
101
  For successive administrations, the Soviet Union ―represented a denial 
of America‘s own experience of nature‖ and so it was no longer enough that 
American values be transferable.  Instead, America had to build a grand strategy 
around the international indivisibility of liberty, and actually transfer American 
values to as many countries as possible, to build and sustain the political and 
economic superstructure of the free world.
102
 
America‘s grand strategy defined not just American internationalism, but also 
American culture.  Anticommunism energised politics in the United States from 
unions to universities and from movies to churches.  Containment thus infected 
American society and culture with the pathologies of nationalism, intolerance and 
suspicion.
103
  The Cold War thus provided for the United States a basic rationale for 
international involvement, a righteous struggle for American ideals and American 
security.   
Containment had, in sense and albeit temporarily, resolved the conceptual tensions 
at the very heart of liberty and exceptionalism that had seen the United States invoke 
their national ideology to justify both righteous imperialism and high-minded 
                                                 
101
 Ronald D. Asmus, The New U.S. Strategic Debate, ed. United States. Army., Arroyo Center., and 
Rand Corporation. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), x. 
102
 Foley, American Credo, 435-6. 
103
 Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996). 
 101 
neutrality over the previous centuries.
104
  The central paradox at the heart of the 
American national myth, between American uniqueness and the universal nature of 
the values that defined America itself, had caused American strategy to oscillate, ―at 
once aloof from and engaged in world affairs‖.
105
  Yet the presence of a strong and 
ideologically antithetical foe rendered that tension irrelevant, for exceptionalism 
would be for nought unless the United States fought for its universal worldview.  
The ideas of internationalism therefore triumphed in the containment consensus: the 
protection of American liberty at home necessitated America‘s support for liberty 
abroad. 
Conclusion:  After Containment –Victory, Loss and Uncertainty 
After forty years, the Cold War competition for history had become a basic fact of 
American life, and so when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
United States experienced a profound sense of loss.  The events of 1989 that brought 
down the Iron Curtain ―unleashed a political gale that swept across the Eurasian 
chessboard, leaving confused and toppled players in wholly new positions.‖
106
  In 
doing so the end of Cold War was not just an outcome of a power struggle, it was 
also a process of recognising and repositioning relative national identities.
107
  The 
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United States was victorious in the sense that that process bought much of the world 
into alignment with America‘s basic political identity, yet at the same time the end 
of the conflict left vacant the purpose to which that identity had been directed.  The 
comforting knowledge of clear enmity and purpose was replaced by moral and 
strategic ambiguity.  As Paul Kennedy wrote in 1993, ―the relief that the Soviet 
Union is no longer an ―enemy‖ is overshadowed by uncertainties about the United 
State‘ proper world role.‖
108
  Ronald Asmus explained the irony: 
―The paradoxical impact of the end of the Cold War is that it simultaneously 
vindicated American purpose and past policies and forced a rethinking of the 
assumptions that guided US foreign policy for nearly half a century.  While 
liberating the United States from its overriding concern with the Soviet threat, 
the end of the Cold War also compelled Americans to again confront core issues 
concerning definitions of our national interests and our role in the world.‖
109
 
The Cold War had expanded the American state, leaving a more powerful 
presidency, a more secretive government and less constraining Congress.  For some, 
the debate that needed to be had was not one of America‘s role in the world, but of 
the role in American life of the executive and legislative branches, the media and the 
military, of public opinion and freedom of information, of the restructuring of 
domestic liberties and industrial organisation in the move from war to peace.
110
  Yet 
there is little evidence that these questions were addressed among a political elite – 
in think tanks, universities and the bureaucracies – that owed its twentieth century 
growth to the grand strategy of anti-communist containment.  The debate in the 
1990s was not therefore about how to dismantle containment, but about what to 
replace it with.  
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The pole star that had guided American diplomacy, that had blinded many to the 
tensions of liberty and exceptionalism for so long, had been extinguished.  America 
had lost the ‗other‘ through which it had come to define not only its interests but 
itself.  If liberty had won, if the end of history had been reached, what was left of 
American identity that had from the very start defined itself through resistance 
against liberty‘s opponents?
111
  The United States at the beginning of the post-Cold 
War era was therefore alone, the only superpower left standing, and the rest of the 
world that had been caught up in the bipolar rivalry of the twentieth century looked 
towards Washington.  In his memoir Present at the Creation, Dean Acheson recalls 
thinking that the task that faced the United States after World War II was only a ―bit 
less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis.‖
112
  Now the 
United States faced having to redefine the international order for a second time, but 
on this occasion nobody had made plans for the job.  As Patrick Buchanan put it, the 
United States had no ready answer to the question of the war movies of his 
childhood: ―What are you going to do, Joe, when this is all over?‖
113
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CHAPTER 3:  „COME HOME, AMERICA‟ – 
NEOISOLATIONISTS, REALISTS  
AND THE RETREAT FROM GLOBALISM 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 set the scene for the debate surrounding American grand strategy that took 
place after the Cold War, a debate that was an important feature of the 1992 
Presidential election, which is this chapter‘s starting point for a discussion of the 
revival of the historical tensions between internationalism and isolationism.  This 
chapter presents a case-study of the strategic ideas presented by proponents of 
American disengagement following the Cold War to construct the first ideal-type 
grand strategy.  It begins by analysing the utility of the contested term ‗isolationism‘ 
to describe this strategic outlook, and considers the assumption of internationalism 
that neoisolationists complain is present in the very process of grand strategy 
formation itself.  It then proceeds to set out the grand strategy of disengagement, 
which identifies the sources of the United States‘ strategic immunity in the post-
Cold War world and argues for a refocusing of American priorities towards domestic 
concerns.  Those priorities included removing the constraints on individual liberty 
that had been justified by Cold War security concerns and focusing policy resources 
on the task of reviving the American domestic economy.  Retrenchment seeks to 
return the United States to the position of a ‗normal country‘, by dismantling 
America‘s Cold War infrastructure both at home and overseas.  The chapter argues 
that the neoisolationist and realist approaches to a strategy of disengagement are 
consistent strategies that have their roots in the theoretical ideas of defensive or 
minimal realism.  
 105 
Discarding The Cold War Mindset 
In the 1992 Presidential election the incumbent George H.W. Bush was defeated, 
despite a record of foreign policy achievement that had seen his administration 
preside over the peaceful defeat of the Soviet Union and the violent routing of Iraqi 
aggression in Kuwait.  In the absence of a serious foreign threat, domestic issues 
overshadowed foreign concerns for the first time since the 1930s.  That Ross Perot, 
with his ―long record of gun-slinging hypernationalism‖ was a plausible candidate, 
gaining almost 19% of the popular vote, revealed that the American public had 
already grown out of its Cold War mindset that judged potential Presidents on their 
likely calm in a crisis in the shadow of nuclear war.
1
 
In this period ―anti-internationalism‖ and ―foreign-affairs bashing‖ prevailed on the 
hustings and in Congress.
2
  On either side of party-political divide candidates in 
Presidential primaries exploited this inward turn to advocate domestic agendas and 
attack foreign policy elites.  On the democratic side Paul Tsongas focused on the 
scale of the budget deficit necessitated by high military spending, arguing that ―if 
our security needs have lessened, our level of military spending should reflect that 
change.‖
3
  America‘s Cold War leaders were out of touch, Jerry Brown said, ―more 
interested in a new world order 10,000 miles away than they are in a full 
employment economy‖, adding that he ―wouldn‘t give a penny for foreign aid until 
every small farmer, businessman and family [in the United States] are taken care 
of.‖
4
  That a realignment of American strategic concerns was so important now that 
the Cold War had ended was reflected in the serious challenge made for the sitting 
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President‘s Republican Party nomination by Pat Buchanan, the flag-bearer of the 
new American nationalism.  Ross Perot‘s independent candidacy in the general 
election itself was made possible by the success of Buchanan‘s challenge in the 
primary campaign, and he subsequently defined himself as an economic nationalist 
committed to balancing the federal budget.
5
 
All of this came out of a Cold War victory that left many on the right in particular 
searching for meaning.  Roland Steel‘s lament of an ‗ambiguous victory‘ is worth 
quoting at length: 
 ―During the Cold War we had a vocation; now we have none.  Once we had a 
powerful enemy; now it is gone... The world we knew has collapsed around us... 
Until the Cold War was over we did not appreciate that the conflict, for all its 
iniquities and dangers, imposed a kind of order on the world.  Now even that is 
gone... Yes, the other side lost.  But did we win?  And if so, was it because of 
our superior strength and values?  Or did we merely have deeper pockets than 
our foe?  And what does it mean to win?  What do we do with our victory?  
Who wants to be a superpower these days?  Who wants to pay the bills?  What 
is the point of being a superpower if there is only one of them?‖
6
 
Such questions left a nagging nostalgia for the Cold War, derived partly from that 
fact that it ―was easy to figure out‖.  Underneath the ideological overlay it was a 
classic conflict between states fought with the classic tools of statecraft.  It was a 
zero-sum game that everybody could understand, in which ―every arena was critical, 
every problem, by definition, a crisis.‖
7
  In setting up the struggle for the minds of 
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men, for their choice between the two universal ideologies of political and economic 
organisation, it provided a set of axioms for understanding the world.  The Cold War 
gave the United States a cause, deferent allies, and ―a role of undisputed boss of the 
realm we called the ―free world‖‖ and it neatly divided the world along clear lines of 
good and evil.
8
  It had changed the United States from a republic normally at peace 
into a national security state perpetually prepared for war, with a massive military-
industrial complex.
9
  Anticommunism was nothing less than the ―sextant by which 
the ship of state has been guided since 1945‖,
10
 and for its intellectual clarity and 
economic and bureaucratic largesse it was, according to one commentator, ―not 
surprising‖ that some ―actually miss the Cold War.‖
11
 
Yet what is striking is how this sense of loss was superseded by those that felt it 
most not by a rush to define a new purpose for America in the world but by the urge 
to withdraw from America‘s global role.  So strong was this conviction that it could 
even justify the disavowal of the Cold War commitment that had sustained a 
bipartisan internationalist consensus for forty years.  The doctrine of containment, 
one author argued, had ―warped our sense of national interest‖ and left America 
entangled ―in areas and issues of marginal utility to the United States while eroding 
America‘s wealth and prosperity.‖
12
  For the more positive, ―for the first time in half 
a century, the United States has the opportunity to reconstruct its foreign policy free 
of the constraints and pressures of the Cold War.‖
13
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In this reading, the Cold War was an anomaly, the bulk of a ―seventy year detour‖ 
from the main road of American diplomatic history.
14
  With victory assured and 
totalitarianism vanquished the immediate post-Cold War years in particular were 
characterised by a desire for America to withdraw from its global position and reap 
the benefits of its victory in that long and tiring conflict with the Soviet Union.  The 
United States was secure; its power total, its ideology unquestioned.  At the same 
time, many saw new threats to the United States arising from within rather than 
without, issues of public policy that had been neglected during the interminable 
emergency of the Cold War years.  It was time for the United States to discard its 
Cold War mindset, to resist the imperial temptations of its sole superpower status 
and ‗come home, America‘.
15
 
The „I‟-Word 
―And so we now come squarely and closely face to face with the issue which 
Americans most hate to face.  It is that old, old issue with those old, old battered 
labels – the issue of Isolationism versus Internationalism.  We detest both 
words.  We spit them at each other with the fury of hissing geese.‖ 
Henry Luce, ‗The American Century‘, 1941
16
 
That the United States should consider a policy of withdrawal from internationalism 
raised familiar passions.  The idea that America has ever had or sought to have a 
foreign policy that can be described as ‗isolationist‘ is a notion that has attracted a 
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great deal of controversy among politicians, commentators and scholars.
17
  This may 
derive from the fact that their chosen subject matter is foreign policy, and indeed the 
label ‗isolationist‘ has long been used as a ―conjuring trick‖ by internationalists, a 
stick with which to beat those who advocate a more restrained strategic posture, and 
―a hoodoo to call up whenever they feel threatened.‖
18
  The Cold War instantiated 
engagement as a defining norm of good policy, and as a result isolationism could be 
summarily dismissed, as Clinton‘s National Security Advisor did in a major foreign 
policy speech, as ―the rhetoric of Neo-Know-Nothings‖.
19
  Owen Harries and 
Michael Lind were not alone when as self-identified realists they complained of 
being labelled isolationist by proponents of foreign policy activism who ―relied on a 
tendentious misreading of American history, according to which either generations 
of foolish isolationism suddenly gave way to heroic internationalism in 1941 or 
1945, or an unbroken tradition of high-minded idealism from the Founding Fathers 
on effectively rules out realism as an approach to American foreign policy.‖
20
 
Indeed, isolationists tend to disavow the label, largely due to the opprobrium it 
attracts in public debate.  Perhaps the most high profile exponent, Patrick Buchanan, 
finds ―traditionalist-nationalist‖ more accurate, and prefers to use Lippmann‘s 
―enlightened nationalism‖.
21
  Far from representing the fringe grouping that 
isolationism has come to imply, this school sees themselves as being in tune with the 
overriding theme of American foreign policy, summarised by Washington‘s dictum 
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that the United States commits to ―temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.‖
22
   
Given this debate, it is worth a brief introduction to consider whether isolationism is 
the most appropriate way of characterising proposals for a rollback of American 
commitments and more limited American engagement with the world.  
‗Isolationism‘ is a difficult term to locate because its definition is both logically and 
empirically ambiguous.  First, it is not clear whether it refers to a policy of isolating 
or isolation.  Isolating oneself from particular aspects of international politics does 
not entail isolation.  So it is uncertain whether isolationism refers to a specific 
condition to be attained (isolation) or a more general tendency related to process.  
Second is the extent to which a policy of isolationism seeks to detach a state from 
international politics.  Is it that the policy seeks to avoid entanglement, or does it go 
even further and seek to avoid involvement?  Third is the sense of willingness – does 
the policy advocate detachment because the state doesn‘t need to engage itself, or 
because it doesn‘t want to become engaged? 
From these three considerations we can see that isolationism can be understood quite 
fairly to encompass a range of attitudes, from the wilful refusal to get involved in 
any aspects of international politics to such an extent that it might advocate a ban on 
all migration and trade, to a policy of selective engagement that seeks to maintain 
national freedom of action and judges involvements on the basis of necessity.  It is 
hard to imagine any state in the Westphalian era that has pursued the policy of pure 
isolationism suggested here, and indeed, William Appleman Williams dismissed 
American isolationism as a ‗legend‘, largely on the basis of its economic contacts 
with the world.
23
  Similarly, James Baker prefers to use ‗disengagement‘ to describe 
the prevailing American tradition up to 1941, arguing that America was never 
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isolated, but it was able to remain disengaged from world affairs, and ―to indulge in 
the fantasy of isolation‖.
24
 
Yet the fact that the United States – or any other nation for that matter – has not 
taken isolationism to its extreme logical conclusion should not render the term 
analytically useless, particularly if we regard it less as an ontological state than as a 
process that is directionally opposed to internationalism.  At the same time, there is a 
danger that this becomes hopelessly relative, that ‗isolationism‘ becomes no more 
than a term do denote a position ―one notch less internationalist than the one 
currently be defended.‖
25
 
David Dunn has objected that to use neoisolationism to describe this aspect of the 
1990s grand strategy debates is to lump together the realist end of internationalist 
sentiment, concerned with the dangers of imperial temptations and seeking to 
mitigate balancing behaviour, with the advocates of a more radical redefinition of 
American engagement with the world who would genuinely withdraw to a fortress 
America on the hill.  As he writes, ―It is only by conflating and confusing these 
phenomena... that it is possible to see the steady rise of neoisolationism as a serious 
development in the American foreign policy debate.‖
26
 
There are two rebuttals to be made here.  First, the ‗neo‘ prefix is a recognition that 
this sentiment is time-contingent, related to the post-Cold War moment.  It is about a 
significant shift in American strategy away from the previous position of total global 
engagement, and so may be related to but not equated with the limited 
internationalism of the interwar years.  Such a policy can be fairly characterised as 
neoisolationist whether justified by realist or radical rationales because it seeks to 
detach the United States from many of the engagements of the Cold War, just as the 
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isolationists of the twenties and thirties sought to detach the United States from the 
engagements of the League of Nations and great-power politics.  Second, as we shall 
see, it is unclear that Dunn‘s distinction between realist and radical approaches is 
one whereby the underlying philosophy defines the degree of retrenchment.  Whilst 
some neoisolationists are motivated by radical libertarian notions of the necessarily 
entangling effects of international engagement, others argue for similar degrees of 
withdrawal simply on the basis of a highly limited yet clearly realist conception of 
the American national interest.  In short, there aren‘t clearly distinct phenomena to 
conflate and confuse.
27
 
Whilst a few neoisolationists have been prepared to embrace the designation, 
scholars examining the debate have attempted to recapture the descriptive utility of 
term and free it from the realm of invective.  John Dumbrell admitted that he had 
―perhaps unwisely‖ attempted to rescue the term, though whether he is admitting 
naivety in believing such a liberation was possible or scolding his own attempt is 
unclear.
28
  Dumbrell‘s definition of isolationism as ―beliefs or policy propositions 
which tend to contradict the general thrust of post-1945 US internationalism‖ is 
rather too broad, because after any major conflict a degree of retrenchment is the 
normal course of policy.
29
  The issue with neoisolationism is one of degree – a 
neoisolationist policy must go further than realist predictions would expect a state to 
drawdown after the global commitments of a major conflict like the Cold War. 
What distinguishes neoisolationism from more standard realist responses to the 
disappearance of a major great power competitor is that their conception of the 
national interest, however derived, is so restrictive that it renders international 
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engagement not only unnecessary but counterproductive.
30
  Neoisolationists look to 
two elements in the national interest – the territorial integrity of the United States 
and the prosperity of its citizens.
31
  Or, as Doug Bandow, a fellow of the CATO 
Institute, the only major think tank to fully subscribe to the neoisolationist agenda 
during the 1990s, wrote, ―the purpose of the United States government [is] to protect 
the security, liberty and property of the American people‖.
32
  Such an outlook 
reflects the fact that isolationism is a unilateral policy, ―in that it involves a self-
centred act of non-engagement.‖
33
  That form of non-engagement rejects the 
institutions of internationalism founded by the first generation of Cold Warriors that 
binds the United States‘ freedom of action to multilateral frameworks, and seeks to 
return American foreign policy to the essential dictums of Washington and Jefferson 
and their single-minded focus on national survival.
34
 
This chapter examines the strategies that proposed that the United States retreat from 
its global Cold War role.  Some may be fairly considered neoisolationist, others are 
based on a limited conception of internationalism.  All advocate disengagement to 
greater or lesser degrees, and would have been the subject to the opprobrium of the 
‗isolationist‘ accusation from proponents of American primacy or liberal 
multilateralism.  In preference to what they deem ―vainglorious efforts to create a 
benign international environment‖, advocates of strategic disengagement regard the 
post-Cold War environment as anarchic, incapable of being ―led, managed or 
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stabilized.‖
35
  This school believes foreign policy is about making the best of bad 
choices, and disengagement is designed to reduce the number of those choices the 
United States will be forced to make and to provide flexibility of response.   
The Internationalist Assumption 
The basic approach of all of the strategy proposals advocating greater or lesser 
degrees of American disengagement is the same: by adopting a limited conception of 
the American national interest they produce a strategic assessment that limits the 
threats that the United States has to address through international engagement.  That 
America‘s national interest can be so limited rests on one, or a combination of two 
propositions.  First, that particular features of American geography and power 
relative to the rest of the world make it strategically immune.  Second, that 
American liberty may be threatened not by neglecting to universalise its 
prescriptions but by failing to create the domestic conditions for its flourishing.   
However, for one self-confessed neoisolationist merely engaging in a strategic 
assessment is to accept a number of unjustifiable internationalist assumptions.  In 
what is by far the most sophisticated of the genuinely neoisolationist texts, Eric 
Nordlinger complains that the even the narrowest definitions of strategy assume the 
necessity of interactions with others, making empirical assumptions of activism that 
implicitly downplay policies of nonengagement and inaction.  Indeed, even the most 
basic theoretical underpinnings of game theory allow only the activist options of 
cooperation or defection, neglecting the choice of disengagement, of refusing to play 
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the game.
36
  That Nordlinger can reject Thomas Schelling‘s conviction that if you 
are ―invited to play chicken and you say you would rather not, you have just played‖ 
(and lost) denotes a more sophisticated understanding of the security dilemma that 
denies that states are like units, or that all features of power are convertible between 
states.
37
  For Nordlinger then, the process of making an assessment of the strategic 
situation and adopting a strategy is less deterministic than that suggested by the 
dilemmas of rational actors seeking to maximise conflicting and shared interests.  
His resultant definition of a security strategy therefore subtly eschews zero-sum 
assumptions, to refer to ―any broad gauged policies that a state may adopt for the 
preservation and enhancement of its security.‖
38
   
Whilst this may not look particularly different to any of the conceptions of grand 
strategy discussed earlier, Nordlinger‘s definition does two very important, and for 
neoisolationists, useful, things.  First, in rejecting the internationalist assumptions of 
strategy it removes the basis upon which strategy is judged.  Rejecting the 
assumptions of game theory leaves us without strict predictors of state behaviour, 
and it becomes difficult, even invalid, to suggest what the reaction of another state to 
a policy of disengagement would be.  This theoretical move may be seen as usefully 
underpinning many neoisolationists‘ assault on the foreign policy-making ‗elite‘.  
Second, by rejecting the assumptions of security strategies it makes ‗security‘ 
ambiguous and therefore builds in a bias in favour of more limited definitions, 
because the criteria for establishing which elements may constitute security have 
been dismissed.  Nordlinger uses the space to discredit more expansive conceptions, 
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and as a result can summarily reject elements of ‗national security‘ as mere ‗milieu 
goals‘.
39
 
Nordlinger is right that game-theory doesn‘t provide the option of disengagement, 
but what he doesn‘t do is address the salient issue: whether national security 
strategies really are analogous to a prisoner‘s dilemma or stag hunt, that is to say, 
does international anarchy actually create those conditions?  There is a case to be 
made, but neither Nordlinger nor any of the other neoisolationists make it, which is 
perhaps just as well, because in spite of this interesting and potentially fruitful 
theoretical aside, Nordlinger, like all of the other advocates of international 
disengagement, takes the standard approach towards the strategic assessment, 
assessing the international environment, assigning threats and then establishing the 
most appropriate means to meet them.  Realists argue that in much of the post-Cold 
War debate this kind of serious geopolitical analysis is eschewed in favour of an 
attempt to articulate an idealist and engaged strategic vision for the United States.
40
  
Such a tendency cuts against the grain of American history, which has consistently 
made geopolitical realism the basis for any engagement in world affairs, valuing 
freedom of action above all else and creating an elaborate rhetorical superstructure 
of foreign policy only as a tool to gain public and congressional consent.
41
   
Thus what makes this branch of the debate in the 1990s distinctive is that whilst the 
advocates of primacy and multilateralism do so partially on the basis of what they 
view as America‘s Cold War success (they disagree regarding from what policies 
that success flowed), the case for disengagement is usually made on the basis that 
because the Cold War is over, the strategic environment is new, and Cold War 
knowledge is irrelevant.  This ―foreign policy equivalent of zero-based budgeting‖ 
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doesn‘t exclude the continuation of Cold War policies, but insists that the changes in 
the international system precipitated by the Soviet Union‘s collapse mean that 
engagements ―must be justified anew, regardless of any utility they had in the Cold 
War.‖
42
  For neoisolationists more than anyone else in the American grand strategy 
debate, the 1990s presented United States foreign policy with the opportunity and 
obligation to start with a blank slate. 
America‟s Strategic Immunity 
The most basic aspect of this school‘s strategic assessment is that it denies that 
American security is threatened, not because there are no potential threats, but 
because America is so secure.  Its adherents believe that ―America‘s major 
advantage is strategic immunity... the United States is unique not just ideologically 
but geographically.‖
43
  Protected to the East and West by two great oceans, with an 
ideologically aligned and historically peaceful neighbour to the north and 
fragmented and weak states to the south more interested in gaining the benefits of 
American power than challenging it, the United States is ‗security-rich‘.  This view 
sees a state‘s geopolitical security as being most fundamentally rooted in the nature 
of its geography, and so the United States‘ distance from the likely theatres of great 
power conflict not only means that it will be insulated from their effects but also that 
the US will not be regarded as threat to others‘ security.
44
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Central to the concept that the United States is strategically immune is the belief that 
America‘s nuclear weapons ―virtually eliminate the possibility of a conventional 
attack on US territory.‖
45
  Such is the ability of America‘s nuclear deterrent to inflict 
total destruction on any would-be first-strike enemy that ―there can be no politically 
rational motive‖ for such a strike, and so the possibility may be disregarded when it 
comes to defense planning.
46
  As Christopher Layne succinctly puts it, ―threats to 
commit suicide are inherently incredible – in both senses of the term.‖
47
   
Together with America‘s geographic advantages, the nuclear deterrent serves to 
confer full political sovereignty on the United States.  This was no new idea, the 
result of post-Cold War wishful thinking that the demise of the Soviet Union would 
somehow put an end to nuclear fear.  Instead, it draws on the theory of mutually 
assured destruction to argue for the obsolescence of balance-of-power alliances.  As 
early as 1972, isolationists were arguing that nuclear weapons confer such a surfeit 
of deterrent power that alliances cannot serve to enhance security, and in fact the 
need to act on behalf of allies may itself increase potential threats.
48
  Twenty years 
later, that argument was being revived in the face of the increasing likelihood of 
nuclear proliferation:  
―As the membership of global nuclear club expands, alliances are dangerous 
arrangements that can needlessly entangle the United States in conflicts that 
might go nuclear... If U.S. policy does not change, the United States will find 
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itself having to shield an assortment of nonnuclear allies from a rogues‘ gallery 
of nuclear-armed adversaries.‖
49
 
Thus the argument that underpins strategies advocating disengagement is that the 
United States is in the uniquely advantageous strategic position of being isolated 
from the threats of the strategic environment.  The nexus of geographical advantages 
and nuclear weapons raises the bar of American deterrence so high as to be absolute 
– the United States is both insulated and invulnerable, ―doubly immune, which is to 
say maximally secure, despite minimal security efforts.‖
50
  Underlying American 
security is the fact that the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union‘s global ambitions left questionable the indivisibility of international security 
that had been the key tenet of American internationalism.  Local problems once 
more become local, not global.
51
   
―It is time to re-examine the first principles and assumptions – both stated and 
unspoken – that have shaped America‘s vision of world order and the imperial 
conception of security that underpins it.‖
52
 
Thus the combination of the absence of zero-sum global conflict, America‘s 
geographic situation and its nuclear deterrent ensure that the United States retains 
the luxury of the strategic choice of where, when and on whose terms to act outside 
of its own borders.  Even were another state foolish enough to attempt to threaten the 
United States, as Patrick Buchanan concludes, no other nation ―has the luxury 
America does, of time, space, and power, to observe at a distance and assess whether 
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some emergent menace is a true peril – to us.‖  Quoting Washington, he asks ‗why 
forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?‘
53
 
All variants of disengagement strategies – from neoisolationist pleas for near total 
withdrawal to realist arguments for selective and ad hoc international engagement – 
base their arguments on the fact of America‘s strategic immunity and a limited 
conception of the national interest.  America does not need, as a rule, to go out into 
the world in order to secure its security, and the conflicts of others can rarely be 
fundamental to the United States‘ territorial or ideological integrity.  Moreover the 
United States was unable to intervene effectively in others‘ conflicts.  William 
Hyland, a highly experienced foreign policy official and the then-editor of Foreign 
Affairs, asserted that America‘s strategic position was – paradoxically – weaker as a 
consequence of 1989.  In his view, the breakdown of the geopolitical alignments of 
the Cold War had served to devolve power away from the institutional arrangements 
of containment controlled by Washington and reduce the dependency of allies on the 
United States, with the result that America could not ―have anything approaching the 
freedom of action it enjoyed in the Cold War decades.‖
54
  The columnist William 
Pfaff agreed, arguing that the collapse of superpower rivalry had abolished 
superpower status itself.  There was not therefore a single superpower – the United 
States – there were none.
55
  Once this actual consequence of the illusory victory in 
the Cold War was recognised, realism‘s expectations mandate a strategy that will 
delay balancing by attempting to reduce the sense of threat that American power 
provokes.  Nordlinger therefore neatly summarises the realist position of restraint 
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despite apparent dominance when he states that ―going abroad to ensure America‘s 
security is unnecessary, doing so regularly detracts from it‖
56
 
This is the ‗internationalist temptation‘.  By engaging with the conflicts of others, by 
allying and entering into treaty commitments, the United States exposes itself to 
discord with others when it has no need to do so, and the costs of maintaining 
alliance commitments may divert resources from where they are really needed: the 
home front.
57
  Liberty, and so American identity, is to be preserved within the 
borders of the United States, so that America may be a beacon of righteousness, 
rising above the waves of a world order that more than ever is characterised by 
disorder.  Surprise that the post-Cold War world was even more violent despite the 
removal of the Soviet Union must not induce the United States to define its interests 
more widely than they really reside, or to believe that US involvement is a universal 
solution to others‘ problems. 
America‘s strategic immunity is therefore both the guarantor and the source of an 
inward-focused American nationalism.  The strategic environment to which the 
United States should focus its attention is not the great-power posturing of 
international relations but the domestic arena in which America‘s fate is held.  As 
Lincoln warned:  
 ―At what point shall we expect the approach of danger?... Shall we expect some 
transatlantic military giant, to step the Ocean, and crush us at a blow?  Never!  
All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined... with a Bonaparte for a 
commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on 
the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.... If destruction be our lot, we 
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must ourselves be its author and finisher.  As a nation of freemen, we must live 
through all time, or die by suicide.‖
58
  
„It‟s The Economy, Stupid‟ – Domestic Post-Cold War Priorities 
America‘s uniquely strong position at the end of the Cold War presents the 
opportunity to radically reconsider the priorities of the American nation.  It is not 
simply that, as Nau puts it, ―America has never felt at home abroad.‖
59
  Instead, it is 
argued that long-neglected domestic concerns needed to feature higher on the list of 
priorities given that the resources that had been devoted to containing the Soviet 
Union were no longer required for foreign policy.  The 1992 presidential election 
bore testament to this, as James Carville‘s pithy précis of Democratic candidate Bill 
Clinton‘s agenda became the slogan to define the campaign.  For all President 
Bush‘s foreign policy successes, from the peaceful fall of Communism to the 
reversal of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, the American public were focused on the 
pressing necessities of a recession that had hit the middle classes, and it was their 
assessment of Bush‘s economic performance that proved decisive.
60
  Much like the 
British public‘s decision in 1945 to oust a respected foreign policy leader, in 1992 
the United States believed that the war was won, and it was time to focus on 
prosperity at home, on challenges that were both significant and pressing in their 
own right, and which spoke to America‘s exceptional self-image. 
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―Our domestic troubles are not in a realm separate from our foreign policy.  
They are an integral part, even a product, of it.  A nation that pretends not only 
to protect, but inspire, the world with its values and achievements must be able 
to offer at least as much to its own people as to those it seeks to guard.‖
61
 
Thus the foreign policy story of the 1992 election was that an Arkansas governor 
with no previous military or foreign policy experience was able to get elected on a 
promise not to be a foreign policy president.  In 1992 ―the national mood was clearly 
to lessen the burdens of international leadership and to ask others to accept more 
responsibility for military security, foreign aid, and support for international 
organization.‖
62
  For the previous forty years American politics on issues from 
technology to sport had been totally subsumed by the foreign policy framework of 
the Cold War.  The first post-Cold War presidential election was a reminder, as the 
Heritage Foundation noted in its contribution to the debate, of the long-forgotten 
truth that: 
―Foreign policy is domestic policy... [it] is not an end in itself, but a means to 
secure the greatest possible degree of liberty, freedom and opportunity for 
Americans from foreign threats.  It has no other purpose.‖
63
 
Such was the dominance of domestic issues in the prevailing mind-set in 1992 that 
for two scholars of American history ―It was only a short step from that attitude to 
isolationism, 1930s style.‖
64
  Yet there was a definite split among the advocates of 
retrenchment when it comes to the relationship between domestic policy and a 
reduced foreign policy activism.  The foreign policy realists saw these issues entirely 
from a foreign policy perspective – the use of American power in the world will 
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provoke threats in reaction to it, and so a reduction in the United States‘ foreign 
entanglements will increase American security whilst providing the domestic fillip 
of cost savings in the defense budget.  Realists‘ belief that the use of power provokes 
resistance leads them to focus on the costs and dangers of globalism and unipolarity, 
rejecting the temptation to perform international ‗social work‘ and judging that the 
United States‘ engagement with conflicts in which it has no direct interest makes it 
less secure.
65
   
This school of thought should not be confused with the liberal isolationist impulse 
which had largely died out by the 1990s.  Emerging in the wake of the Vietnam War, 
liberal isolationism worries ―that the world is pure while America is not, and hence 
America‘s forays into the world are likely to generate evil results.‖
66
  Liberal 
isolationism is opposed to America intervening in the world not on the security basis 
that it is likely to harm the United States but on the moral basis that the United 
States is likely to cause harm to others, and was embodied by the Presidential 
candidacies of George McGovern, who wanted to ensure that ―there will be no more 
Asian children running ablaze from bombed-out schools.‖
67
   
Ending the Cold War at Home 
The neoisolationists of the 1990s were largely conservative, nationalist and 
concerned about the world‘s effect on America rather than America‘s action in the 
world.  Conservative neoisolationists base their isolationism on the ―conviction that 
America is pristine and the world corrupt, and hence maintaining America‘s purity 
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requires that it stay out of the evil world‖
68
  Their focus then is not on the foreign 
policy arena per se, but on foreign policy‘s capacity to impact upon America at the 
domestic level, in particular by restricting domestic liberties in the cause of national 
security.  They believe that the security and prosperity of the American people is 
most likely to be assured by a focus on domestic policy and a watchful but 
disengaged and uncommitted foreign policy.  Thus the neoisolationist movement in 
the 1990s is chiefly concerned with rebuffing new foreign policy visions – denying 
that the ‗hole in the doughnut‘, as the American political scientist Michael 
Mandelbaum characterised it, needs to be filled.
69
  
The domestic arena, in this view, had been long neglected as a result of the attitudes 
of the ―globalist elites‖ and ―bureaucratic-military empire‖ that had come to hold a 
grip on American foreign policy during the Cold War, a power which they were 
loath to yield.
70
  These elites viewed the position of the United States in the world as 
a reflection of their own status, and worried that that following the break-up of the 
Soviet Union their importance would be reduced by a more circumscribed role for 
the United States.  As one academic noted, the notion that America may not have 
global interests is hard for foreign policy professionals with three generations‘ 
experience of running the world to deal with.   
―Experts... often know a great deal about their subject.  But as with every 
speciality, they are particularly attached to it.  They tend to elevate it in 
importance above everything else.  Often they have little perspective, and lost 
track of the concerns of the person in the street.  They tend to get contorted in 
considerations of ‗credibility‘, ‗national prestige‘ and ‗influence‘.  They are 
suckers for abstractions like ‗leadership‘ and ‗stability‘.
71
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Now that their defining bipolar contest was over, the subsequent threat to their 
professional identity helps to explain the ―frantic‖ search for new missions and 
visions for United States foreign policy, efforts that the CATO Institute concluded 
―are so wide ranging as to constitute a campaign of threat procurement.‖
72
  Realist 
and neoisolationists were therefore united in their concern to debunk constructed 
threats, to ensure that American foreign policy could not persist at a level of 
engagement that was more reflective of bureaucratic inertia than the strategic 
environment. 
Such arguments were therefore present both in the reactionary nationalism of Pat 
Buchanan and the more sophisticated realism of some significant luminaries of the 
foreign policy establishment.  Charles Maynes, the influential editor of Foreign 
Policy magazine, wrote that the Cold War had fundamentally changed the nature of 
American society and in particular the relationship between its people and its 
government.  America‘s separation of powers meant that in foreign policy the 
country had been unable to speak with one voice, placing the United States at a 
disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union‘s ability to communicate accurately and 
act swiftly.
73
  Morton H. Halperin concurred, arguing that compensating for this 
weakness in the ―bellicose climate‖ of the ultra-securitised Cold War conflict had 
led ―policymakers to adopt, and led the public to accept, restraints on freedom 
unprecedented in peacetime.‖  The power of the military-industrial complex; the 
designation of enemy ideologies; the annexation of constitutional powers by the 
executive from Congress; the culture of classifying information; the secret 
institutions of the national security infrastructure; all redefined the American 
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people‘s relationship with their government to the detriment of their constitutional 
rights.
74
 
Although the Cold War was over the institutions of containment survived, ―a 
burgeoning bureaucracy in search of a new mission.‖
75
  The consequences of this 
bureaucracy on the health of American democracy had been little considered during 
the Cold War, due to an establishment consensus that elevated national security 
above the usual political debate.  But now that liberalism had triumphed, the 
preservation of liberty at home was no longer an issue of protecting the United 
States from foreign foes but of protecting the American people from their 
government, which in the field of international affairs, as the editor of Foreign 
Policy noted, had more capacity to affect the American people‘s lives and welfare 
than in any other area.  The end of the Cold War therefore needed to stimulate a 
debate about foreign policy that was prior to its domestic effects, to reap a peace 
dividend that was ―not just about the money that will be freed up‖ but is also about 
―the categories of thought that will finally be opened up.‖
76
  The lack of any 
significant reassessment of the national security infrastructure of the Cold War after 
1989 led Halperin, a veteran of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, to go as far 
as to call for Congressional hearings on the domestic legacy of containment in a bid 
to ―End the Cold War at Home.‖
77
   
Whilst the regeneration of both American democracy and capitalism is central to the 
neoisolationist platform, the notion that the maxims of market democracy could 
become an organising principle for American engagement with the world was 
fiercely resisted.  The idea that there is any correlation between free markets, 
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democracy and pacifity in international affairs is thus rejected as a ―provincial 
conceit, a delusion rather than a policy.‖
78
  Whilst promoting democracy may be ―a 
laudable American ambition‖, it ―could become a perilous guide to policy... It is one 
thing to support the new democracies of Eastern Europe that have liberated 
themselves, but it would be another matter to intervene to institute democracy‖.
79
 
Thus in the 1990s neoisolationist sentiment, broadly conceived, was about more than 
simply retreating to a fortress America to celebrate a famous victory.  Having 
concluded that America‘s security from external threats was effectively assured, 
neoisolationists repeat a strategic assessment at the domestic level to assess the 
threats to liberty that come from inside the state.  Neoisolationists therefore focused 
inward, recognising that American identity as defined during the Cold War was 
unsustainable, that liberty could no longer be sustained simply by anticommunism, 
and that America therefore needed to realign its priorities from the inside-out, once 
again paying most attention to issues of domestic liberty and prosperity.   
―For as long as most of us can remember, foreign policy has dominated our 
national agenda.  Our domestic needs have consistently been sacrificed to it.  
We have turned security against foreign challengers into a shibboleth.  But we 
have neglected the threats to our own security that come from within.‖
80
 
Immigration and the Multicultural Society 
The most prominent of these threats arises from the linked issues of immigration, 
demographics and multiculturalism, which together threatened to push the United 
States towards heterogeneity and social fragmentation.  In the absence of an external 
other to bind the nation together, America‘s ideological national identity – 
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summarised in the motto a plurabis unum – was under threat.  American foreign 
policy had become one of ‗particularism‘, devoted to promoting highly specific 
ethnic and commercial interests, which substitutes the rights of individuals for the 
rights of ethnic groups and lobbies.
81
   
Indeed, it was the lack of direction and the open debate of the early post-Cold War 
period that allowed lobbying by ethnic minorities to make their kinsmen‘s cause 
America‘s cause.
82
  Whether it was relations with Britain being made more difficult 
by Irish Americans‘ closeness to republicans in Northern Ireland; the easing of 
restrictions towards Cuba being blocked by swing-vote Cuban Americans; the Israel 
lobby‘s effect on Middle East policy or NATO expansion being driven by the need 
to appeal to voters of East European origin, ―pandering to ethnic constituencies‖ had 
become an ―accepted norm‖ in post-Cold War American foreign policy.
83
  For 
Stephen Walt, this constituted a dangerous imbalance in American foreign policy, 
between the organised and particular interests which constantly push the United 
States to do more things in more places, ―and the far-weaker groups who think we 
might be better off showing a bit more restraint.‖
84
 
For realists and neoisolationists, this hijacking of the national interest threatens to 
undermine the American identity that it purports to serve.  No less powerful a voice 
than Samuel Huntington regarded the fate of the Soviet Union as a ‗sobering 
example‘: 
―The United States and the Soviet Union were very different, but they also 
resembled each other in that neither was a nation-state in the classic sense of the 
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term. In considerable measure, each defined itself in terms of an ideology, 
which, as the Soviet example suggests, is likely to be a much more fragile basis 
for unity than a national culture richly grounded in history. If multiculturalism 
prevails and if the consensus on liberal democracy disintegrates, the United 
States could join the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history.‖
85
 
Immigration without assimilation was therefore a malignant force undermining 
American identity and distorting the national interest.  As a nation based on the idea 
of liberty, the dilution of commitment to that founding ideology was as great a threat 
as to the United States itself as any threat to the integrity of American territory.  For 
Patrick Buchanan mass immigration and the radical demographic alteration that it 
might cause constituted ―the most immediate and serious problem facing the United 
States in this hemisphere‖.
86
  Liberal attitudes towards immigration therefore struck 
at the heart of America itself: 
―When we say we will put America first, we mean also that our Judeo-Christian 
values are going to be preserved, and our Western heritage is going to be handed 
down to future generations, not dumped into some landfill called 
multiculturalism.‖
87
  
This kind of rhetoric reflects that strand in American history that relies less on the 
abstract idea of the preservation of American identity as liberty than it does on racial 
and religious prejudice.  Charles Krauthammer, no leftist liberal himself, was moved 
to accuse Buchanan of ―subliminal appeals to prejudice‖.
88
  Yet at the same time it 
was clear that the American public was expressing a conscious preference for 
European over Asian and Latin American immigration, and growing concerns about 
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the integrative nature of a multicultural society had led twenty-one states to pass 
legislation making English their official state language.
 89
  Writing in The National 
Interest, James Kurth went so far accuse the American intellectual class, in their 
advocacy of a multicultural America, of being ―present at the deconstruction of 
Western civilization.‖
90
 
This focus on immigration reflects the expansionary approaches to national security 
that came to prominence in the post-Cold War period and that see any threat to a 
country‘s population‘s quality of life as a security concern.
91
  Yet one would not 
expect a school of thought whose modus operandi is so distinctly realist to embrace 
such an expansive notion of security.  For the neoisolationists it was a useful tool of 
nationalism in that securitising domestic issues allowed them to capture the 
intellectual space and resources that might otherwise be devoted to internationalism; 
for the realists it was about ensuring a unified conception of the national interest.  
But whether the underlying motivation arises from the recognition that American 
identity requires a sustained and consistent ideological commitment or whether this 
stream of conservative neoisolationism is simply the refuge of the disgruntled white 
man, there is no doubt that throughout the 1990s immigration was as contentious an 
issue as any aspect of foreign or domestic policy. 
The main catalyst of immigration‘s rise as an increasing concern of the American 
public during the early 1990s was their economic worries.   In 1993, nearly two-
thirds of survey respondents felt immigration should be lowered, nearly seventy 
percent believed that most new immigrants were in the country illegally, a majority 
felt that immigrants tended to cause problems for American society and over a third 
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felt immigrants took American jobs.  Such sentiments confirmed a sustained trend in 
US public opinion in which the desire for reduced immigration is highly correlated 
with levels of unemployment.
92
  It was therefore natural for neoisolationists to raise 
immigration and integration concerns as part of a broader focus on domestic 
economic issues.  Indeed, by the mid-1990s it was possible to discern a new ―fiscal 
politics of immigration‖ in which immigration, and in particular the cost of 
providing social services for immigrants, were depicted as a drain on government 
funds, as ―growing anti-immigrant sentiment coalesced with the forces of fiscal 
conservatism to make immigrants an easy target of budget cuts.‖
93
 
The Economy 
The recession of the early 1990s was the overriding feature of all areas of American 
policy debate.  By 1990 US economic expansion had ground to a halt, labouring 
under the burdens of rising oil prices, a capital shortage, tightening credit markets 
and a burden of public and private debt.  Growth in the 1980s had been fuelled by a 
―borrowing binge‖ to fund trade and budget deficits, and the United States had taken 
the dubious title of the world‘s largest debtor nation.
94
  With the federal budget 
deficit restricting government‘s ability to use fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, 
balanced-budget conservatism became a major force in American politics, in 
particular with neoisolationists who believed that the major areas in which 
government had become too big were expressions of a sustained Cold War 
internationalism that was now redundant.  With its ―omnipresent focus on deficits, 
spending cuts and tax avoidance‖ balanced-budget conservatism was used by 
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conservatives to ―celebrate meat-axe approaches‖ to public spending.
95
  Its 
legislative expression was the Republican Party‘s 1994 Contract with America, 
which of the ten policy-planks it set out for a Republican-led Congress only one 
related to foreign policy, and that was a pledge to prevent American troops coming 
under foreign command.  The Contract was a manifesto for small government, 
calling for zero base-line budgeting of the entire Federal budget and a legislative 
bias against tax increases.
96
   
Part of this emphasis on budget deficits stemmed from the need to compete with 
Japan, which had emerged as the world‘s most competitive economic power and 
biggest creditor, having exploited the ‗new industrial revolution‘ in manufacturing 
and invested heavily in research and development.
97
   Japan‘s economy had grown 
rapidly and consistently as a de facto American protectorate during the Cold War, 
and by 1991 it was the second-largest economy in the world with growth rates over 
the previous three years above 5%, whilst in the same year America slipped into 
recession.
98
  Concern about trade relations with Japan had been building since the 
mid-1980s, but with the end of the Cold War came the realisation that America‘s 
alliance with Japan could no longer proceed upon the premises it had for the 
previous forty years.
99
   
Ironically, Japan‘s economic accomplishments that now so concerned American 
policymakers were the result of America‘s long-term economic strategy in the 
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Pacific rim.
100
  Since the United States had focused its resources on defeating 
communism it had been unable to invest domestically, and now its economy was 
structurally deficient compared to Japan‘s, which had been a free-rider on American 
security guarantees for the better part of forty years.  With the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat Tokyo no longer needed to defer to the United States, with the result 
that by the early 1990s the relationship was becoming more fractious, ―its tone 
increasingly acrimonious and its original post-war rationale now largely 
irrelevant.‖
101
  One contribution to the debate, which was translated into both 
Japanese and Chinese, went as far as to argue that a second war in the Pacific was 
unavoidable.
102
   
The suggestion that the success of Japan‘s export-led growth could be in large part 
attributed to the security umbrella provided by the United States was an open goal 
for neoisolationists who argued for a drawdown of American overseas commitments 
in favour of domestic investment.
103
  Yet at the same time the less nationalist 
amongst them were cautious not to fall into the trap of regarding Japanese growth as 
a security threat requiring American political and military engagement.
104
  As the 
realist editor of Foreign Affairs noted, ―efforts to depict Japanese economic success 
as a security threat comparable to the Soviet military menace can succeed only if 
hysteria replaces common sense.‖
105
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Such hysteria was not in short supply.  Jeffrey Garten, an investment banker who 
had worked on economic policy for the Nixon administration, presented the idea that 
it was not just Japan, but the newly reunified German economy, that were the two 
poles to which power was shifting, and that the economic rivalry between those two 
pacifist trading states and the world‘s policeman might constitute a ‗Cold Peace‘ in 
the coming era.  This economic competition represented the most severe challenge 
the United States had faced since 1941.   
―We are in danger of become a hobbled power, and, based on current trends, a 
second-rate country in the areas that will count most in the coming world order.  
More significantly, we risk the prospect of a declining standard of living, with 
attendant social strife and increasing dependence on other nations for critical 
capital and technology... with all that and more, is there any wonder why we 
should be thinking about Japan and Germany and all they represent in terms of 
the competition we face, the cooperation we need, and, most of all, the urgency 
of getting a grip on ourselves at home?‖
106
  
That this type of thinking was so salient during Clinton‘s first term in office was 
made clear by Garten‘s selection by the new administration as Under Secretary for 
International Trade, a powerful position in a government that seemed to be moving 
from geopolitics towards a focus on geo-economics, closely monitored by an activist 
and inward-looking Congress that that for the first time in forty years refused to 
extend fast-track authorisation to a US trade negotiation.
107
  The political difficulty 
that the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
presented reflected the fact that the early 1990s was a period in which 
―protectionism in trade has much greater support than at any time since the 
1930s.‖108  Agreed and signed by George H.W. Bush before he left office, NAFTA 
was initially opposed by a good deal of Congressional opinion on the basis of a 
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populist and nationalist desire to maintain America‘s industrial base in an era where 
outsourcing was already transforming the United States into a services-dominated 
economy.
109
  Largely based around the representatives of organised labour within 
the Democratic Party but led by the activism of Ross Perot, opposition to the 
agreement was unusually heated and public for what remained a ―dull as dishwater‖ 
trade agreement.
110  
Portraying Mexico as weak, dependent and corrupt, 
neoisolationist sentiment stoked fears that NAFTA would force American workers 
to accept lower wages and higher taxes.
111
 
Another aspect of the conservative neoisolationists‘ irascibility with NAFTA was 
that in reality it was a foreign policy issue of providing material and legitimising 
support for a democratic and market-reformist government in Mexico.
112
  Some of 
the key objections to NAFTA were that it would subvert representative government 
to a trade policy governed by a NAFTA bureaucracy and international lawyers.
113
  
Neoisolationists worried that it entangled American prosperity with Mexico‘s 
economic success, and that its advocates could use the success of NAFTA to justify 
an ever more extensive agenda of foreign agreements advancing both free trade and 
its associated international institutions and an idealised crusade to support and 
spread democratic governance.  Thus one feature of the Congressional debate was 
the deliberate conflation of trade and foreign policy issues, leading one critic to snap 
that ―protectionism and isolationism are sisters under the skinheads‖
114
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Following NAFTA‘s eventual ratification after a political-capital-sapping campaign 
by the Clinton administration, a 1994 ABC News/Washington Post poll showed 
respondents rejecting a leadership role for the United States in favour of reducing 
American involvement in world affairs by 27% to 67%.
115
  The midterm elections 
later that year that ushered in one of the least internationalist Congressional 
memberships ever could therefore be understood as Americans ―stampeding back 
into the laager from which they were forced to emerge in 1941.‖
116
   Over half of the 
members of the 104
th
 Congress had served less than five years on the Hill, and many 
proudly declared they did not even have passports.
117
  Responding to criticism that 
the new Congress was isolationist, Newt Gingrich argued that America‘s ambitions 
had to have a limit.   
―A conservative watching a feckless liberal throw away American money in an 
utterly infantile pursuit of projects that have no hope, it‘s not isolationism to say 
that‘s stupid.‖
118
 
The ‗infantile pursuits‘ in which the American government was engaged were 
numerous.  In search of a low tax, small government economy, balanced-budget 
conservatives and neoisolationists advocated swathing cuts in a range of areas, most 
deeply in what might collectively be characterised as the United States‘ 
internationalism budget.  Any federal money spent for the benefit of anything other 
than a highly narrow definition of national security was waste.  The means of Cold 
War strategy were to be re-appropriated so the American people could have a 
balanced budget and lower taxes, in a set of proposals that amounted to ―the most 
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severe restructuring of the US foreign policy apparatus since these institutions were 
established in the late 1940s.‖
119
 
A Normal Country In A Normal Time – Retrenching The American Empire 
For neoisolationists, the institutions with which the United States had fought the 
Cold War amounted to two massive empires.  Realists were most concerned about a 
foreign empire that entangled the United States in the affairs and conflicts of foreign 
nations in ways that threatened American security, and, the neoisolationists added, 
all at an enormous economic cost to the United States.   A second concern was the 
effect of a domestic bureaucratic empire that threatened American liberty by 
extending the purview of government deep into American society.  A zero-based 
budgeting approach to reviewing the architecture of the Cold War therefore reflected 
the need to make budget cuts in order to free up resources for the needs of the 
domestic economy and the desire to revive American liberty by rolling back the 
forces of the state.  This task was nothing less than the rebuilding of America 
through the demolition of its Cold War commitments, to force allies to take 
responsibility for their own security and ensure that American power could only be 
used in pursuit of American interests.  In a world in which there was ―no pressing 
need for heroism and sacrifice‖ the time for Americans to bear unusual burdens had 
passed and the United States could become ―an independent nation in a world of 
independent nations.‖
120
  In short, the United States could behave like a normal 
nation, and keep its troops and its money at home.
121
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In order to achieve this normality, the United States needed to fundamentally 
reconceptualise its role in the international order to reflect American society‘s 
willingness to pay for it.
122
  In the post-Cold War era, few international issues would 
threaten the nation's territorial integrity, political independence or material welfare, 
so that ―America can choose not to become involved in many conflicts.‖
123
  Now 
that the indivisibility of international security and prosperity need not be 
presupposed, focusing upon and protecting America‘s vital interests should be an 
easier task, and by recalibrating American strategy along the lines of its vital 
interests the United States could avoid the temptations of international leadership 
and their associated costs which threatened a ―most worrisome means-ends gap‖.
124
  
For all the talk of exploiting a peace dividend the United States was already 
suffering from a strategy-forces-budget mismatch that meant that ―sooner rather than 
later it will be a case of raise the anchor or lower the ship.‖
125
   
At the same time, retrenchment was not solely a means to cut budgets for the short-
term benefit of the American people.  It also reflected the deeply realist belief that if 
American power was too engaged in the world it would provoke retaliation towards 
it.  Here was the essential policy challenge of the security dilemma: to balance the 
need to deploy military forces that were capable of deterring potential aggressors 
and defending against threats with the necessity of preventing challengers from 
rising by appearing non-threatening.  Neoisolationists, however, believed that 
America was in a unique position to avoid having to walk this particular tightrope if 
it retrenched itself sufficiently: 
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―The dilemma‘s viselike (sic) grip can be released for a strategically immune 
America situated at great distances from any challengers, one whose security 
interests are circumscribe by an exceptionally narrow core perimeter.‖
126
 
Thus the underlying rationale of realist and neoisolationist grand strategy proposals 
was to use America‘s strategic immunity to underpin a reduction in America‘s 
global military commitments, to ―attain safety and prosperity by carrying a 
significantly lower international profile.‖
127
  Such a strategy would enhance 
America‘s security by ensuring that the inevitable transition to a multipolar world 
could be a peaceful one whilst concentrating on servicing the internal elements of 
American power and security.  The unipolar moment was an illusion, and neither 
benign nor preventative strategies could prevent the rebalancing of world order away 
from hegemony.
128
  America‘s success in the new century would depend on the 
extent to which it embraced this inevitability, accepted that ―over time the position 
of preponderance that we have acquired with the close of the Cold War inevitably 
must weaken‖ and recognised that the United States ―ought to avoid doing things 
that speed up that process‖.
129
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America’s Redundant Alliances 
―America cannot afford to pursue the mirage of a new world order, nor can it 
tolerate the continuing haemorrhage of its wealth to subsidize the defense of 
prosperous allies who are now capable of defending themselves.‖
130
 
The central feature of the United States‘ global commitments was the system of 
military alliances that had been carefully constructed to constitute an anti-communist 
bloc over the previous forty years.  The question in 1991, given the collapse of the 
nation that inspired those alignments, was what continued to justify the military 
budgets they commanded?
131
  Apart from the first law of bureaucratic survival, the 
neoisolationist answer was ‗very little‘.  Yet many American strategists advocated 
policies designed to ensure that those allies – potential great powers in their own 
right – regarded the gap to the United States as too big to be closed and thus choose 
to bandwagon with rather than balance against American system dominance.  
Neoisolationists regarded this position as expensive, arrogant and dangerous.  It 
required the United States to be perpetually involved in quarrels in which it could 
have no direct interest; it presumed to replace national sovereignty with American 
security guarantees; and it imagined that American ‗reassurance‘ is universal, and 
that it could somehow serve to simultaneously reassure without constituting a threat 
to anyone.  Such a strategy cast the United States not as an honest broker but as a 
―meddlesome belligerent‖.
132
  The end of the Cold War provided the opportunity to 
recalibrate American entanglements, the first task of which was to deconstruct the 
rationale for America‘s global apparatus of military bases and capacity for 
worldwide intervention.  This ―strategic internationalism‖, Nordlinger wrote, ―is 
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expensive.  It is all the more so when wealthy allies do not contribute their fair 
share‖.
133
   
In East Asia, from Tokyo to Bangkok via Seoul, Manila, Taipei and Saigon, the 
United States dominated the Pacific Rim through a network of alliances and security 
guarantees that had ensured the dominoes stayed standing during the Cold War.  The 
United States had overseen the growth of Korea from an impoverished and war-torn 
society into an economic powerhouse, in stark contrast to its communist neighbours 
in the North.  As the CATO Institute‘s Handbook for Congress argued: 
―there is no special gravitational field on the Korean peninsula that prevents 
those living in the South from constructing a military as powerful as – or even 
more powerful than – that possessed by the North.  Rather, for years South 
Korea has chosen not to match the North's military effort… a curious way for a 
nation allegedly under siege to act.‖
134
 
Other American commitments could be scaled back too, including the ‗basically 
useless‘ ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand that was a manifestation 
of ‗pactomania‘ in the 1950s and in which no possible threat to American interests 
could be constructed.  The defense treaty with Pakistan, more worryingly, proffered 
the prospect of entangling the United States in a conflict on the turbulent Indian 
subcontinent.
135
  Yet to question these commitments, even including the perpetual 
protectorate of South Korea, was simply to fiddle around the margins of America‘s 
global commitment, which rested upon the fundamental relationships with Japan and 
Europe, the United States‘ richest and most powerful economic competitors. 
Having rebuilt their former enemy following the Second World War by 1991 the 
United States still had 45,000 troops stationed in Japan, a military deployment 
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amounting to approximately half of America‘s $40 billion annual security 
commitments in East Asia.
136
  The issue of American military presence in Japan was 
intimately bound up with issues of economic competitiveness.  William Pfaff 
discerned a ―colonial quality‖ in the relationship whereby American debt was 
purchased by Japan, which in return received the forces of the United States to 
guarantee its security.
137
  Japan‘s own military spending had been kept low under 
Article IX of its Constitution adopted following the Second World War and designed 
to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism.  As a result, in pure cash terms, the 
United States was spending over nine times what Japan was on military expenditure, 
but more importantly from an economic competitiveness point of view, Japan was 
spending no more than 1% of its GDP on military expenditure during the 1990s 
compared to United States average of 3.79%.
138
  Indeed, what military spending 
there was, moreover, was overwhelmingly directed towards domestic industries, 
with hardware produced under license from American companies, eroding the 
United States‘ technological lead and in some cases spawning direct competition in 
the arms business.
139
  And because Japan did not have to concern itself with military 
development it was able to direct far greater research and development resources to 
civilian products.
140
  America‘s alliance relationship with Japan, in short, allowed 
one of its chief trading partners to pursue trading practices that were ―less than free 
and fair‖.
141
 
This reconsideration of America‘s relationship with Japan was more than simply an 
expression of another trade dispute, the likes of which had been a regular source of 
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turbulence in US-Japan relations for decades.  Instead, neoisolationist and realists 
were engaged seriously with the question of whether the United States and Japan 
had essentially similar or dissimilar interests, of whether this was indeed the natural 
alliance that diplomats on both sides claimed.
142
  It reflected their realist 
understanding of the theory and history of international relations that predicted the 
dissolution of alliance solidarity in the absence of a common threat.  In the absence 
of the Soviet Union then, the United States should not assume that the interests of 
Japan or Europe would coincide with their own.
143
 
In Europe, the defining alliance of the Cold War and the symbol of American 
entanglement with the affairs of the ‗old world‘ found its formal military expression 
in NATO, which was always more than a tool, in its first Secretary-General Lord 
Ismay‘s words, ―to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
down.‖
144
  The United States instead became the linchpin of European security, with 
NATO as the military symbol of the cultural and political grouping called ‗the 
West‘, an alignment of forces in defence and pursuit of a shared economic, political 
and ethical ideology.  Yet in the absence of the Soviet Union, the threat that held 
together this highly integrated alliance had vanished, and realists therefore expected 
the freedom of action that the backing of those allies conferred on the United States 
to diminish.
145
  For American advocates of disengagement, here was an alliance that 
in the post-Cold War world was not only unnecessary but dangerous, a outdated 
military behemoth fighting the last war in pursuit of a model of social organisation 
that was now uncontested.  In seeking to avoid clinging to the carcasses of dead 
policies - what Lord Salisbury had called the commonest error in politics – the 
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CATO institute was moved to describe it as a ―Cold War Anachronism‖.
146
  Steel 
argued that: 
―What started as an alliance to defend West Europeans against Russia has turned 
into one for protecting Europeans against themselves... We did not pledge to 
come to the aid of any European country embroiled in a quarrel with its 
neighbours.  All we intended was to put the Russians on warning that they had 
expanded their influence as far west as they would be allowed to go.‖
147
 
The historical argument was a strong one.  The United States had never intended 
NATO to be a permanent or enduring alliance.  It was to have been a primarily 
European operation to which the United States would provide assistance – initially 
as a security contribution to assist rearmament whilst European economic recovery 
was completed, and then as a backup to a European deterrent force.
148
  As the then 
NATO Supreme Commander General Eisenhower wrote shortly after assuming the 
post in 1951, ―If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national 
defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project 
will have failed.‖
149
 
Although there had been significant calls for the United States to disengage from 
NATO throughout the 1980s, it was not until the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 
July 1991 that that failure could be rectified.
150
  America‘s alliance with Europe had 
achieved its basic aims: Europe was unified; Eastern Europe had been liberated and 
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the military threat of the USSR had been removed.
151
  Europe, like Japan, would 
finally become responsible for its own defense.  Rejecting President Bush‘s claim 
that ―European and American security is indivisible‖,
152
 neoisolationists came to 
regard NATO as the ultimate expression of the peace dividend, and along with 
realists concerned about being drawn into conflicts on the European periphery, 
advocated a drawdown of American military commitments in and to Europe.   
Allied to these concerns, realists worried about the effect of Clinton administration 
proposals for NATO enlargement on Moscow, and the instability that might result 
from a policy that might be perceived as an attempt to encircle, isolate and 
subordinate Russia, rather than integrating them into a new European system of 
collective security.
153
  Enlargement was a policy whose logic the advocates of 
disengagement could not understand, and which sparked one of the fiercest national 
security debates of the decade.
154
  The point of an alliance, they maintained, was to 
pool security against a common foe.  Yet NATO seemed no longer to have an 
enemy: 
―If we expand NATO further east, how far are we willing to go?...  At what 
point does an expanded NATO become an anti-Russian alliance...  Or do we 
want Russia in NATO as well?  In that case, whom is the alliance directed 
against?  If everyone is under the umbrella, who is outside?‖
155
 
Defenders of enlargement argued that NATO would evolve from a traditional 
security alliance into an instrument of European security and out-of-area military 
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cooperation.
156
  Such an altered role would however, bring with it commitments that 
America need not engage in and expose United States troops to dangers they need 
not face.  This attempt to maintain US pre-eminence within an alliance with which it 
no longer shared security interests left some incredulous: 
―It is difficult to imagine how becoming entangled in ancient and intractable 
ethnic quarrels, religious conflicts, and territorial disputes in regions that have 
never been deemed relevant – much less essential – to the security of the United 
States constitutes a worthwhile mission for the American republic.  Assuming 
such burdens would be an exercise in masochism as well as futility.‖
157
 
However, this neoisolationist-realist view was not the dominant one among those 
calling for retrenchment from the Cold War strategic posture.  Most realists favoured 
maintaining NATO as the cornerstone of a transatlantic alliance, but expected the 
European role vis-à-vis the US to increase.  Realists were also opposed to 
enlargement, predicting greater political and cultural divisions within the alliance 
that would weaken it and hasten its inevitable demise as American and European 
security interests grew apart in the absence of a shared existential threat.
158
  
Ultimately therefore, even those realists who saw value in the continuation of the 
Transatlantic Alliance believed that the structural realities brought about by the end 
of the Cold War would force at the very least a reconfiguration of NATO, with the 
United States accepting less of a leadership role.  As Steel sums up, ―The problem 
with NATO is that changes in world politics have outrun the organization‘s 
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logic.‖
159
  Republican Congressman John Lander was even more succinct: NATO 
―expired in 1989‖.
160
 
This school of strategic thought therefore insists that the organisational logic of 
America‘s alliances be reassessed in the light of the changed strategic situation, not 
justified again on the basis of some hypothetical or discretionary circumstance.  
Calls for friends to bear more of the burden could therefore have little impact ―until 
America‘s allies see GIs leaving their bases in Europe, Japan and Korea.‖
161
  
Independence from allies was to be welcomed, since it reduced the burdens on 
American taxpayers and made it less likely that the United States could be dragged 
into conflicts in which it had no vital interest.  
Conclusion:  Neoisolationism As Defensive Realism 
Neoisolationists understood that their proposals were unlikely to be well received by 
the foreign policy establishment, which finds the task of sustaining the international 
order a difficult one to relinquish, no matter how counterproductive for the United 
States that mission may appear.  As the realist analysts Christopher Layne and 
Benjamin Schwarz wrote: 
―Simply put, the U.S. foreign policy establishment does not want international 
responsibilities to be reallocated because it fears diminished American 
leadership and a greater – perhaps even equal – German and Japanese voice in 
international affairs.  Better, they say, to bear disproportionate costs than to 
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yield American control... [in this view] the great post-Cold War danger actually 
is imperial understretch.‖
162
  
In an environment so totally biased towards internationalism, there is the sense in 
which some of the advocates of neoisolationism are playing politics rather than 
genuinely writing strategy – advocating an extremely limited conception of the 
national interest in order to get foreign policy realism onto the political agenda, 
particularly in a domestic political climate keen to reduce the federal budget.  At the 
same time, neoisolationism justifies such an agenda because it asserts that for a 
foreign policy to be effective it requires the support of the American public that 
generally demonstrates a keen sense of proportion.
163
  The new threats of 
proliferation, fundamentalism and ethnic conflict around which the foreign policy 
establishment attempts to mobilise foreign policy are discretionary: none carries the 
immediate threat to the United States that was present during the Cold War and that 
was so effective in mobilising American public opinion.
164
  That neoisolationist 
politics had become so important was reflected when the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, ―one of the nation‘s venerable bastions of internationalism‖
165
, 
produced a report which focused first and foremost on America‘s domestic 
economy, declaring that ―whilst foreign policy has lost glamour, domestic policy has 
gained urgency... To advance our interests abroad we must get our own house in 
order.‖
166
  Nonetheless, the less politically motivated advocates of American 
retrenchment remained careful not to present their arguments as the raiding of 
foreign affairs budgets for domestic wish lists.  Whist recognising the importance of 
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defense, they remained confident in America‘s strategic advantages, and regarded it 
as ―unpatriotic‖ to sustain ―a bloated budget on the basis of an outmoded and flawed 
doctrine‖.
167
 
Thus Earl Ravenal argues that the United States cannot simply isolate itself but 
should attempt to ―quarantine regional violence and compartmentalize regional 
instability, but not by active intervention... At most, American policy should 
encourage regional balances of power, whether bipolar or multipolar. The balances 
do not even have to be neat and precisely calibrated: Rough and messy ones will 
do.‖
168
  James Kurth goes further, arguing for the United States to aid regional 
powers in shaping their legitimate spheres of influence.  The US could then be the 
global hegemon of the regional hegemons – ―the boss of all the bosses‖.
169
 
Thus the differences between the American nationalist and realist internationalist 
ends of the spectrum are significant.  Yet at the same time the strategies exist along 
the same spectrum, sharing fundamental ideas of a limited reading of the national 
interest, and a recognition that victory in the Cold War fundamentally changes the 
strategic environment in which the United States operates.  These ideas that inform 
the strategy of strategic disengagement reflect the theoretical perspective of 
defensive or minimal realism, which argues that since states cannot avoid the 
security dilemma they act to maximise their security rather than their power.
170
  This 
form of realism is inherently declinist, since states will always act to ensure their 
                                                 
167
 Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of US Foreign Policy". 
168
 Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment", Foreign Policy, no. 81 (1990). 
169
 James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy: A Pattern of History", The National Interest 43 (1996), 
19. 
170
 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism", in Making Sense of International Relations Theory, ed. 
Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 15.  The theoretical 
foundations of defensive realism can be found in Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma".  
Examples of defensive realist works include Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Stephen Van 
Evera, Causes of War: Structures of Power and the Roots of International Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1999); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). 
 151 
security against great powers such as the United States.  However, although the 
security dilemma is intractable, it need not spark intense conflict.
171
  Therefore even 
this schools more internationalist variants prescribe that America selects its interests 
carefully, in order to reduce the perception of threat its power elicits, in the belief 
that it ―can and should act as an ordinary great power‖.
172
   
Defensive realists therefore conclude that what some might perceive as unipolarity is 
an illusion, a necessarily temporary phenomena, a function of time-lags before the 
inevitable rise of great-power challengers.
173
  As Christopher Layne writes, such 
‗minimalists‘: 
―advise that the United States should seek security by capitalizing on the 
dynamics of the balance of power in an emerging multipolar world. They do so 
because they believe that the United States lacks the resources to sustain its 
present predominance, and, more fundamentally, because they see hegemony as 
inherently unstable.‖
174
 
From its understanding that international anarchy creates disincentives for 
expansionary strategies, defensive realism advocates moderation as the best route to 
security.  Strong states in particular best serve their security interest by pursuing 
―military, diplomatic and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.‖
175
  
The challenge was therefore not to seek purposes to which to direct America‘s vast 
power but rather to proportionately assign elements of that power to those genuine 
purposes to which it needed to be directed.  Indeed the lack of threats to American 
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interests meant that America could not construct a national purpose that might 
command widespread support.  The alternative, however, was not the: 
―…promulgation of a ‗grand design‘, ‗coherent strategy‘, or ‗foreign policy 
vision‘.  It is a policy of restraint and reconstitution aimed at limiting the 
diversion of American resources to the service of particularistic subnational, 
transnational, and nonnational interests. The national interest is national 
restraint, and that appears to be the only national interest the American people 
are willing to support at this time in their history. Hence, instead of formulating 
unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad, foreign policy elites might well 
devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in 
the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests.‖
176
 
Neoisolationism recognises that the overarching structure of the Cold War that 
established public and bipartisan consensus was unusual, and that the American 
domestic polity is structurally unsuited to foreign policy activism.   As James 
Schlesinger puts it, ―the Founding Fathers did not envision a nation absorbed by 
foreign policy, let alone one that was the world‘s leading power.‖
177
  Given this 
structural failing, for the United States to embark on an internationalist course to 
which it could not be sure to be able to keep could strain America‘s friendly 
relations by creating expectations that could not be fulfilled.  Thus, despite the 
complaints of internationalists, neoisolationism should not be thought parochial or 
provincial but cautious, fundamentally concerned with the national interest of the 
United States, and disinclined to endanger American security or prosperity by 
writing cheques American government and society can‘t cash.
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CHAPTER 4:  „INSTITUTIONALISING AMERICA‟  
– LIBERAL MULTILATERALISM 
Introduction 
Chapter three showed how neoisolationism reflected defensive realist ideas to 
envision a world in which a secure United States would remain disengaged.  This 
chapter discusses the diametrically opposed views of liberals, who envisioned a new 
world order in which the ideas of the United States were placed at the very centre of 
the international system.  This chapter outlines the strategy of liberal multilateralism 
and its sources.  It proceeds by first making the liberal case that the United States 
needed to pursue a multilateralist approach to international politics both as a result 
of its paradoxical international weakness and in order to sustain the domestic support 
for internationalism.  It then argues that precisely because the emerging security 
environment was heterogenous and complex the United States needed to engage 
with others to build regimes and institutions for the effective management of the 
international system.  Liberals drew their strategic ideas from liberal international 
relations theory, in particular the principle of democratic peace, and the belief that 
peace and prosperity were indivisible.  These ideas generated a strategy based 
around the enlargement of the liberal community of free market democracies, 
multilateral cooperation in international institutions and a collectivised approach to 
security provision.  Fundamentally, although liberal multilateralism advocated an 
unashamedly moral approach to international politics, it was one that was in the 
national interest of the United States, since its identity was defined by reference to 
liberal values. 
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Creating A New World Order 
When President Bush proclaimed his ‗new world order‘ to Congress in 1990, he was 
echoing Mikhail Gorbachev‘s image of world progress enunciated at the United 
Nations two years earlier.  As the old structures of an international order structured 
on enmity were collapsing around them, here were the two leaders of that order 
articulating a new vision of international relations based on the harmony of the 
values of mankind. Out of what Gorbachev called the ―de-ideologisation of interstate 
relations‖ would emerge a global order based on universal values, the liberty of 
peoples and the rule of law.
1
  Here in two hopeful speeches was what Francis 
Fukuyama would proclaim as the ‗end of history‘, the result of which would be the 
realignment of international politics along the principles of liberal order.
2
 
Fukuyama reflected and was the source of an unashamedly idealist and liberal side 
of the debate surrounding America‘s post-Cold War grand strategy.  Here was an 
opportunity to remake the world in America‘s image, to realise the dreams of Wilson 
and usher in an era of perpetual peace in which liberal rights of men would be the 
foundation of an international order based on cooperative institutions, resurrected 
from the ashes of the Cold War to fulfil their original purpose of entrenching the 
American liberal order into the very structure of international society. 
This vision was not, however, as utopian as it could be made to sound.  American 
ideology had, after all, proved victorious in the Cold War, and in a world that was 
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economically increasingly globalised and in the process of undergoing the greatest 
democratic shift in history, there was, liberals argued, a very real opportunity to use 
America‘s preponderant position to underpin collective security and the multilateral 
management of world order.  Such order-building was not some act of hegemonic 
generosity, (although there were plenty who were happy to praise American 
enlightenment), but a process that served both the interests of the United States and 
the world.  That the order envisioned by Wilson in 1919 and revived in 1945 was 
now coming of age had been shown by the coalition, led by the United States and 
authorised by the United Nations‘ Security Council, to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi 
occupation in the Gulf War. 
At the same time, there was a recognition that America‘s relationship with 
multilateralism had long been an ambivalent one.  On the one hand, the United 
States had created and financially sustained an institutional framework of world 
order after World War II, but on the other it had been constantly tempted to 
undermine those institutions by acting unilaterally.  The roots of this vacillation are 
not difficult to discern in the exceptionalism that pulled the United States 
simultaneously in the opposite directions of liberal world-making and domestic 
preservation, and in the power of the United States since 1945 to act regardless of 
the sanction or censure of multilateral instruments.  Moreover, the institutional 
structure of the American foreign policy process, in which the joint executive and 
legislative controllers of policy often have different interests, and which contains an 
inbuilt bias against foreign engagements in the form of the two-thirds majority 
requirement in the Senate, makes commitment to internationalism difficult to 
sustain.
3
  Whatever the reasons, the United States‘ record in the development of 
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international law was hardly one of principled leadership: as one realist succinctly 
noted, ―great powers do not make great multilateralists‖.
4
 
Yet despite these structural and historical impediments, the end of the Cold War was 
seen by liberals as providing both the means and the opportunity for the United 
States to embrace its liberal idealism without succumbing to the illiberalism of 
imperialism.  The new President, who had attacked George Bush for his limited and 
cautious construction of America‘s post-Cold War role, reflected that idealism in his 
first speech to that symbol of liberal multilateral hopes, the United Nations General 
Assembly: 
"During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free 
institutions.  Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those 
free institutions... to foster the practices of good government... [and] pursue our 
humanitarian goal of reducing suffering‖
5
 
Liberal multilateralism was therefore more than just a grand strategy for the United 
States, it was a global strategy of integrationist order building.  Liberals viewed the 
position of the United States at the end of the Cold War as providing both the right 
and the duty to remake world order to institutionalise the principles that had won 
that conflict: democracy, capitalism and multilateral management of the 
international system.   
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The Necessity Of Multilateralism 
At the end of the Cold War, the global distribution of power was more complex than 
it is often presented and many thought.  Although the United States was dominant in 
terms of traditional military power, economic power was more evenly distributed 
between the United States, Europe and Japan, with China‘s growth likely to make 
the world of geo-economics still more multipolar.  Liberal theory also pointed to the 
host of transnational relations that were largely outside of government control, from 
international finance to terrorism, and in this realm power was widely dispersed.  
Thus the characterisation of American unipolarity was ―misleading because it 
exaggerates the degree to which the United States is able to get the results it wants‖.
6
   
This paradoxical powerlessness owed much to the fact that interstate war was no 
longer the great arbiter of international politics.  Indeed, great power war might even 
be thought obsolete.
7
  So even though the United States‘ power was too great to be 
challenged by any other state, it was not great enough to solve the problems that the 
new international order posed.
8
  The United States would therefore need to 
cooperate to address a whole host of transnational issues of varying problematics, 
from terrorism to climate change and migration to money laundering.  On these and 
other issues the need for international collaboration was obvious, since ―unilateral 
action simply cannot produce the right results on what are inherently multilateral 
issues.‖
9
  The United States needed therefore to base its post-Cold War foreign 
policy on a strategy of inclusiveness, since as part of the international system, ―the 
US simply does not have the luxury of framing policy without reference to the 
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perceptions and policies of other states‖.  The post-Cold War moment presented 
United States foreign policy with the opportunity ―to help shape elements of the 
system in directions that favour the achievement of greater political and economic 
development and stability.‖
10
 
At the same time, the United States needed multilateralism in order to marry a global 
role to its historical isolation, due to both the absence of a ―pull-factor‖ such as that 
the Soviet threat had exerted, and the American public‘s tendency to prefer that the 
United States ‗mind its own business‘ internationally.  The ―milieu preferences‖ for 
security cooperation through institutionalised commitments; an open door world 
economy governed by uniform rules of trade; and a commitment to the universal 
rights of individual liberty that American leaders had reached for in 1919 and 1945 
now needed to be reaffirmed in the post-Cold War era.  Doing so would both reflect 
American civic nationalism‘s built-in affinity for multilateralism, and ensure that the 
American public remained minded to accept an expanded conception of American 
interests through collective legitimation and burden-sharing.
11
  Moreover, it would 
avoid the costs and potential pitfalls of unilateralism, which both generated false 
legitimacy for activism that could be emulated and abused by other states, and which 
would inevitably produce resistance or backlash.
12
 
The resultant emphasis on multilateral institution-building drew on a body of 
international relations theory that had emerged in 1970s and which emphasised the 
utility of regimes for governing activity within the international system.
13
  These 
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regimes could be loose and informal, based on general consultation, or more rigid 
structures of rules and sanctions, but in its basic character multilateralism involves 
sacrificing sovereign autonomy for the establishment of mutual group gains.
14
  
Multilateral norms and institutions had formed the bedrock of the international order 
after 1945, as American enthusiasm to embed itself in the international order (and 
avoid the retreat to closed regional blocs of the 1930s) manifested itself in the birth 
of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
15
  Insulated by the Cold War and 
able to put down bureaucratic roots, the postwar institutions and their progeny were 
also credited with having contributed to the peaceful nature of that conflict‘s end and 
the stabilisation of its international consequences.
16
  Indeed, here was evidence that 
having been embedded within the structure of the system itself, multilateral 
institutions could outlast the structure that produced them.  The United States could 
therefore use its hegemonic position to embed in regimes principles that would 
provide it with ‗structural power‘ even after its hegemonic position had wilted.
17
 
The emphasis on embedding American power recognised the dangers inherent in 
assuming that because of America‘s preponderant position in the international 
system it could act unilaterally.  Unilateralism threatened to provoke balancing – 
hard or soft – against the United States; exclude efficiency gains from institutional 
cooperation; and undermine the legitimacy of the United States as leader of the 
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international order.
18
  Hegemony therefore brought with it the obligation to act, and 
to be seen to act, in the interests of the international order, since self-interested 
unilateralism would undermine the hegemony that both permitted that unilateralism 
and sustained the existing order.  As Stanley Hoffman warned, ―nothing is more 
dangerous for a ‗hyperpower‘ than the temptation of unilateralism‖.
19
 
Multilateralism was therefore a way of both capitalising upon and reinforcing 
America‘s ‗soft power‘.
20
  It recognised the fact that coercive power can repel, and 
concluded that there was therefore ―a much bigger payoff in ‗getting others to want 
what you want‘,‖ a process which involves using ideological attractiveness and the 
power of ―agenda setting‖ to hold out prizes for cooperation.
21
  Faced with the 
overriding requirement to establish an international order for the post-Cold War 
world that was legitimate and durable, liberals argued that the United States needed 
to seek a general settlement in a process of ‗constitution building‘ that drew upon a 
multilateral consensus.
22
  The United States needed once again to realise that its 
long-term interests were best served by embedding its preponderance in multilateral 
regimes that would provide the basis of future international order.  Indeed, as one 
scholar had observed as much as fifteen years before, every state had an interest in a 
network of global rules, and even deep disagreements on what the rules should be 
did not prevent that interest being recognised.
23
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Although international law and institutions had evolved since their mostly postwar 
inception they had failed to keep pace with changes in the world, but with the end of 
the Cold War the United States had an ―extraordinary opportunity for updating the 
world order‖, since ―most of the nations in the world... appear refreshingly open to 
discussion, negotiation and agreement.‖
24
  Indeed, there was already a striking 
amount of underlying global agreement in terms of the so-called ‗Golden Rule‘ of 
reciprocity of conduct which could underpin an expansion of international 
agreements.
25
  This opportunity might allow the United States to adopt an idealistic 
foreign policy which embraced multilateral norm-generation, with the specific aim 
of generating a security architecture in which the global arms trade was regulated 
and curbed and the United Nations empowered and updated to reflect new 
geopolitical realities.
26
  President Clinton‘s Secretary of State appeared to agree, 
arguing that a key task of American statecraft was to ―adapt and strengthen‖ the 
postwar institutions of Western democracies to ―build the security, political and 
economic structures for the more integrated world of the twenty-first century.‖
27
  
The liberal vision for establishing multilateralism in the new world order then, was 
nothing less than a call for ―a new Dumbarton Oaks‖.
28
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“A Jungle Full Of Poisonous Snakes” 
Such a visionary order would be necessary for the international community to 
address the new dynamics of threat that were emerging in that more integrated post-
Cold War world.  The new international landscape that was forming bought with it, 
for many members of the American foreign policy establishment, a sense of 
uncertainty and trepidation.  Established landmarks had been removed and new, 
ambiguous reference points were being tentatively established.  Although liberated 
from the existential threat of nuclear war, a whole raft of lesser, indistinct and 
uncertain issues simmered away on the surface of international politics, leaving 
officials unsure where and when a problem might boil over. 
Many commentators, policymakers and scholars continued to focus on the 
traditional political-military concerns of national security.  Some worried about the 
potential for disorder that would result from the dismantling of the Cold War order, 
particularly the dangers arising from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union‘s 
military establishment and the related danger of proliferation of military hardware 
and technological knowledge, in particular with reference to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).
29
  The proliferation of military capabilities was particularly 
worrying in the cases of ‗rogue states‘ determined to undermine the international 
order either through expansionist aims or by the deliberate creation of regional 
instability.  Standing outside the international order, these states tended to be ruled 
coercively by cliques opposed to the liberal values that dominated the system, and 
exhibited aggressive and defiant behaviour, the most worrying element of which was 
a shared desire to gain WMD capabilities in order to protect their own regimes or 
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threaten their neighbours.  The danger they therefore represented to the stability and 
peacefulness of the international order was ―clear and present‖.
30
   
Rogue states were also considered to be a source of terrorism that threatened 
American interests both abroad and at home, raising the costs of doing business in 
the process.
31
  Concerns about terrorism grew during the 1990s, as incidences of 
terrorism increased along with the number of actors resorting to terrorist tactics, 
ranging from state-sponsored, well-organised groups to individual persons, and as 
attacks became more lethal and effective.  Such was the concern by the late-1990s 
that Bill Clinton used his address to the United Nations in 1998 to call for the issue 
to be placed ―at the very top of the world‘s agenda‖.  Militant Islamic terrorism 
received state sponsorship from Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan that enabled it to 
flourish in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, and to carry out a number of 
international attacks against Western interests.
32
   
Terrorism could also flourish in areas of the world where governance was weak and 
social cohesion threatened by ethnic and nationalist conflicts.  These failed and 
failing states were ―utterly incapable of sustaining themselves as members of the 
international community‖, and suffered internal civil and often ethnic conflict 
alongside economic collapse.  The resultant descent into violence and anarchy not 
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only threatened their own citizens, who often became subject to massive human 
rights abuses, but also their neighbours, who were forced to deal with the 
destabilising consequences migration flows and the presence of conflict on their 
borders.
33
  As the Director of the Agency for International Development put it in 
1994, ―disintegrating societies and failed states with their civil conflicts and 
destabilizing refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global 
stability.‖
34
 
Yet at the same time new ‗security threats‘ seemed to emerge by the week in the 
early 1990s.  Formerly domestic issues of crime and poverty became subsumed into 
the national security debate.
35
  This manifested itself most clearly in the attempt to 
go to ‗war‘ on drugs.  By taking a supply-side approach to the admittedly severe 
social problem of illegal drug use, policies and rhetoric surrounding the issue came 
to regard those responsible for importing drugs into the United States as threats to 
national security.  Even the Lord-High-Priest of hard-headed realism concurred, 
arguing that the internal situation in Colombia, a weak state in which a guerrilla 
movement controlled most of the countryside and which was the world‘s largest 
supplier of cocaine, was ―the most menacing foreign policy challenge in Latin 
America for the US.‖
36
 
This process of ‗securitising‘ domestic social problems and other issues that required 
political action as threats to national security even extended to issues of the physical 
future of the planet.  Formerly the preserve of the natural sciences, political 
commentators now argued that the range and extent of these problems were so great 
                                                 
33
 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Policy, no. 89 (1992). 
34
 J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly, Chaos", The Washington Post, 31/7/94. 
35
 Then Secretary of State Warren Christopher confirmed this blurring of domestic and foreign threats 
by citing a domestic crime bill as a foreign policy achievement.  Christopher, "America's Leadership, 
America's Opportunity", 26. 
36
 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?  Toward Diplomacy for the 21st Century 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 90. 
 165 
that some argued that the ―social fabric of our planet‖ was being destroyed as a 
result of demographic, environmental and societal stresses. The global environment 
was threatening to become ―the national security issue of the 21st century‖ with the 
effects of environmental degradation, surging populations and scarce resources felt 
in the political impacts of migration, civil conflict and war.
37
   Although only 
occasionally leading directly to conflict, the vicious cycle of human and resource 
impoverishment would exert a downward pull on economic performance and 
political stability and feed existing religious and ethnic conflicts.
38
  These effects 
were likely to be felt most sharply in what used to be called the Third World and 
which was becoming increasingly disconnected from the world of the advanced 
nations, creating a rich-poor divide that would fuel conflict and resistance that would 
be impossible for Western states to keep the lid on.
39
  The bleak conclusion, 
according to one former National Security Council official who would return to 
government in the Clinton administration, was that human population and economic 
growth was rendering ever scarcer the planet‘s finite resources, and that therefore, in 
Einstein‘s words, ―we shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if 
mankind is to survive‖.
40
 
This expansion of what constituted security issues during the 1990s was both 
rhetorical and practical, as policymakers engaged daily with the complexities and 
possibilities of ‗security‘ in a wider sense; and conceptual, reflecting a shift away 
from neorealist theory and its focus on the state as the object to be ‗secured‘.
41
  The 
concept of security was therefore both broadened to consider non-military security 
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threats, and deepened, to consider the security of individuals and groups, rather than 
focusing solely on external threats to states.
42
  As a United Nations Report 
explained, the rationale for this expanded definition of security was that: 
―The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security 
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in 
foreign policy or as global aggression, or as protection of national interests in 
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.  It has 
been related more to nation-states than to people… Forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily 
lives.‖
43
 
It was not that many of these issues had not existed during the Cold War, of course 
they had.  Indeed some were addressed by the superpowers, both separately and in 
concert.  Others were considered useful and even actively fomented as a tool of 
superpower competition.  But all were subsumed by the bipolar system itself and 
their importance judged within the framework of Soviet-American rivalry.  Absent 
that barometer in the 1990s, each threatened to become urgent.   
For liberal multilateralists, this proliferation of security issues only reiterated the 
need for multilateral system management and cooperative responses to security 
issues, to both reduce the likelihood of conflict and address the humanitarian 
suffering that resulted when it did.  One nation alone, no matter how powerful, could 
not function as the world‘s policeman, but a cooperative order could establish 
institutions and regimes to both prevent security threats arising and seek to address 
them when they did. 
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Liberalism Reincarnate  
Apart from the instrumental utility of institutions and regimes, they provided a 
unique opportunity to establish liberal principles within the structure of the 
international system.  The end of the Cold War therefore represented the second 
coming (or rather a third chance) for the liberal approach to international relations.  
The first attempt had ended in the failure of Woodrow Wilson‘s League of Nations, 
having comprised an ―institutionally thin‖ liberal order organized around the 
principle that states would act virtuously to uphold open trade and national self-
determination.  It was simultaneous massively ambitious – seeking a universal 
transformation of both international order and the ways of doing of international 
politics – and strikingly limited, its foundations resting not on serious security 
commitments or limitations on state sovereignty but rather in the hoped-for power of 
the force of moral suasion.
 44
  Yet despite the isolationism that followed the Senate‘s 
refusal to ratify the League American diplomats continued to commit themselves to 
multilateral arrangements for disarmament and conflict prevention.
45
   
The second instantiation of liberalism in the international system arose from the war 
that Wilson‘s League could not prevent, and whilst it envisioned a similar ―one-
world‖ liberal system as the League it recognized the importance of wedding the 
great powers to that order first and foremost, and of creating a thicker network of 
institutions through which the international politics of the liberal order could be 
conducted.  In both economic and security affairs, multilateral institutions embedded 
liberalism in the international system, helping to sustain and share the burden of 
America‘s Cold War commitment.
46
  However, the combination of the sheer power 
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of the United States and the advent of the Cold War swiftly turned an international 
liberal order into a liberal hegemonic order, with the United States cast in the role of 
owner and operator.  Thus the second major attempt to embed liberalism resulted not 
in an international liberal order but in a Western liberal order, based around the 
security commitments of NATO and the economics of free trade that together stood 
in opposition to communism.
47
 
Whilst admitting that ―the liberal imagination is vast‖, it is possible to identify a 
number of consistencies that delineate the liberal approach to international order and 
which link historical attempts to make liberal multilateralism the organizing 
principle of the international system.  Liberals envision an open, rule-based system 
in which states trade and cooperate to achieve mutual gains.  This cooperation rests 
on the assumption that international actors have a common interest in the 
establishment of a cooperative world order, and that states can overcome the 
constraints of anarchy to achieve collective and cooperative ends.  That the restraint 
and commitment necessary is possible is underpinned by the view that international 
trade has a pacific effect on states, presenting incentives to cooperation and in the 
institutions that are established between states, reinforcing collective action and 
creating a sense of responsibility in the international community.  Finally and 
crucially, democratic states are the most able and willing to cooperate to create and 
abide by the rules of an open system, because they are inherently peaceful in their 
dealings with other democratic states.  Liberal states have therefore been able to ‗co-
bind‘ each other by locking themselves into mutually constraining institutions.
48
  
―National security liberalism‖, in Tony Smith‘s conception, is therefore 
fundamentally about the promotion of three ideas: democracy, open markets and 
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international institutions to regulate conflict.
49
  These ideas were once again the 
central themes around which liberal multilateralists in the 1990s argued for an 
expansion of the Western liberal order of the Cold War to encompass the entire 
international system.   
Inseparable Siblings: The Indivisibility Of Peace And Prosperity 
The case for liberal multilateralism rests most fundamentally on an understanding of 
the international system that states on the one hand that peace in the system is 
effectively indivisible; and on the other that economic interdependence binds the 
prosperity of nations to one another.  Moreover, prosperity and peace are bound 
together in a virtuous circle of liberal economic and political norms.  America‘s own 
security and prosperity was therefore intimately bound up in the peacefulness and 
prosperity of the rest of the world.  Free markets and democracy formed a 
―symbiotic and reciprocal relationship that produced free, stable and prosperous 
societies... What was important, from the US perspective, was that the existence of 
one increased the probability of the existence of the other, and that both produced 
benefits for the United States.‖
50
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Democracy, Politics and Peace 
The peaceful nature of democracy is perhaps the most important single idea of the 
post-Cold War period.  Although its origins go back as far as Kant‘s advocacy of a 
league of democratic states in Perpetual Peace, the arguments of democratic peace 
theory became particularly prominent only with the opportunity to engage in 
principled order-building in the absence of the constraints resulting from the 
aftermath of great power war, the usual precursor of major structural change.  
Democratic principles, it was argued, had to be placed and the very centre of the 
new world order, because of one salient fact: ―constitutionally secure liberal states 
have yet to engage in war with one another‖.
51
 
This assertion is as bold as it is simple.  It can be disputed empirically: Whilhelmine 
Germany was at least semi-democratic immediately before the First World War; 
Peru and Ecuador were nascent democracies when they went to war in the 
nineteenth century; the United States was certainly involved in undermining 
democratic regimes – most notably Allende in Chile – during the Cold War.  Yet 
that these counter-examples are so few and so marginal only serves to highlight how 
strong the empirical case is.
52
  The democratic peace therefore constitutes ―one of 
the strongest nontrivial or nontautological generalisations that can be made about 
international relations.‖
53
  In a social science that struggles to justify the description, 
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here is a repeatable finding, a truth about its subject matter – democracies do not go 
to war with one another.
54
 
If the fact of the democratic peace is relatively uncontroversial, the reasons for it are 
fiercely disputed.  Why should states with a particular similar form of government 
be able to overcome the imperatives of structural anarchy?  Kant had posited three 
causal hypotheses: the force of public opinion which eschews belligerence; 
democratic states‘ trade interactions that establishes peaceful relations; and the role 
of shared values and common institutions in creating norms of peaceful interaction.  
A great deal of research took place in the 1990s based around each of these 
hypotheses, with results that were at best inconclusive.  The role of public opinion 
varies between states, and seems to exercise a restraining effect only in the case of 
the outright use of major military force.  Although countries with extensive trade ties 
are statistically less likely to go to war, the direction of the cause-effect relationship 
between trade and peace is unclear.  Similarly, whilst the historical evidence 
supports the idea of a norms-based pacific union amongst democracies, it is unclear 
whether that union reflects cultural or historical ties rather than anything intrinsic to 
democracy itself.
55
 
Further causal hypotheses, such as the shared expectation deriving from domestic 
politics of the non-violent contestation of power; the high risks to democratic 
leaders‘ political futures associated with foreign wars; and the transparency of 
democratic societies which allows for mutual recognition of both peaceful intent and 
the costs of war, have proved equally difficult to demonstrate beyond doubt.
56
  Yet 
at the same time the basic fact of the democratic peace remained, and since liberal 
ideology seemed to prohibit war against liberal democracies liberals saw in the 
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democratic peace a self-fulfilling prophecy that the further that democratic peace 
was extended, the more peaceful the world would be.
57
  Liberal states, Michael 
Doyle had noted, had created a ―separate peace‖, but with democracy now the 
dominant form of political organisation, liberal foreign policy ideology held the key 
to world peace.
58
 
For liberal multilateralists, ―preserving the legacy of the liberal peace without 
succumbing to liberal imprudence‖, was the key task of American grand strategy in 
the post-Cold War period.
59
  Thus their prescriptions for American foreign policy 
were two-pronged: democracy promotion on the one hand, and multilateral means 
on the other.  It was therefore on the issue of means that the liberals differed from 
the neoconservatives in their shared goal of spreading democratic governance.  
Whilst the democratic globalists advocated the unashamed use of American primacy 
to remake the world in its own image, liberal institutionalists favoured embedding 
liberal norms in the international system through the use of organisations and 
regimes that would create incentives for democratic reform, and thought it ―critical‖ 
to avoid the temptation to promote democracy through force or threats of force.
60
 
Despite eschewing unilateral or militaristic means, liberals sought to make exporting 
democracy the cornerstone of American grand strategy, believing it could replace 
anticommunism as the organising principle of American internationalism, capable of 
sustaining a domestic consensus that would enable American order-building.
61
  To 
some extent the United States had relied on the rhetoric of democracy promotion 
during the Cold War, but high ideals were often subsumed by the need to support 
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any and all non-communist forces, which more often than not meant that the United 
States supported right-wing dictatorships rather than encourage truly democratic 
forces out of the fear of the rise to power of left-wing elements sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union.  As President Kennedy had explained America‘s dilemma following 
the assassination of the Dominican Republic's tyrannical but anti-communist 
dictator, Rafael Trujillo: ―There are three possibilities in descending order of prefer-
ence; a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro 
regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we 
are sure that we can avoid the third.‖
62
  During the Cold War then, anticommunism 
had trumped democracy, and order was valued above freedom.  Henry Kissinger‘s 
attitude towards Allende‘s Chile neatly summed up the order of America‘s Cold War 
priorities: ―I don‘t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist 
because of the irresponsibility of its own people.‖
63
 
The end of the Cold War therefore represented the opportunity to right the necessary 
evils of superpower competition, and to reengage with the ideals of the American 
revolution to support and extend the democratic revolution that was taking place in 
the world.
64
  Typically, American policymakers drew lessons for others from the 
historical experience of the United States.  Thus in preaching patience with 
democratisation efforts, Strobe Talbott noted that following American independence, 
―it took 11 years to draft a constitution, 89 to abolish slavery, 144 to give women the 
vote, 188 to extend full constitutional protections to all citizens.  And four score and 
seven years along the way, we were in the midst of a civil war.‖
65
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Yet far from being ―some starry-eyed crusade‖, a commitment to support, promote 
and defend democracy was consistent with America‘s national interest.
66
  Peace was 
indivisible since modern communication has expanded both what people knew and 
cared about beyond their borders, a process that was beginning to break down the 
exclusivity of identity.  Moreover, security issues that had traditionally been thought 
the domestic preserve of other states were more likely to produce ―spillover effects‖ 
to neighbouring states, for example in refugee flows.  In this ―turbulent‖ world, as 
one author put it, chaos, complexity and  disorder were rendering more porous the 
barriers between states.
67
    Thus the basis for placing democracy promotion at the 
heart of United States grand strategy was that American values and interest reinforce 
each other, since ―In short, the well-being of Americans is increasingly tied to that of 
‗foreigners‘.‖
68
 
―In an increasingly interdependent world Americans have a growing stake in 
how other countries govern, or misgovern, themselves.  The larger and more 
close-knit community of nations that choose democratic forms of government, 
the safer and more prosperous Americans will be, since democracies are 
demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less 
likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to 
make war on each other.‖
69
 
Whilst the liberal commitment to democracy promotion rested primarily on the 
arguments of the democratic peace, it was not just about the reliable nature of liberal 
states internationally.  Domestically too, democratic regimes tended to respect the 
human rights of their populations, seek to improve social conditions avoid economic 
disasters.  Democracy promotion was therefore not just about the moral imperative 
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of human freedoms, it was about human needs, and democracies were most 
consistent in fulfilling those needs.  As Amartya Sen noted, it was ―a remarkable fact 
in the terrible history of famine‖ that no significant famine had ever ―afflicted any 
country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition 
parties to voice criticisms, that permits newspapers to report freely and to question 
the wisdom of government policies without extensive censorship.‖
70
 
Democracies then, could free people not just from tyranny and violence, but from 
privation and want.  Liberals therefore posited a connection between democratic 
economics and politics in which the liberty of the individual to consume became as 
important to generating peaceful relations between states as did his political 
freedom. 
Interdependence, Prosperity and Peace 
Interdependence became the leitmotif of the arguments for liberal multilateralism in 
the 1990s, which embraced globalisation as the defining feature of the post-Cold 
War order.  There was of course nothing particularly new in the lionising of 
economic interdependence as the source of peaceful relations between states.  
Norman Angell‘s The Great Illusion, published in 1909, although often presented as 
an argument about the impossibility of war and whilst admittedly a liberal anti-war 
tract, was actually a far more sophisticated material argument concerning the costs 
and benefits of war, the ideas of which formed the basis of liberal internationalist 
arguments for open markets.
71
  The ―Great Illusion‖, wrote one contemporary 
reviewer, was the idea that military and political power gave states commercial and 
socio-political advantages and that the prosperity of militarily weak states was 
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somehow at the mercy of the stronger ones.
72
  Angell‘s was a statement of the 
effects of what he called ‗modern economic civilisation‘, and sat among a related 
body of ‗utopian‘ work in the early part of the twentieth century that dealt with the 
economic bases of peace, the conditions of peaceful change, the role of public 
opinion and the effect of rules, regulations and agreements.
73
   
The central ideas of this early body of work were revived in the post-Cold War 
period by International Relations theorists studying the effects of globalisation and 
international economic regimes, and articulated as a new liberal economic order by 
political leaders.  Two distinct arguments are advanced by modern liberals, both of 
which seek to enunciate the rationale behind the dictum that ―prosperous neighbours 
are good neighbours‖.
74
  The first holds that trade leads to prosperity, which in turn 
leads to democracy which is peaceful.
75
  That trade leads to economic growth is 
undisputed, and the correlation between prosperity and democracy is clear.
76
  At the 
same time, the causal processes that explain this correlation are hotly disputed.
77
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Nonetheless, ideas about the positive effects of modernisation through trade have 
been a constant feature of liberal proposals for United States foreign policy from 
Wilson onwards, and continued to be prominent during the 1990s.  The second 
rationale asserts that trade leads to interconnectedness which in turn creates mutual 
dependencies that lead to peace.  Trade itself is a source of order because it creates 
commercial linkages that blur national boundaries, undermining a state‘s ability to 
act upon nationalistic economic interest, and increasing a state‘s stake in the 
maintenance of a stable international order.
78
  Participation in an open trade order, 
moreover, can have socialising effects on states that can act as a kind of ―democratic 
solvent‖, opening up societies and dissolving the political supports of undemocratic 
regimes.
79
 
However, this literature recognised that the economic realities of the 1990s were 
significantly different from either the late-nineteenth century European trading 
system or the world economy of the previous fifty years.  The system was far larger, 
having integrated new states from the former communist bloc into a system of free 
trade and witnessed the emergence of rising economic powers from the developing 
world, but the connections within it were more multiple and less deep as a result.  
Cold War allies were beginning to regard themselves as economic competitors to the 
United States, which instead of accounting for fifty percent of global GDP as it had 
in 1945 now accounted for around twenty-one percent.  Information and 
communication technologies were speeding up the pace of economic interactions, 
particularly in global financial markets, which were increasingly replacing 
governments as the arbiter of capital allocation worldwide.
80
  ‗Globalisation‘ 
became the buzz-word to describe these changes, which emerged concurrently with 
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an increasingly associated global social order that meant that interconnectedness 
now went ―farther, faster, deeper‖, thickening and intensifying as well as broadening 
the networks of interdependence.
81
 
However, despite the siren calls of globalisation, economic nationalism was 
becoming increasingly prominent, giving rise to protectionist and mercantilist 
sentiments in the early period of the decade.  Since American power was based on 
economic and technological leadership, ―the debate on competitiveness must 
become a debate on national security.‖
82
  Poor educational attainment; unacceptable 
poverty and associated crime levels; persistently declining median income; all 
threatened America‘s ability to sustain its fundamental values and institutions, which 
was to say, its national security.
83
  Others pointed to the erosion of America‘s 
technological superiority, and in particular the need to integrate military research 
towards civilian commercialisation purposes or face being overtaken by economic 
competitors.
84
  These considerations would be so important in the post-Cold War 
world that failure to make progress on this domestic economic and social agenda 
―threatens America‘s long-term national security more than the traditional 
preoccupations of security and foreign policy.‖
85
  Trade ‗hawks‘ therefore argued 
that the reduced military security imperative had opened the way for the vigorous 
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unilateral promotion of American trade interests, and did so with not inconsiderable 
success, particularly in Congress.   
Others, however, retorted that the dichotomy between foreign and domestic policy 
on which the trade hawks‘ arguments rested was becoming increasingly false.
86
  It 
was simply not true that states could act unilaterally in pursuit of narrow economic 
interests without ultimately harming their own economic prosperity in a world in 
which economic success was a function of interdependence.  Paul Krugman, the 
outspoken liberal economist, described the focus on economic competitiveness as ―a 
dangerous obsession‖ which threatened the international economic system, and was 
not alone in warning that neo-mercantilist ideas threatened the rise of military 
conflict between competing trade blocs.
87
  In such an environment, cooperation was 
essential to provide ―institutions that promote international economic stability and 
effective crisis management‖ and to generate ―consensus on common approaches to 
key global problems.‖
88
  The President therefore needed to ―zero in on the global 
economy‖, update his campaign slogan to ―the international economy, stupid‖, and 
confront the deeper economic issues of a globalised world by means of common 
rules and joint commitments.
89
   
An updated economic architecture needed to integrate the emerging economies – 
China, India and Brazil in particular – into the multilateral governance organisations, 
most pointedly the G7.
90
  The Clinton administration‘s focus on ―Big Emerging 
Markets‖ (BEMs) was therefore justified as more than simply a trade strategy 
targeted at economic growth and job creation.  As part of what was termed ‗global 
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economic engagement‘
91
, it was also a means of integrating and sustaining emerging 
states within the liberal order, both to prevent domestic failures that might provoke 
humanitarian or sectarian-separatist security concerns, and to further isolate potential 
―backlash‖ states from the broader will of the international community.  By focusing 
on the rising players and smoothing their introduction to the stability of 
―transnational civil society‖, the United States could ensure that everyone kept 
playing the same game, to prevent ―any credible alternative ideology to open 
markets and, by extension, to liberal democracy.‖
92
 
This was a strategy of ‗transnational integration‘ designed to ‗ensnare‘ foreign 
economies and make an open capitalist order an international fait accompli, and to 
enhance the likelihood of mutual rather than relative gains.
93
  In order to establish 
the regimes necessary to manage this changed international order the United States, 
liberals argued, needed to work collaboratively with the other major economic 
powers, Europe and Japan in particular.  Together, the ‗Big Three‘ needed to assert 
control of economic management to shape the evolution of the new world economic 
order, to build an order of ―true multilateral cooperation‖ which could 
simultaneously revive America‘s economic performance whilst establishing 
multilateral agreements to contain the threat of mercantilist behaviour.
94
  The United 
States, therefore needed multilateralism ―to ensure that the playing field is level‖ 
through the revision of existing commercial architecture ―to provide a consistent 
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framework for trade agreements‖ and the ―continued integration of the world 
economy‖.
95
 
The expansion of democracy, the opening of markets and the embedding of liberal 
norms in the regime architecture of the international system – here was the liberal 
multilateral approach to creating and managing international order.  Such a strategy 
was intended to be preventative, seeking to avoid conflict by offering the carrot of 
integration and the promise of prosperity.  It saw peace as a condition that could be 
created and sustained, rather than a happy accident, a transitory pause amidst the 
norm of anarchy and conflict.  In a truly liberal multilateral system, ―a genuine new 
world order‖, military conflict would be ―a symbol of defeat because it would mean 
that the most critical non-provocative policies – the tools of economics, democracy, 
diplomacy and law – had failed.‖
96
   
Collectivising security 
Whilst institutional cooperation, democratisation and the riches of integrated liberal 
capitalism might create substantial incentives to prevent war, they could not be 
expected to restrain all leaders all of the time.  The security provisions of military 
power would not therefore become redundant no matter how successful liberal 
multilateralism proved.  At the same time, liberals believed, the indivisibility of 
peace and prosperity meant that the fate of nations was bound up with each other, 
and so the provision of security must be collectivised. 
The liberal multilateral approach to collectivised security in the post-Cold War 
period featured two distinct and complementary approaches for international 
security provision, collective security and cooperative security. 
                                                 
95
 Peter F. Cowhey and Jonathan D. Aronson, "A New Trade Order", Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 
(1992). 
96
 Shuman and Harvey, Security without War, 233. 
 182 
Collective Security 
Collective security is a commitment by states, when necessary, to band together to 
balance against states in transgression of multilaterally agreed rules of conduct.  
Stability is therefore the product of regulated cooperation, rather than the 
unregulated balancing of competition under anarchy.
97
  Collective security makes 
for more effective balancing because it confronts aggressors with preponderant 
force.
98
  Indeed, its proponents claim, even when collective security fails, the 
residual balancing of the directly threatened states is roughly equivalent to the 
coalition that might be formed as a result of balancing under anarchy.
99
  Collective 
security, in short, is a win-win: 
―The case for collective security rests not on woolly-headed moralism or 
naiveté about the demands imposed on states by power politics. It rests on a 
more nuanced understanding of international politics than that offered by 
structural realism. The post-Cold War era offers an excellent laboratory in 
which to pit these competing theoretical perspectives against each other.‖
100
 
Laboratory experiments in collective security got underway quickly, as Saddam 
Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait on the 2nd August 1990 led to a series of United 
Nations resolutions calling for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally.  Multilateral 
economic sanctions were applied and a US-led international coalition waged an air 
and ground war to liberate Kuwait.  On the surface, here was a textbook example of 
collective security in operation, in which the international community balanced 
together to reverse an aggression committed against one of its members.  However, 
the United States‘ decision to invade had in fact been taken unilaterally, with the 
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United Nations simply legitimising military action, which although contributed to by 
American allies was undertaken under US command.
101
 
The Gulf War showed that collective security could not help but reflect the realities 
of individual states‘ own capabilities.  Thus even for the most idealistic liberals, it 
had to be the responsibility of the United States is to underpin any global collective 
security regime.  America‘s military dominance meant that was only realistic, as 
President Bush‘s National Security Strategy had made clear.  ―As the world's most 
powerful democracy, we are inescapably the leader... The pivotal responsibility for 
ensuring the stability of the international balance remains ours.‖
102
 
At the same time, collective security in a system dominated by one power contains 
real difficulties, necessitating as it does either American leadership in material 
contribution and therefore policy-setting, or a smaller American contribution and 
truly multilateral decision-making.  Yet few who argue for a liberal multilateral 
strategy advocate that the United States defer to other members of the 
international community.  Indeed, truly multilateral security enterprises would be 
more difficult to sustain, since American dominance brings with it the possibility 
of providing collective goods efficiently, avoiding the inevitable burden-passing 
and resultant discord if a sizeable number of states are asked to contribute 
relatively equal shares to a collective enterprise.
103
  Joseph Nye therefore borrowed 
from economics to note that ―if the largest consumer of a collective good, such as 
order, does not take the lead in organising its production, there is little likelihood 
that the good will be produced by others.‖
104
  Indeed, liberals see American 
provision of the public good of security as a source of international order not only in 
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terms of other states‘ behaviour but also the actions of the United States, since 
binding itself to act multilaterally would: 
―…provide a safeguard against the excessive use of American power. This 
might benefit all concerned: the United States would not be able to act on its 
own worst impulses; others would share the costs of interventions and would 
also be less fearful of the United States and so, perhaps, more prone to cooperate 
with it.‖
105
 
Collectivising security might therefore mitigate the perceived threat that American 
military dominance gives rise to in others, and legitimise America‘s position as the 
sole superpower.  Moreover, the United States could not sustain a position as the 
multilaterally-authorised unilateral supplier of security.  Indeed, most security issues 
did not require the sophisticated and overpowering application of American military 
force, but multilateral commitments across a spectrum of other areas. 
Cooperative Security 
It was in the engagement of more plural security concerns than interstate war that 
security needed to be cooperative rather than collective.  Cooperative security ideas 
focused on preventing the means for large scale organised aggression from being 
assembled rather than countering threats once they arise.  In this sense, cooperative 
security differs from collective security ―as preventative medicine differs from acute 
care.‖
106
  In practice this involved building upon the binding international 
agreements that restrain military operations – from global non-proliferation treaties 
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to intelligence sharing and establishing regional cooperative security arrangements – 
to ―thicken and unify‖ this web of commitments.
107
   
At the same time, cooperative security would be required to do more than simply 
build security norms and institutions.  In ―the age of deregulation‖ security issues 
were more pervasive and interrelated than ever before.
108
   This complex, 
unstructured order bought with it a litany of threats and challenges, and the danger 
that ―chaos is an infectious disease‖.
109
  Cooperative humanitarian interventions in 
cases of ethnic conflict, civil war or genocide, would therefore be required to 
maintain order and prevent the spread of insecurity.
110
  And since in such cases 
historic national interests might prevent conflicts being regarded as collective 
security threats, organisations such as NATO, which are more flexible than the 
United Nations, were therefore ―invaluable international networks for coordinating 
common responses‖ in a host of situations, with ―precisely the kind of command, 
control, communications, intelligence and logistics networks required for 
cooperative security or humanitarian efforts‖.
111
 
Cooperative security is not an alternative to collective security, rather they two are 
intended to be mutually reinforcing.  There remained a need for collective security 
as a ―residual guarantee‖ in the event of aggression.
112
  Yet cooperative security 
sought to establish security through collaborative and institutionalised consent, and 
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to replace deterring aggression with mechanisms that make preparation for it more 
difficult.  At the same time, it justified security actions which collective security 
guarantees could not validate, to address security threats where states‘ traditionally 
conceived vital interests might not be engaged, despite the danger to international 
order more generally.  In this, cooperative security favoured activist, pre-emptive 
action through specialised institutions and regimes, as well as ad hoc and partial 
coalitions, to the spontaneous universal balancing of collective security.  Taken 
together, the collectivisation of security was a key tenet of a liberal multilateralist 
strategy for the United States, allowing it to set the international security agenda and 
act internationally to address threats without the constraints imposed by the twin 
stigmas of unilateralism or self-interest. 
Conclusion:  America‟s Liberal Grand Strategy 
For liberal multilateralists, the proliferation of post-Cold War security threats 
mandated the means of American grand strategy be based around a commitment to 
multilateral instruments, democracy promotion, open markets and collectivised 
security.  This school of thought is the grand strategic expression of the key ideas of 
liberal international relations theory: that democratic, interdependent and prosperous 
states are inherently peaceful, and that states are both able and willing to cooperate 
and bind themselves to norms, institutions and regimes to create and sustain order.  
The nature of the post-Cold War security environment made such cooperation 
essential: its threats and challenges could not be dealt with by a strategy of ‗liddism‘.  
Only by actively seeking to extend and deepen an integrative international system 
could a balance be maintained in favour of order over chaos. 
At the same time, it was inevitable that American internationalism should have a 
liberal and democratic character – the values of individual freedom, rights and 
democracy, after all, were the defining features of the United States‘ self-image, the 
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content of American identity.
113
  Therefore the central argument of liberals in the 
1990s was that an American policy that advocated universal liberal principles of 
human rights and democratic governance was actually profoundly in the national 
interest of the United States.  As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it on the 
eve of a Presidential trip to Africa, promoting liberal values ―is not only the right 
thing to do, it is the smart thing to do‖.
114
  A liberal grand strategy was not mere 
ideas or ideals, it had real practical value for the US government, because a world in 
which liberalism was dominant was a world in which the United States could most 
effectively pursue its interests, foster a stable order and reduce security threats.
115
 
However, the rhetoric of liberal strategy also lay in the perceived need to articulate 
an idealist vision of American grand strategy in order to sustain support for 
American internationalism, since ―the American people have never accepted 
traditional geopolitics or pure balance-of-power calculations as sufficient reason to 
expend national treasure or dispatch American soldiers to foreign lands... [they] 
want their country‘s foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik.‖
116
  
Curiously this was a perception not borne out by poll data which showed ―very 
limited support among either the general public or opinion leaders for the expansion 
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of democracy abroad, and that the end of the Cold War has not given rise to 
heightened approval for that goal.‖
117
   
Since the vast majority of liberal multilateralist thinking had its origins in academia 
and left-of-centre politics, it is unsurprising that much of this liberal thinking 
appeared in the Clinton administration‘s 1995 National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement, which advocated preventative diplomacy, open 
markets, democracy promotion and security cooperation to address a diverse range 
of threats.
118
  This strategy based the necessity of American engagement in the world 
on sustaining and expanding the community of market democracies which bought it 
peaceful relationships.  Democratic enlargement was ―the Clinton Doctrine‖, the 
result of the ―Kennan sweepstakes‖ to define a new ―compass word‖ for American 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.  Presented with the opportunity to establish 
the strategy by managing the transition of states of the former Soviet Union from 
communism to market democracy, the President likened the strategy of enlargement 
to the domino-theory in reverse; encouraging and supporting rather than preventing 
a succession of mutually reinforcing societal changes that were in the interests of the 
United States.
119
   
Liberal multilateralism then, was an attempt to embed the fundamental features of 
the United States within the international system, to universalise American society in 
the norms and institutions of the world economic and political system.  Whilst many 
of its suggested means were prosaic, the daily grist of international lawyers and 
technocrats, its ambition was startling.  For here was an attempt to extend the 
Western settlement of 1945 to the entire world, to capitalise on the ideological 
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vacuum the Soviet Union had left, and to make Fukuyama‘s ‗end of history‘ thesis a 
fait accompli.
 190 
CHAPTER 5:  AMERICAN PRIMACY –  
ENSURING NO RIVALS DEVELOP 
Introduction 
As chapter four made clear, liberals were ambitious in their vision of the capacities 
of American leadership.  Yet their world-making paled in comparison with the 
diverse arguments that argued for the aggressive promotion of American primacy.  
Rejecting liberals‘ arguments for self-binding, this school drew on offensive realist 
theories of international relations that emphasised the structural imperatives for 
expansion, and on theories of hegemonic stability that highlighted the possibility of 
a stable unipolar order.  This chapter begins by making the case that, unlike many 
contemporary approaches to policies of American dominance, discussions of 
neoconservative foreign policy are an unhelpful way of analysing this debate, which 
requires instead a broader and less ideological approach to understanding the sources 
of arguments for American primacy.  It then proceeds to discuss the history of 
arguments for primacy in the post-Cold War era, and expand upon primacists‘ 
approach to making strategic assessments, one that hinges on the possibility of one 
state maintaining a preponderant position of power.  Since primacy serves to 
universalise American interests, the chapter then discusses the universal threats to 
those interests, and the emphasis on primacists‘ advocacy of unilateral military 
responses to them.  It then disaggregates the advocates of American primacy into 
two distinct camps on the basis of their differentiated goals for that primacy: 
assertive nationalists on the one hand and democratic globalists on the other.  The 
chapter concludes by emphasising offensive realism‘s theoretical contribution to this 
school of thought, which argues that the United States should take on the burdens of 
empire. 
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The Neoconservative Convergence: The Diverse Sources of Primacy 
This chapter assesses the arguments that were put forward during the 1990s in 
support of a grand strategy of American primacy.  Advocates of strong American 
leadership could be found among liberals, indeed it can be argued that perhaps the 
most high-profile advocate of liberal grand strategy, the political scientist John 
Ikenberry, was also a primacist, in that he recognised the importance of American 
power in building and sustaining liberal institutions.
1
  Yet the advocates of primacy 
do more than advocate the utility of American power.  In their rejection of 
multilateral institutions as an unacceptable constraint on American freedom of 
action, and their overwhelming focus on the use of military means, primacists stand 
in direct opposition to the arguments of liberals that emphasise the necessity of self-
binding. 
Foremost among the advocates of American primacy are neoconservatives, a loose 
grouping of public intellectuals prone to ―highly politicized and often polemical 
language‖ that, as Michael Williams notes, often ―sits uncomfortably with the 
culture of scholarly discourse and with overtly theoretical debate in particular.‖
2
  If 
they were initially a movement of former Marxists who became disillusioned by the 
value-relativism of Lyndon Johnson‘s ‗Great Society‘ liberalism, by the 1990s few 
neoconservatives had ever railed against the New Left or been anything other than 
card-carrying Republicans.
3
  If the original neoconservatives were better understood 
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as ―a group of people rather than as a group of ideas‖, the movement‘s growth and 
progress only emphasized that philosophical heterogeneity.
4
  Moreover, the level of 
vilification that has been attached to neoconservative thought in the wake of the 
2003 Iraq War means that the term has ceased to have a great deal of analytical 
usefulness.
5
 
Indeed, by the end of the 1990s the majority of would-be practitioners of 
‗neoconservative‘ grand strategy had no history in the movement in terms of its 
broader philosophical ideas.
6
  Some prominent neoconservatives had reacted to the 
end of the Cold War by advocating a return to realism – for them, the ideological 
challenge of the Soviet Union had been defeated and America needed to abandon its 
idealistic moralism and revert to being a ‗normal country‘.
7
  Although the 
neoconservatives did make a significant contribution in arguing for primacy, as 
many of those who made the case for American dominance after the Cold War did 
so from different intellectual backgrounds and for reasons that were far removed 
from neoconservative rationale.   
Perhaps even more importantly, there has been a tendency in academic circles to 
treat neoconservative thought as an aberration, a temporary affliction in the 
American foreign policy tradition.  It is not uncommon in the critical literature on 
neoconservatism to find conspiratorial notions of cabals, references to godfathers 
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and a tendency to view neoconservative intellectuals as agents of Israel‘s Likud 
party, intent on subverting US foreign policy for Zionist ends.
8
  Focusing on these 
myths has meant that scholars have often failed to address the arguments of 
neoconservatives on their own terms, and to appreciate that they and their 
intellectual antecedents, far from being a ‗blip‘, have actually been ever-present in 
debates over American grand strategy.  There have been self-confessed 
neoconservatives in American administrations since Nixon, and arguments for a 
hard-power based, activist American foreign policy have a history as long as the 
republic itself.
9
   
For the philosophical and practical reasons outline in this introduction, arguments 
for American primacy can and should not be identified purely with neoconservatism.   
The assumptions, ideas and analysis that underlie the arguments for a grand strategy 
of American primacy need to be assessed on their own merits, and understood in 
terms of the historical environments in which they arise – international and 
domestic; ideological and empirical.  The next section will address the history of 
those arguments following the Cold War. 
 “Bully on the Block” 
For Colin Powell, America at end of the Cold War had to send out a message: ―We 
have to put a shingle outside our door saying, ‗Superpower Lives Here‘… we exist 
to go kick someone‘s butt if necessary.  I believe that if you look like you can kick 
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someone‘s butt, more often than not it will not be necessary.‖
10
  Thus the crux of 
primacy arguments is that the end of the Cold War left America in a dominant 
position, and from that position America needed to not only maintain but extend its 
superiority.  Primacy would ensure security, because no potential adversary could 
hope to get close enough to the power of the United States in order to challenge it.
11
 
Early in 1992 the world became aware of how American primacists envisaged 
President Bush‘s ‗new world order‘ taking shape, as leaked drafts of the Pentagon‘s 
‗Defense Planning Guidance‘ found their way into the offices of the New York Times 
and the Washington Post.  According to these reports, the classified document made 
the case for ―benevolent domination by one power‖ of the post Cold War world, 
requiring ―concerted efforts to preserve American global military supremacy and 
thwart the emergence of a rival superpower in Europe, Asia or the former Soviet 
Union.‖
12
   
―Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival... the U.S. 
must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that 
holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire 
to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture... There are other potential 
nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and 
a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now 
refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global 
competitor.‖
13
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The leaked documents were part of a process of debate within the Pentagon that was 
being carefully orchestrated by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, assisted by 
hawkish policy aides including Paul Wolfowitz, who was responsible for the 
Pentagon‘s plan and I. Lewis ‗Scooter‘ Libby.
14
  The leak was embarrassing for the 
Bush presidency, and the document‘s importance was hastily played down.
15
  A 
softer version was leaked to the press and the controversy subsided.
16
 
However, the ideas behind the plan didn‘t go away, and although some of the more 
blunt language was softened the plan that Cheney published after Bush lost the 
election was essentially the same as the draft Wolfowitz‘s policy team had produced.  
The United States intended ―to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve 
and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains.‖  This would be achieved 
by maintaining ―highly capable forces‖ capable of precluding ―hostile competitors 
from challenging our critical interests.‖
17
  As David Armstrong summarised, the 
Defense Strategy for the 1990s was still a plan ―for the United States to rule the 
world…  It was kinder, gentler dominance, but it was dominance all the same. And it 
was this thesis that Cheney and company nailed to the door on their way out.‖
18
 
Some of this was bureaucratic, a function of Cold Warriors such as Powell and 
Cheney arguing for primacy in order to ward off congressional budget cutters.
19
  Yet 
even once Clinton‘s election on a mandate to exploit the peace dividend for 
domestic purposes swept such interests out of office, arguments for American 
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primacy remained prominent.  In July 1996, the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated 
that the Pentagon was still thinking along the lines of the 1992 Defense Planning 
Guidance by issuing Joint Vision 2010.  This stated that ―Full Spectrum Dominance 
will be the key characteristic we seek for our Armed Forces in the 21st century‖, and 
tasks the military to remain ―preeminent in any form of conflict‖ in order ―to prevent 
threats to our interests from emerging, deter those that do, and defeat those threats 
by military force if deterrence fails.‖
20
  This conceptual framework was expanded 
the following year into a fuller strategy that reiterated the goal of full spectrum 
dominance, defining it as ―the ability to dominate any adversary and control any 
situation in any operation across the range of military operations.‖
21
  Here was 
evidence, wrote one of the few major publications to cover either of these military 
blueprints, that American military doctrine continued to rest fundamentally on 
notions of massing military might that drew heavily from the Cold War in order to 
continue to justify a $250 billion defense budget.
22
 
Outside of government, more political advocates of American predominance took up 
posts as foreign-policy intellectuals in Washington think-tanks – coalescing at the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute and the Center for Security 
Policy
23
 – and wrote influential opinion pieces, particularly in magazines such as 
National Review, the Weekly Standard, Commentary, the New Republic the National 
Interest.  This kind of public intellectualism meant the ideas of American primacy 
remained very much alive in the political consciousness as a muscular alternative to 
the policies of the Clinton administration. 
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Some on the right had actually switched their allegiance to the Democratic 
candidate, whose criticisms of the incumbent‘s strict interest-based realism and 
advocacy of American values in the international arena went down well with 
primacists.  However, it was not long into Clinton‘s presidency before primacists 
began to criticise the appeasement, misguided interventions and lack of moral 
courage which would become their scathing characterisation of the Clinton era.
24
  
Effectively utilising the popular news media, in particular Fox News, advocates of 
American predominance were able to take their message to a far larger audience.  
When Rupert Murdoch launched Fox News in 1996, his claim that it would represent 
both sides of the political spectrum was seen by conservatives as an indication that 
Fox wouldn‘t pander to what they believed was a liberal bias in the American news 
media.
25
  So it proved, as Fox signed up prominent advocates of American primacy 
such as William Kristol, resulting in news coverage that was significantly to the 
right of both all other television news networks and the views of the average elected 
American official.
26
 
By the end of Clinton‘s second term, the primacy arguments from opposition 
conservatives had coalesced into a fully articulated strategy of global dominance 
published by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).  Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century took the 
ideas of the earlier Defense Planning Guidance and developed them into an 
overwhelmingly thorough, meticulously detailed and unashamedly primacist grand 
strategy for the United States.  This entailed maintaining an ability to ―fight and 
decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars‖; a commitment to 
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performing the ―‗constabulary‘ duties associated with shaping the security 
environment in critical regions‖; control of ―the new ‗international commons‘ of 
space and ‗cyberspace‘‖ and a network of bases and long-range capabilities to allow 
the United States to ―project military power around the globe‖.
27
 
―The United States is the world‘s only superpower, combining preeminent 
military power, global technological leadership, and the world‘s largest 
economy.  Moreover, America stands at the head of a system of alliances which 
includes the world‘s other leading democratic powers.  At present the United 
States faces no global rival.  America‘s grand strategy should aim to preserve 
and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.  There 
are, however, potentially powerful states dissatisfied with the current situation 
and eager to change it, if they can, in directions that endanger the relatively 
peaceful, prosperous and free condition the world enjoys today.  Up to now, 
they have been deterred from doing so by the capability and global presence of 
American military power.  But, as that power declines, relatively and absolutely, 
the happy conditions that follow from it will be inevitably undermined.‖
28
 
Thus, ―in a collective voice, PNAC spelled out the particulars of a global empire 
strategy‖.
29
  The strategy required funding increases: from $70 billion to $95 billion 
per year for the army; from $91 billion to $110 billion for the Navy and Marine 
Corps; and from $83 billion to $115 billion for the Air Force, a combined increase 
for the three services of almost one-third.  All this to maintain ―the enormous 
disparity between US military strength and that of any potential challenger [that] is a 
good thing for America and the world.‖
30
  As the British historian Bernard Porter put 
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it, rather than denying American empire, a certain type of American not only 
―grasped the nettle, but rather likes the feel of it‖.
31
  
America Unrivalled – Building Preponderance 
Primacists approach the process of assessing the international environment by asking 
whether the United States is preponderant.  The first subject of analysis is not other 
states‘ capabilities or their threatening postures, but America‘s strength.  Is America 
strong enough to afford her freedom of action in the international system?  If not, 
what are the constraints placed upon that freedom, and what is required to free the 
United States from those shackles?  Primacy, before all other considerations, is itself 
the goal and the means of strategy. 
Approaching the international system in this way betrays certain theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of the international system, and particularly, about the 
possibility of a stable unipolar order.  Unipolarity is a structure in which one state‘s 
capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced.
32
  In the main, International 
Relations theory rejects unipolarity.  For structural realists, it can only be a 
temporary phenomenon, since ―in international politics, overwhelming power repels 
and leads other states to balance against it.‖
33
  For realists, the costs of a strategy of 
preponderance may actually provide other potential great powers with relative 
advantages that enables them to rise to challenge the hegemon.  States will always 
attempt to balance because no matter how benign the hegemon may appear, its 
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future intentions cannot be guaranteed.
34
  Elsewhere, the very idea of the kind of 
power concentration implied by unipolarity is anathema to liberal and constructivist 
theorists of International Relations.
35
 
Advocates of primacy however reject these traditional ways of thinking about power 
concentrations in international politics.  They concur with structural realists that 
states will attempt to balance power, not because power is threatening, but rather 
because anarchy creates powerful incentives for states to expand.  Thus where 
defensive realism sees states as security maximisers, offensive realists believe that 
states seek to maximise their power.  This offensive realist way of understanding the 
international system implies that rather than being a game of chess, with powers 
jostling for position, international relations is in fact a perpetual race in which the 
aim is to gain, keep and extend a lead.  Therefore, ―status quo powers are rarely 
found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives 
for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take 
advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.  A state‘s 
ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.‖
 36
 
Primacists use the logic of a world of revisionist powers to justify continued 
American expansion.
37
  In doing so they regard a unipolar system, with the United 
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States maintaining a significant lead over all other states, as not only attainable but 
desirable, and a source of security and justice.  Unipolarity is a peaceful state of 
international politics, because it removes two of the major sources of instability from 
the system: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among the major 
powers.  In a system that is unipolar, there are no aspiring or potential hegemons 
seeking to alter the status quo since no state can hope to get close to the sole 
superpower.  The goal of primacy is therefore to present second-order states with the 
inconsequential strategic options ranging from enthusiastic bandwagoning with the 
polar power to studious avoidance of direct enmity.
38
  Thus primacy aims to deter 
balancing and force bandwagoning behaviour: so long as the US remains committed 
to, and consistent in, its hegemonic role, peaceful stability should follow.   
The key critique of unipolarity from a structural realist perspective, is not its 
peacefulness but its durability.  In international relations overwhelming power repels 
and states balance against hegemons, because international structure impels great 
power emergence.
39
  As Paul Kennedy puts it, ―the only answer‖ to the question of 
whether the United States can maintain predominance ―is ‗no‘ – for it simply has not 
been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others‖.
40
  At 
the same time, how long we should expect the inevitable process of adjustment to 
take is not specified by neorealist theory, and it is for this reason, and the lack of any 
clear moves towards balancing behaviour in the course of the 1990s that a range of 
scholars provide explanations of the possibility of a more enduring unipolar 
system.
41
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For Wohlforth, both the extent of the United States‘ dominance and its peculiar 
advantages of geography, and in particular, its enduring alliances to the north and 
south, reinforce the likely longevity of American unipolarity.
42
  This idea draws on 
Stephen Walt‘s balance of threat theory, which suggests that states balance against 
their perception of threat rather than power per se.  Thus ―states that are viewed as 
aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them... intention, not 
power, is crucial.‖
43
 Balance of threat theory therefore suggests that balancing 
behaviour may be overcome by powerful states reassuring weaker states, thus 
mediating the power-disequilibrium and leading other states to regard the status quo 
as preferable to the rivalry of multipolarity.
44
   
Unipolarity may then be durable, or at least, longer-lasting, if the polar power is 
considered ‗benign‘, that is, if the other states in the system do not have a sense of 
threat commensurate with the difference in capabilities.  Charles Kupchan argues 
that this can be achieved through ‗self-binding‘, a process which sanitises power 
through restraint, multilateralism and the promotion of joint gains.  ―Self-binding is 
the mechanism through which states render their power benign… [it] entails a state's 
willingness to withhold power, to refrain from fully exercising its resources and 
influence.‖
45
  This fits in with an idea derived from international political economy, 
hegemonic stability theory, which emphasises that dominance may be reflected in 
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‗leadership‘ rather than exploitation.
46
  In a unipolar system, a polar power that is 
prepared to lead may provide the public goods of security and stability through its 
willingness to exercise its power for systemic ends. 
Some who advocate forms of American leadership believe that ‗self-binding‘ is 
necessary to its success.
47
  However, a grand strategy of predominance is predicated 
on not diluting American power and freedom of action.  It does not envisage 
America leading primus inter pares.  Rather than rendering American power benign 
by submitting to self-binding, primacists assume that the United States will be seen 
as benign because, quite simply, the United States is benign – a truth that rests on 
distinctively American ideas about the special nature of their own nation.  American 
leadership will be accepted because it is American, and, therefore, unipolarity need 
not be transitory. 
For primacists, American dominance is not only good for America, but also good for 
the rest of the world.  Familiar ideas from the history of American grand strategy 
were used to justify both the United States‘ position as the sole global superpower 
and its determination to build upon that status.  America could be trusted with 
unipolar power because its values were the values of all men.  Indeed, the 
identification of America with the universal rights of Liberty was such that the 
protection of American hegemony should not just be the priority of the United 
States, but the priority of most of the rest of the world as well.  Indeed, for Kagan: 
―The identification of others' interests with its own has been a striking quality of 
US foreign policy.  The conviction that American well-being depends on the 
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well-being of others is based on enlightened self-interest that in practice comes 
dangerously close to resembling generosity.‖
48
 
For the proponents of primacy then, the world had nothing to fear from American 
dominance, and felt assured that ―most of the world‘s major powers… prefer 
America‘s benevolent hegemony to the alternatives.‖
49
  The United States should be 
prepared to ―pay the bill‖ because in providing security for others in Europe, the 
Middle East and the Pacific it buys security for itself in the form of stability.  Power 
―exacts responsibility, and responsibility requires a vision that transcends niggardly 
self-interest.‖
50
  The durability of the American system rests therefore rested simply 
on America‘s own choice: that as long as the United States was prepared to bear the 
burden of global leadership the rest of the world would be happy to follow.  The 
absence of balancing and the increasing gap in economic capabilities through the 
period of the two Clinton administrations only served to reinforce that impression.
51
 
The Universality of American Weakness 
Given America‘s predominant position in the international system, the central idea 
behind a strategy of primacy is not security but continued dominance.  One might 
assume that dominance would be an auxiliary goal of states, one that can be 
contemplated once all threats to security have been dealt with and a surfeit of power 
is left.  But for primacists, states are power seekers not security seekers, and so 
dominance is the origin of everything else, and the source of continued American 
freedom of action.  Threats are identified after the strategy has been chosen, threats 
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not to the national security of the state, but to the unipolar nature of the system, to 
the grand strategy of primacy itself. 
Perversely, all this dominance may reduce a state‘s security - as Robert Jervis has 
observed, empires, whether territorial or ideological, have a larger frontier: thus the 
very extent of the polar power‘s influence means that all sorts of disturbances can 
threaten it.
52
  This insecurity is a function of perception rather than reality, a ‗myth 
of empire‘ that has historically fuelled the overexpansion of great powers.
53
  Yet for 
advocates of primacy, dominance and threat exist in a virtuous circle, since the 
grand strategy itself may be justified by the myriad of threats to it.  Indeed, 
primacists regarded complacency about the United States‘ strategic situation as the 
greatest danger of all: 
―In fact, the ubiquitous post-Cold War question – where is the threat? – is 
misconceived… Our present danger is one of declining military strength, 
flagging will and confusion about our role in the world.  It is a danger, to be 
sure, of our own devising.  Yet if neglected, it is likely to yield very real 
external dangers, as threatening in their way as the Soviet Union was a quarter 
century ago.‖
54
 
Therefore, as one might then expect, during the 1990s the primacists‘ ideas of where 
the threat to American security lay was both expansive and vacillated with events, to 
such an extent that it would be almost impossible to construct an exhaustive list of 
the threats which proponents of American preponderance constructed between the 
end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror.  Such nervous 
hyperactivity reflected a definition of American interests that was global in scope 
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and which therefore apparently regarded each and every occasion where America‘s 
interests were not met in full as representing a reduction of American power. 
Hardened – and hard-line – Cold Warriors initially treated the notion that the Cold 
War was over with caution, both unsure of the durability of the Soviet Union‘s 
internal political changes, wary of the challenges the Soviet leadership faced and 
conscious of its still-massive military capabilities.
55
  Later in the decade, that 
prediction was in part realised as Russia became both increasingly nationalist and 
bellicose under Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer who had made his reputation 
sanctioning gross human rights violations in Chechnya and whose regeneration of 
Russian nationalism involved the systematic undermining of the democratic reforms 
of the immediate post-Cold War years.
56
   At the same time the rise of Russian 
organised crime posed a direct threat to the peace and stability of the United States 
and even to world order.
57
  As a Department of Justice Report noted in early 2001: 
―The nature and variety of the crimes being committed seems unlimited… but 
no area of the world seems immune to this menace, especially not the United 
States. America is the land of opportunity for unloading criminal goods and 
laundering dirty money.
58
 
Russia was also implicated in exacerbating the threat from Iran, both as a principal 
supplier of conventional weapons and nuclear assistance and by aligning themselves 
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with Iranian positions on a number of issues in the Persian Gulf.  Here was a tactical 
alliance, wrote the director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center, 
designed to fill a geopolitical vacuum in the Middle East and make a common cause 
against American hegemony.
59
  Iran, for its part, was seeking nuclear weapons in a 
bid to fundamentally realign the balance of power in the Middle East away from 
Israel, and, in what was more than a happy coincidence for the Iranian leadership, 
the United States.
60
  At the same time, Iran‘s treatment of women was an affront to 
the American model of moral leadership in the international system that emphasised 
liberty and equality.
61
 
The problem of Iranian proliferation was mirrored more urgently with regard to 
North Korea, where Pyongyang‘s ―deliberately menacing‖ external policies had 
placed it in near-permanent conflict with the international community, and in doing 
so, exposed the United States‘ weakness by threatening American allies in East Asia 
and even the United States itself with long-range ballistic missile and nuclear 
programmes.  According to one scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, North 
Korea was an ―unappeasable state‖, and the United States‘ ―‗engagement policy‘ 
perversely used Western power and resources to preserve, and indeed magnify, 
North Korea‘s threat to the West.‖ 
62
   
Not that the West was itself necessarily a benign entity.   In 1992 separate RAND 
studies talked of the need to ―reduce Japanese incentives for major rearmament‖ and 
prevent Germany becoming ―a heavy handed rouge elephant in Central Europe.‖
63
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European Union state-building efforts after the end of the Cold War too, were 
―stirrings of independence bordering on insubordination‖.
64
   
North Korea‘s fellow Communist remnant to the north was even more dangerous.  
Chinese economic expansion was fuelling its military spending and resulting in 
short-sighted policies of attempting to engage this anti-democratic human rights 
violator as a strategic partner.  Yet China‘s weapons exports and its continued 
ambitions for regional hegemony meant that the United States could not afford such 
appeasement if it were to stand with its allies in the region for the hopes of peace, 
democracy and prosperity in East Asia.
65
   
However, the most pressing of these ideologically opposed ‗rouge states‘, regarded 
as challenging America‘s predominant position in the international order, was Iraq.  
The continued presence of Saddam Hussein‘s government was regarded by former 
Bush administration officials as unfinished business from the first Gulf War when a 
cautious President had failed to cement the new –American – world order by 
removing a revisionist regime from the strategically important Middle East.  Instead, 
a policy of containing Saddam had allowed him to continue to thumb his nose at 
American power by stoking regional instability and abusing his own population, 
whilst all the while attempting to gain weapons of mass destruction with which to 
threaten Iraq‘s neighbours and the United States interests in the region.
66
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The litany of threats presented by primacists indicate that they saw the ability of the 
United States to control international order, rather than the security of the American 
state, as the essential frame of reference in the post-Cold War world.  American 
dominance is therefore ―hub-and-spokes‖ strategy, in which American unipolarity is 
the key feature of the international system that had to be defended.
67
  The resulting 
expansion of American interests to encompass what would normally be thought of as 
local issues amounted to a ‗Global Monroe Doctrine‘ in which the United States 
extended the principles of non-interference in its own hemisphere worldwide.
68
   
The drive for American primacy thus constructed an image of the world as being far 
more anarchic and unstable than the bipolar conflict that had preceded it.  Given the 
consistent enthusiasm with which he advocated using American power to lay down 
and enforce the rules of world order, Charles Krauthammer was surely being 
disingenuous when he wrote in 1991: 
―Compared to the task of defeating fascism and communism, averting chaos is a 
rather subtle call to greatness.  It is not a task we are any more eager to 
undertake than the great twilight struggle just concluded.  But it is noble and just 
as necessary.‖
69
 
There is of course some irony in those arguing for a grand strategy that explicitly 
rejects one of the key tenet of traditional realist thought – the innate instability of 
unipolarity – doing so on the basis of a most extreme form of Hobbesian realism.  
Yet the idea that the world is intrinsically an incredibly dangerous place, and had 
become more so with the collapse of the familiar enmity with the Soviet Union, 
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necessitated that the United States have all possible strings to its bow.  Robert Kagan 
worried that ―there is no certainty that we can correctly distinguish between high-
stakes issues and small-stake issues in time to sound the alarm.‖
70
 
For Powell that level of uncertainty as to the threat you might face meant ―putting it 
in the mind of an opponent that there is no future in trying to challenge the armed 
forces of the United States.‖
71
  Those arguing for primacy fundamentally agreed that 
the main threat to the United States arose from its being perceived abroad as weak 
and irresolute.
72
  Therefore, however challenged, the United States had to be able to 
respond emphatically.  ―I believe in the bully‘s way of going to war.  I‘m on a street 
corner, I got my gun, I got my blade, I‘ma kick yo‘ ass.‖
73
 
American Militarism 
The grand strategy of primacy requires first and foremost that the United States 
maintain or extend its geostrategic advantage over the rest of the world.  Maintaining 
primacy then, is about maintaining power – the ability to influence the behaviour of 
other actors in the system.
74
  Thus the formulation of primacy as a grand strategy 
does not involve the selection of particular means to address particular threats – we 
have already seen that the identification of threats is subordinate to the maintenance 
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of primacy.  Instead, it involves the creation of policies to maintain America‘s power 
dominance, that is, in Mead‘s conception, they seek to maintain a monopoly on 
hegemonic power at a global level.  As we saw, hegemonic power is dependent on 
pre-eminence in other areas of power, so it is to these that primacists address their 
policy prescriptions. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the arguments that advocate American primacy is 
the extent to which their policy prescriptions were focused on the development of 
and willingness to use American military power.  During the 1990s the United States 
held a military position unmatched since Rome dominated the Mediterranean 
world.
75
  With the Soviet Union‘s military capabilities outdated and lacking in the 
ability to mobilise, the United States was free to take command of the global 
commons of the sea, the air and of space.
76
  Primacy viewed maintaining this 
command as the key element in deterring potential adversaries from pursuing 
military build-up; it is a strategy to ―create barriers to entry into the global military 
power club that are so high as to seem insurmountable.‖
77
 
Yet the proposed increases in defence spending already sketched out should not be 
seen purely as spending for its own sake.  Primacists were highly vocal in 
advocating a system of missile defence, a ‗son of star-wars‘ in keeping with many 
primacists‘ ardent admiration for the muscular foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, and 
which would require the United States to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
78
  Primacists tend to reject the possibility that non-
proliferation treaties can buy security, because the states from which security may be 
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needed are the ones who are most likely to violate them.
79
  Underlying this is the 
conviction that the United States should be powerful enough not to need to enter into 
agreements with hostile powers that will only encourage potential adversaries.  
Missile Defense therefore, is intended to nullify a potential threat through nothing 
other than the employment of American power to make the threat obsolete.  It is 
both an accumulation of military power, and a show of might. 
A grand strategy of primacy also requires a reconfiguration of American military 
forces to be able to respond to any of the myriad of potential threats.  To this end, 
primacists‘ advocacy of full spectrum dominance to take advantage of the revolution 
in military affairs so that the US could rapidly deploy forces wherever they might be 
required across the globe.  As one prominent commentator put it: ―If someone 
invades your house, you call the cops. Who do you call if someone invades your 
country? You dial Washington.‖
80
 
American military power would maintain primacy by undertaking a number of 
global missions.  Apart from the usual security requirements of national defence, the 
American military also needed to continually provide ‗insurance‘ against new and 
emergent threats.  Further, in order to maintain primacy the US military would need 
to maintain systemic order, preventing or limiting the ability of others to gain certain 
capabilities, specifically WMD, and punishing those who undermine that order.
81
   
The literature on primacy is therefore overwhelmingly dominated by 
recommendations for US defense policy.  Primacy is about being by far the strongest 
military power.  So although a strong economy is necessary to maintain America‘s 
ability to fund that military strength, economic policy must not undermine 
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America‘s military situation.  On this basis, Michael Ledeen was moved to describe 
the dismantling of the export-control system that deprived the Soviet Union of 
military technology and the subsequent military-technological sales to China as ―the 
greatest crime committed by the Clinton administration‖.
82
  Yet by in large, 
primacists take the continued dominance of the American economy for granted, and 
agree that, at 3.5% of GDP, American military dominance is being purchased ―on 
the cheap‖.
83
   
Primacists, then, favour the qualities of military power above all else.  In spite of, or 
perhaps because of, their fundamentally coercive nature, primacists reject the notion 
of softening or sweetening the exercise of that power by deploying it through 
multilateral mechanisms.  Deeply sceptical about the ability of international 
institutions to play an effective role in international security, primacists argue that 
the United States can and should act as it chooses, with allies welcome to share the 
burden but not to constrain strategic choice.
84
  It is for this reason that liberal 
multilateralists who advocate policies designed to sustain American unipolarity to 
underpin the strength of international institutions should not be considered 
primacists – primacy asserts that it is unilateral decisionmaking by the sole 
superpower that is the best way of managing the international order.
85
 
This rejection of multilateralism has a number of sources.  Like primacy itself, 
unilateralism may be considered beneficent on the basis of the ideas of American 
exceptionalism, which see the United States as a righteous nation founded upon 
universal values.  Some of the critiques of multilateralism reflect a genuine 
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frustration with the failure, both of the theoretical foundation and the practical 
operation, of the institutions of international society.  Thus Charles Krauthammer 
can pose the question: ―By what possible moral calculus does an American 
intervention to liberate 25 million people forfeit moral legitimacy because it lacks 
the blessing of the butchers of Tiananmen Square or the cynics of the Quai 
d‘Orsay?‖
86
 
Some of it derives from the fact the multilateralism constrains the strongest most.  
For as long as America must coexist with untrustworthy and tyrannical regimes for 
whom ―moral suasion is a farce‖, multilateral agreements to which America would 
bind herself entail a loss of power to those regimes.
87
  Treaties constrain ‗good guys‘ 
who will adhere to them; ‗bad guys‘ will either not sign, cheat or openly violate the 
agreements.  On this basis, primacists reject any multilateral policy which might 
result in the weakening of the relative power of the United States.
88
 
The United States‘ own military supremacy then, is to all intents and purposes the 
sole means to the end of primacy.  Primacy itself allows the United States to choose 
to deal with whichever threats present themselves in the post-Cold War world, by 
virtue of the ability to resort to incontestable force if that threat refuses to be 
deterred.  Sustaining the enormous military gap between the United States and the 
rest of the world itself sustains American primacy by preventing other powers from 
even attempting to balance against it, either alone or in concert, as it ―raises still 
higher the coordination and collective action barriers against external balancing.‖
89
  
It is therefore a grand strategy that seeks to provide America with strategic choice 
whilst limiting strategic choice to America. 
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American Interests and Noble Goals 
The major debate between advocates of primacy is the extent to which that primacy 
should be used for the management of the existing international order versus a more 
radical reordering of the international system.  If, as we have seen, primacy is both a 
means to the end of security and an end in itself, should it be a means to other ends?  
And if so, what should those goals be, how important are they, and with which 
elements of American dominance should they be pursued? 
These questions exist on a sliding scale on which there are essentially as many 
strategies as there are strategists.  However, in the 1990s it was possible to identify 
two distinct camps – those of more realist disposition, that believe that primacy is 
solely for defeating direct threats to American security; and idealistic muscular 
Wilsonians, or democratic globalists, who seek to use American power to entrench 
radical system-wide change to universalise liberal norms through policies of 
democratisation. 
Assertive Nationalists 
The first of these groups are simply prepared to accept both the fact of American 
power and the necessity of its use to defeat threats to US security.  In essence then, 
the United States should have no auxiliary goals, despite its unipolar power.  For 
these assertive nationalists, threats are identified on a traditionally realist conception 
of the national interest, largely ignoring the ideological character of the threat or any 
moral imperatives that a situation might be thought to imply.
90
  Highly sensitive to 
the levels of domestic political capital required for overseas missions, this group of 
policymakers prefer to husband that capital for times when it‘s really required – 
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when vital American interests are threatened.
91
  In this sense primacy is maintained 
primarily for deterrent purposes, with America only being prepared to flex its 
military muscles when an undeterred revisionist state threatens America‘s strategic 
interests, for example, when Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait was considered a first step 
towards a hostile regime gaining control of the oil fields of the broader Middle 
East.
92
 
The flip-side of this concentration on serious security threats is that the United States 
should avoid the ‗wasteful activism‘ of humanitarian, nation-building and 
peacekeeping missions.  This rejection of a global policing role was neatly summed 
up by the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Afghan Task Force.  
When asked why the CIA had no intention of sorting out the squabbles of Afghan 
tribal leaders after the organization had been so active in helping to evict the Soviets 
from Afghanistan, the agent replied that ―superpowers don't do windows.‖
93
  This 
has become the organisational imperative for assertive nationalists, who prefer to let 
regional powers take responsibility for regional issues that do not affect US strategic 
interests.  ―America proclaims that ―superpowers don't do windows,‖ so if you want 
your local windows washed, you had better gear up to do them yourselves…  
History shows that another major conflict is never far away and is usually 
unpredictable.  The United States is the only nation capable of forestalling or 
fighting that conflict.  It must remain focused on doing so, for that is the task no one 
else can do.‖
94
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Democratic Globalists 
The dominant primacist viewpoint, however, rests on an American exceptionalism in 
which American action in the world should be predicated on nobler goals than 
simply the national interest.  Having won the Cold War on behalf of the free world, 
America should continue to defend the universal values on which the nation itself 
had been founded. 
―Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to 
defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from non-democratic 
forces, external or internal.  That is why it was in our national interest to come 
to the defence of France and Britain in World War II.  That is why we feel it 
necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened.  No 
complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.‖
95
 
Some primacists, however, go further than simply defending democratic nations 
from expansionist forces as America had done in the past.  Rather, the American 
national interest requires its foreign policy to actively work against regimes whose 
values clash with those of the United States.  Just as if American values were 
material elements of the national interest, competition to them must be resisted.   
―The nature of the regime is crucial, rather than some alleged underlying, 
geographically, or economically or culturally determined ‗national interest.‘  
The priority of the political order implies a morally informed American foreign 
policy.‖
96
 
In emphasising this moral component to American grand strategy, these democratic 
globalists cite the muscular idealism of Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.  
American primacy provides the opportunity to ensure the universal spread of those 
values that are bound up in America itself, and the very idea of America as Liberty 
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renders that opportunity a responsibility.  If in the 19
th
 Century it had been 
America‘s Manifest Destiny to expand the rights of liberty across the continent of 
North America, the end of the Cold War had bestowed the responsibility to spread 
liberty worldwide.
97
  Here was an argument for ―Neo-Manifest Destinarianism‖ in 
which ―a unipolar world is a good idea, if America is the uni.‖
98
 
However, it is not just the providence of American history that compels anti-tyranny 
policies of regime change and support for democratic movements.  Democracy is in 
America‘s national interest because democracies are inherently more peaceful and, 
although not always non-irritant, fundamentally sympathetic to America.  As Joshua 
Muravchik points out, the United States could ―live comfortably indeed in a world 
where our worst antagonists were an Olof Palme, a Charles de Gaulle, an Indira 
Ghadhi, or an Oscar Arias‖
99
   
This view draws heavily on the ideas of democratic peace theory, famously 
described by Jack Levy as ―as close as anything we have to an empirical law in 
international relations‖.
100
  For democratic globalists, the democratic character of a 
state is the most important variable of all in establishing its behaviour.  Their 
teleological argument states that world peace would inevitably flow from an 
international system in which liberal democratic governance was universal.  Linking 
personal freedom to the economic doctrine of the free market, democratic globalists 
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subscribe to a development formula in which ―liberty yields peace, and peace yields 
prosperity, in exactly that sequence.  Elections come first.‖
101
  Thus if the United 
States can use its overwhelming power to create the conditions of human freedom 
and democratic elections, not only will America live in a safer world, it will live in a 
more prosperous world with greater export market potential.  As Paul Wolfowitz 
summed up the democratic argument, ―if people are really liberated to run their 
countries the way they want to, we'll have a world that will be very congenial for 
American interests.‖
102
  Pursuing the ―global advance of liberal democracy‖ was 
therefore ―an overarching American interest.‖
103
 
In doing so, democratic globalists are more likely than American nationalists to see 
the value in enhancing America‘s alliances with market democracies, both as a tool 
of regional burden sharing and as a reinforcement of unipolarity.  One commentator 
even went so far as to call for a ―confederated West‖, a super-sovereign grouping of 
economically, culturally and technologically linked industrialised democracies 
whose linked interests could define the international order ―all the way‖, stopping at 
―nothing short of universal dominion‖.
104
 
At the same time, democratic globalists view America‘s interests as the world‘s 
interests.  Rejecting cultural relativism, this school argues that individual liberty is a 
universal characteristic and aspiration of all human beings, regardless of societal 
differences, and that therefore liberal democracy, as the socio-political form of 
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organisation that reflects that universality, can be applied everywhere.
105
  
Extrapolating from the singular American experience to the universal applicability 
of that historical success-story, democratic globalists reflect a long tradition of 
American exceptionalism in their belief that the values on which America was 
founded and flourished constitute a model for the world.
106
  That model of 
development constituted a single narrative of social and economic modernisation in 
which modernity is defined as the establishment of American ideas of liberal values 
and free market economics.
107
 
Michael Ledeen was not alone in recognising that America‘s ―inescapable mission 
to fight for the spread of democracy‖ was a highly revolutionary strategy, but he was 
certainly one of the most rhetorically robust about it.   
―Whenever I hear policy-makers talk about the wonders of ―stability‖, I get the 
heebie-jeebies… In just about everything we do… we are the most 
revolutionary force on earth… Without a mission, it is only a matter of time 
before public opinion will turn against any American administration that acts 
like an old-fashioned European nation-state… That is why I find the realist 
position highly unrealistic.  The only truly realistic American foreign policy is 
an ideological one that seeks to advance the democratic revolution wherever and 
whenever possible.‖108   
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Conclusion: Offensive Realism meets American Exceptionalism 
Primacy essentially relies on three core ideas: the offensive realist notion that states 
are inherently expansionist; the idea that unipolarity is a sustainable structure within 
the international system; and the nationalist and exceptionalist notion that the United 
States is the rightful leader of the world.  This last notion provides support for the 
policies prescribed by the first, since primacists believe that only a grand strategy 
that is aligned with fundamental American values will generate the necessary 
support to maintain the primacy with which to carry out those missions.  As 
Williams notes, there is a sense in which a ―‗moral‘ foreign policy reinforces those 
virtues and values in the citizenry of the US, and helps get their support for pursuing 
the national interest which they can actually see as an expression of their values, and 
which they can identify with.‖
109
  This need arises from the constraints on American 
power that arise from the nation‘s history, identity and political structures, as well as 
the domestic socio-political issues that threaten to divert resources away from the 
United States‘ hegemonic role.
110
  This combination of a moral purpose derived 
from liberty being used to justify a national interest defined as power was summed 
up in the views of Ben Wattenberg, Chairman of the Coalition for a Democratic 
Majority and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who argued in 1989 that 
a future strategy based around America‘s ―destiny‖ of exporting democracy would 
persuade the American people to keep defense budgets high, whilst all the while 
acting as a hedge against Soviet imperial recidivism.
111
  In essence, a grand strategy 
of primacy that articulates a ‗vision‘ of support for democracy and human rights 
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around the world is a grand strategy that the American public will be prepared to 
vote for and pay for.   
Maintaining domestic support is central to a grand strategy of primacy because the 
rest of the world needs to be assured of the United States‘ continued commitment, 
commitment which will reassure allies and deter enemies and thus prevent 
challenges to American predominance arising.  American power therefore needs to 
be matched by American willingness to bear its burdens, as noted by a prominent 
report of the Nixon Center: 
―In the real world, our predominant strength is not enough by itself to ensure 
against a range of potential disasters.  Whether America‘s physical 
preponderance translates into predominant influence over events depends, for 
one thing, on a variety of intangibles – like political will and staying power, the 
credibility of our commitments, our perceived willingness or unwillingness to 
take risks, our reputation for reliability and competence.‖
112
 
Essentially, the United States needed to be prepared to take on the burdens of 
empire, to be prepared to set the systemic agenda and to intervene globally to protect 
and promote its interests and the principles of the system that it sustained.
113
  As 
Colin Powell put it, whilst advocating a Base Force of 1.6 million men, ―You‘ve got 
to step aside from the context we‘ve been using for the past forty years, that you 
base [military planning] against a specific threat.  We no longer have the luxury of 
having a threat to plan for.  What we plan for is that we‘re a superpower.  We are the 
major player on the world stage with responsibilities [and] interests around the 
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world.‖
114
  As one commentator pithily put it, here was ―an Empire, if you will keep 
it‖.
115
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CHAPTER 6:  STRATEGIES OF EMPIRE 
Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 5, a section of the debate surrounding American grand 
strategy held ostensibly imperial ambitions.  Yet despite the prescriptions of the 
advocates of American primacy during the 1990s, thinking about the United States 
as an empire didn‘t take hold until the second Bush administration embraced an 
unashamedly primacist grand strategy after 9-11.  This chapter argues that American 
empire was both an empirical fact and a conceptual reality following the Cold War 
and that the notion of the United States as an empire informed each of the grand 
strategic options in the post-Cold War debate.  The chapter begins by assessing the 
reasons why debate about empire was largely absent during the 1990s, chief of 
which was the idea that the United States, as a liberal polity, did not fit the imperial 
blueprint.  It contests that notion by demonstrating both the congruence of the 
United States with earlier imperial polities and by recapturing the definitional 
specificity of hegemony, the term that has replaced empire in much of the 
contemporary debate.  It then proceeds to discuss the nature of the modern United 
States as an empire, arguing that the United States became an imperial power 
following the Second World War and that after the end of the Cold War it pursued a 
policy of liberal empire building that mirrored its earlier postwar planning.  This 
policy drew on each of the grand strategic options presented during the 1990s 
without fully embracing any single one, resulting in an approach to the second 
American empire that I characterise as ‗uni-multilateralism‘. 
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Denying Empire 
Considering the United States as an instance within empire has a long historical 
tradition, beginning with the establishment of the American Anti-Imperialist League 
in the aftermath of the Spanish American war and gaining credence with America‘s 
rise to great power status after 1919 and its embrace of that role after 1945.  Yet it 
was not until after September 11
th
 when the United States began to look, walk and 
talk like an empire, that International Relations literature really began to engage 
enthusiastically with the debate concerning the suitability of empire as a descriptive 
term, and to think about what kind of an empire the United States was, if it was one 
at all.
1
  Before George W. Bush‘s imperial turn, it was only the margins of 
intellectualism – radicals on the left who regarded American empire as the fulfilment 
of Marx and Galtung‘s predictions, and neoconservatives on the right who found 
political inspiration in the notion – that were prepared to use the term ‗empire‘ in 
relation to the United States.
2
  Indeed, the raft of literature that emerges in response 
to the post-9/11 policies of the United States largely accepts without qualms a 
metamorphosis whereby America is assumed to have gone from primus inter pares 
among the liberal democracies in the 1990s to becoming an empire in the post-9/11 
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world.
3
  But why had this shift occurred after 9/11, and not after the end of the Cold 
War?
4
  The answer is that the shift had happened with the end of the Cold War, and 
that the post-9/11 move was not as great as supposed.  The strategic ideas detailed in 
the preceding chapters and which informed United States foreign policy following 
the Cold War were fundamentally predicated on the assumption that the defining 
feature of the post-Cold War international system was American empire.  Where 
they differ is in their attitude towards that empire – declinist or revivalist; 
celebratory or denouncing.   
The paucity of analysis of American empire in the decade preceding 2001 is not 
entirely surprising.  Although historians had long studied empires, political scientists 
only really began to take an interest in understanding imperial systems as 
decolonisation was making European empires obsolete.
5
  In the 1990s the collapse 
of the Soviet Union also elicited renewed interest in the sustainability of empires, 
although not directed at the empire that had survived.
6
  
There are three reasons that explain why the 1990s has been overlooked, not only in 
terms of debates about empire but also in the analysis of American grand strategy 
more generally.  The first is that September 11
th
 2001 changed the rules of the game, 
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not only for policymakers but for academics and historians interested in American 
foreign policy.  Understanding this new dynamic of asymmetric threat and response, 
of modernity and religious fundamentalism, became the key research priority 
literally overnight.
7
  And the fact that the second Bush administration had therefore 
apparently picked primacy ‗off the shelf‘, and that the Global War on Terror could 
now provide the unifying threat around which to sustain such a strategy, very 
quickly generated a raft of literature on this newly assertive American empire.
8
   
The 1990s became an interregnum, an interlude between more clearly defined eras, a 
period in which International Relations theory – as well as international politics 
more generally – was in a state of flux, lacking a focal point around which to 
organise itself.
9
  Once the ‗war on terror‘ and the Bush Doctrine provided that focal 
point, the ideas and policies of the preceding decade were instantly forgotten, 
automatically deemed irrelevant in this new world of religious fanaticism and 
terrorist mass destruction.  As John Dumbrell notes in his introduction to one of the 
few analytical assessments of Clinton‘s foreign policy, the 1990s became ―that most 
remote of historical periods: the day before yesterday... the era from which political 
analysts, journalists and political scientists have retired, and to which professional, 
document-orientated historians have yet to direct their attention.‖
10
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The second reason that the 1990s did not produce a theoretical revival of the notion 
of empire on a large scale was that it was only America‘s economic revival – and the 
relatively poor performance of its potential challengers – during that decade that 
established the United States as the uncontested supreme leader of the international 
order.  In the early part of the decade, as the debates in the run-up to the 1992 
Presidential election showed, the United States was not so much an imperial 
behemoth as an insecure power, worried about its relative economic decline and 
uncertain about the future of its relationships that had been defined by the Cold War.  
Beneath the Cold War triumphalism lay a deep insecurity, and the notion that the 
21
st
 century would inevitably be as American as the first seemed fantastical.
11
  
Third, and most fundamentally, it is historically unsurprising that notions of empire 
were little addressed within the United States before the Bush doctrine brought the 
question into particularly sharp relief.  There was a reluctance to associate the 
United States with the empires of the past, since ‗empires‘ had come to be thought of 
almost exclusively as ugly polities, responsible for the subjugation of peoples.  
Indeed, having spent the better part of the twentieth century fighting imperialism and 
encouraging decolonisation, the United States had done more than anyone else to 
establish ‗empire‘ as little more than an insult in contemporary political debate.
12
  
America, in contrast to the European empires against which it had historically 
defined itself, was about emancipation, and had based its foreign policy on 
principles of self-determination and individual liberty.   
If the United States was an empire, ran this line of thinking, it was a ‗funny sort of 
empire‘, one that exhibited self-restraint and that used its power to keep the peace 
rather than rule, and whose so-called imperialists didn‘t ―wear pith helmets, but 
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rather baggy jeans and backward baseball caps.‖
13
  As Lawrence Summers, the 
Harvard and World Bank economist who served in the Treasury under Clinton, liked 
to say, the United States was history‘s only non-imperialist superpower.
14
  American 
empire was an oxymoron, and to associate the United States with previous empires 
nonsensical.   So although America might wield enormous power around the world, 
―like a school child on the playground it does not like to be called names.‖
15
 
Thus, if the British had acquired their empire in a fit of absent-mindedness, the 
United States was an imperial power ―in a state of deep denial.‖
16
  However, this 
reluctance to associate the United States with empire reflected negative imperial 
stereotypes more than it did a reasoned appreciation of the form and function of 
earlier empires.
17
  This chapter attempts to redress that failing, and to argue for the 
restoration the theoretical utility of the term empire.  In doing so it makes no claim 
to the moral desirability or otherwise of empire, whether American or any other, but 
rather seeks to show that only by conceptually treating the United States as an 
empire during the 1990s can we really understand the strategic ideas that informed 
American foreign policy in that decade, and – crucially – ever since.   
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One Man‟s Order, Another Man‟s Empire 
Empires arouse intense political passions, both by their defenders and opponents.  
Their historical rarity and for the main their temporal singularity, makes each case 
unique, differentiated by its polity, its policies and the reactions to them.  Moreover, 
arguments that ascribe the term ‗empire‘ to a particular polity usually do so with a 
case to make, whether it be to decry imperial suppression or encourage progressive 
modernisation.   Defining ‗empire‘ is therefore a task laced with difficulty on the 
one hand and expediency on the other. 
Approaches to defining empire generally consist of a kind of historical distillation, a 
process that attempts to extract from all of the past instantiations of empire the 
essential predicates that link these distinct entities together.  This has its weaknesses, 
in that ‗empire‘ becomes an essentially constructed term, defined by subjective 
responses to a particular polity rather than anything objective about that polity itself, 
but for a concept whose instances are so historically diverse and individually 
contextualised a prior, objective definition would be arbitrary.  This is the 
―pornography definition‖ of empire – ―I can‘t say what they are but I know one 
when I see one‖.
18
  However, it does allow for the differences – as well as the 
similarities – of historically associated polities to be highlighted, a process which 
trains the analytical spotlight on the essential nature of the instance in question.   
Treating empires individually recognises that in form and function they differ 
enormously.  Whilst empires are clearly multinational and politically centralised, 
what state is not?  At the same time, empires‘ ―hybrid nature‖ – as simultaneously 
international actors and structured political systems – makes comparing them both to 
each other and other types of polities difficult.
19
  Take for example, the difficulties 
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produced by Niall Ferguson‘s ―simple typology‖ of empires, which consists of seven 
columns with four to eight variations in each.
20
  As Motyl points out, ―A simple 
mathematical calculation shows that his menu results in 184,320 possible 
combinations!‖
21
  Ferguson may need to further distil his imperial liquor, but 
nevertheless his attempt shows that empires are not easily typed, or their 
characteristics rigidly defined.  So whilst this chapter makes the case that the modern 
United States is best understood as an empire rather than as anything else, it 
simultaneously claims that the United States is not historically identifiable with any 
other empire.  It, like all empires, is a unique instance of an historical regularity.  
Alejandro Colas recognises the difficulties involved: 
―any useful understanding of what empire involves requires a strong historical, 
indeed, historicist, approach to concept formation... not only does the meaning 
of empire vary throughout time and space (that much is obvious), but its 
deployment as an explanatory concept requires being especially sensitive to the 
historical particularity of different imperial experiences – their unique structures 
of political rule, their specific modes of social reproduction and their 
correspondingly singular forms of cultural self-understanding.‖
22
 
To demonstrate the point, a fairly limited and uncontroversial list of major historical 
empires might include the following: the Soviet Union; the axis empires of Nazi 
Germany, Japan and Italy; the Ottomon and Austro-Hungarian empires of the late 
nineteenth century; the Spanish, French, Portuguese and Dutch colonial empires, 
which existed in the shadow of Britain‘s ‗imperial century‘; the Chinese Qing 
empire; the Mongol empire; the Islamic Caliphates; and the classical empires of first 
Athens, and then Rome.  And although such a list is hopelessly incomplete, 
including only the obvious candidates, it swiftly becomes clear that imperial polities 
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vary enormously both in comparison with each other and over time as each rises and 
falls.
23
   
Comparisons between the United States and any or all of these historical antecedents 
are thus never likely to be exacting.  Yet comparisons have continually been made, 
and not just in the period in which the United States has been acknowledged as the 
world‘s sole superpower.  As early as 1920, the New York Times was speculating 
that the United States might be a ‗new Roman Empire‘ fated to dominate Europe.  
America could even follow Rome‘s example, and ―leave the European nations in the 
enjoyment of a shadowy independence, thus saving herself the trouble of governing 
them, look on while they tear at one another‘s throats, grow steadily weaker, come 
more and more under her economic and financial tutelage, sink steadily to the 
position of helpless victims for exploitation by Americans.‖
24
  Many years later, 
twenty-first century writers thinking about American dominance made comparisons 
with Rome‘s military strength and engaged with the possibility of similar decline.
25
  
Others speculated that the character of American imperium was more liberal and 
progressive, as their immediate predecessors in the role of global hegemon – the 
British – had been.
26
   
Moreover, the intervening century – the American century – had witnessed an 
ongoing debate about that most associated of imperial concepts, decline.  The 
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consequences of America‘s long-distance victories in two global wars was that the 
United States had become the unrivalled global power in 1945.  Yet with all of its 
potential rivals toiling under the burdens of reconstruction this level of dominance 
was of course illusory – their recovery would mean that the United States ―was 
almost fated to decline‖.
27
  And after the Soviet Union, with its antithetical ideology 
confirmed, tested its own atomic bomb and emerged as a rival superpower, a new 
pessimism concerning American vitality surfaced amidst the cultural and economic 
upheavals of the 1960s, confirmed by the twin political shocks-to-the-system of 
Vietnam and Watergate.
28
  Despite the astonishing demonstration of American 
technological prowess represented by the moon landings; despite Reagan‘s ‗morning 
in America‘ rhetoric, the success of Paul Kennedy‘s Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers owed its success to America‘s obsession with its own decline.  Such naval-
gazing prompting one apologist for American imperium, observing from afar, to 
remark that ―the American government might be well advised to ban books like Paul 
Kennedy‘s, or even burn them.  It might be wiser still to follow the sound advice of 
the poet Heine, who suggested that every state should imprison its prophets of doom 
until such time as their prophecies come true.‖
29
 
If the United States is an imperial construction, identifiable by the fact of others‘ 
responses to it, the decline debate would seem to provide internal confirmation of its 
status as an empire, one whose rise was meteoric and fall torturous.  Yet as Motyl 
notes, whilst when a word comes to dominate the discourse we may be certain that 
we are in the presence of a cultural phenomenon, we may remain uncertain about 
whether we are in the presence of empire itself.
30
  The constructivist analysis thus 
tells us little about empire itself, or what kind of an empire the United States was 
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and is, it simply tells us that people have regarded, to greater and lesser extents, the 
United States as an empire.  Yet to understand why, and assess the accuracy of such 
a judgement, we need to consider the nature of its imperium, its power and its 
policies.  If America is considered an empire just as those historical great powers of 
Britain and Rome were, what unites them, and how do they differ? 
  
 235 
Hegemony and Empire 
Modern literature on international relations has come to describe the role of great 
powers in building international order as hegemony, where in the past those 
functions had been attributed to empires.  Admittedly, language changes over time 
and our descriptors shift.  Yet regarding the usage of these terms as a matter of pure 
semantics would be to miss the importance of the rhetorical shift in academia and 
public policy away from empire and towards hegemony.  As empire has increasingly 
become a synonym for oppression, hegemony has become a means of disguising and 
avoiding talk of empire.  The result is a debate that skirts around the most 
fundamental question of whether imperial systems are desirable or not – and of 
whether beneficial order-building and system-maintenance can be provided without 
unwanted dominance. 
This section will show that hegemony and empire describe two very different 
phenomena.  In order to do so, we require at least a minimal definition of what 
historically constitutes empire, a maxim that even the most ardent of constructivist 
theorists of empire would admit that, if falsified, would constitute an inappropriate 
use of the designation.  Such a definition needs to be loose enough that no polity that 
has been regularly thought of as an empire would not fall within its remit, and yet 
differentiate an empire from other types of polity, in particular the ‗normal‘ nation-
state.   
A number of definitions from the contemporary literature serve such a purpose: 
Michael Doyle‘s, for example, regards empire as ―a system of interaction‖ in which 
―the dominant metropole exerts political control‖ over the ―internal and external 
policy – the effective sovereignty – of the ―subordinate periphery‖.
 31
  Stephen 
Rosen, similarly, sees empire as the ―rule exercised by one nation over others both to 
regulate their external behaviour and ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal 
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behaviour within the subordinate states.‖
32
  For David Lake, empire constitutes ―a 
political relationship‖ in which ―one partner cedes substantial rights of residual 
control directly to the other‖ so that it effectively ―surrenders judgement‖ to the 
dominant state.
33
  This is a view with which Gier Lundestad agrees, stating that 
empire ―simply means a hierarchical system of political relationships with one 
power being much stronger than any other.‖
34
   
Each of these definitions contain their useful ambiguities, in particular the specific 
nature of Doyle‘s ‗interaction‘ and ‗control‘; Rosen‘s ‗rule‘ and Lake and 
Lundestad‘s ‗relationships‘.  These differentiated conceptions indicate the myriad 
ways in which political authority may be manifested in an empire.  Yet whatever 
specific formulation is preferred, the key elements are that is that empire is a social 
relationship in which elements of a number of states‘ political autonomy, both 
internationally and domestically, are limited by the preferences of another single 
state.  
This definition allows us to demonstrate that a number of the most obvious features 
of historical empires are not in fact essential to their nature, being features of 
imperial form rather than functions of empire.  The first and most obvious is the idea 
that empires must directly control territory, to have formal sovereignty over their 
domains.  This was certainly not the case with Athens, or indeed in the early period 
of the Roman empire.  Modern empires such as Austria-Hungary did establish 
sovereignty over their territories, although the Soviet Union came to abandon direct 
control in favour of indirect domination after Stalin‘s death.
35
  The British Empire 
simultaneously mixed formal sovereign rule in some territories with informal 
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dominion in others, its influence in parts of China and in Argentina sometimes 
exceeding that which it held within its formal dominions.
36
  In the absence of formal 
sovereign rule, an informal empire is therefore a different kind of power 
relationship, which creates ―structures of transnational political authority that 
combine an egalitarian principle of de jure sovereignty with a hierarchical principle 
of de facto control.‖
37
 
Rule or dominion is therefore a social relationship which can take different forms: it 
can be imposed (as was the case with the Soviet Union‘s control of Eastern Europe); 
it can be unopposed (as was a great deal of the historical period of British imperial 
rule); or it can be welcomed as protection from other threats, which is one 
understanding of how the America‘s European empire came about in the postwar 
years.
38
  Moreover, whilst the United States influenced the internal and external 
policies of European states it certainly did not control them in the traditional sense of 
colonial rule.
39
  Instead, European autonomy was limited by their dependence on the 
United States, rather than the United States‘ imperial desires.   
A second common error of approaches to empire is to assume that empires are 
imperial powers.  At first sight this may appear a rather strange statement: to deny 
that empires are imperial is ostensibly counter-intuitive.  Imperial is simply the state 
of being of empires, they can no more avoid it than a circle might avoid being 
circular.  Indeed, Doyle‘s definition of empire contains the addendum that 
―imperialism is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire.‖
40
  Yet the 
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shared etymology of the two terms can mislead.
41
  Empire may entail the existence 
of hierarchies and authority, but it need not imply expansionism, repression or even 
subjugation.  Imperialism on the other hand, reflects not the facts of dominance, but 
a particular philosophy or emotional attitude towards that dominance.
42
  Imperialism 
then is a policy, whereas empire is a set of governmental relationships that comprise 
a polity.  Imperialism is always a choice, where empire is generally not.
43
 
The notion that empires are necessarily imperial in nature is not only conceptually 
and empirically wrong, it is also politically problematic.  Imperialism carries with it 
a pejorative element, because it implies the active agency of the imperial power to 
subjugate its imperium.  Imperialism, in short, entails that the dominant state seeks 
its empire and desires its political control, and it implies a range of behaviour in 
keeping with those motivations.  Thus to define something as imperial today almost 
always implies hostility to it.
44
  Hereafter therefore, I use ‗imperial‘ to mean simply 
‗of empire‘, nothing more, nothing less. 
A third, related, error is to attribute empire formation to policy choice, in particular 
by identifying the existence of empire with previous or existing imperialism.  Such a 
view sees empires as the result of aggression and military conquest, and certainly 
many empires have come into being that way.  But empires need not be brought 
about by belligerence and militarism, as Reinhold Niebuhr notes: 
―The word ‗imperialism‘ to the modern mind connotes aggressive expansion.  
The connotation remains correct in the sense that empire, in its inclusive sense, 
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is the fruit of the impingement of strength upon weakness.  But the power need 
not be expressed in military terms.  It may simply be the power of superior 
organisation or culture.‖
45
 
Indeed, whilst some states may achieve empire through their deliberate policies, it is 
difficult to believe that empire formation might proceed as the result of some 
conscious cost-benefit analysis; indeed if it were, most empires would have been 
more modest.
46
  Rather than being the result of careful planning and deliberate 
choice, in many cases states, at least initially, have their empires thrust upon them.
47
  
America‘s informal Cold War empire in Europe had its origins in the postwar 
settlement which left Western Europe with a distinct sense of vulnerability to Soviet 
power, prompting European governments to attempt to get the Americans to take 
greater interest in their affairs.
48
  America‘s security and economic commitments in 
Western Europe, was then an ―empire by invitation‖ rather than conquest, an empire 
not sought, but instead offered.
49
   
That imperialism ―can sometimes wear a grimace and sometimes a smile‖, has 
presented difficulties for scholars.
50
  The alternative conception that some have 
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therefore used, particularly to describe the American order that was built during the 
Cold War, is hegemony.  Hegemonic orders are similar to empires in that they are 
hierarchical orders established and maintained by the preponderance of power of the 
leading state, but under hegemony the secondary states are formally sovereign and 
the mechanisms of domination looser and less formal than empires.  Yet the British 
‗ruled‘ India as an imperial power indirectly through the East India Company, and 
the same author as provides this definition of hegemony admits that in practice, 
―imperial orders have varied widely in their degree of hierarchical domination and 
control.‖
51
  Hegemony at first sight therefore serves to confuse at least as much as it 
clarifies.  Indeed, Robert Gilpin, in his influential book War and Change in World 
Politics, appears to equate hegemony with empire, apparently seeing it as a 
replacement term at a time when, as a consequence of decolonisation, empire had 
gone out of intellectual fashion.
52
  For Niall Ferguson, hegemony is nothing more 
than a way to avoid talking about empire.
53
 
There is however a distinction between hegemony and empire that can and should be 
made to prevent both terms becoming analytically blunted.  Having said that, 
hegemony and empire have become intertwined in a definitional knot that is not easy 
to untangle.  Robert Cox defines hegemony as ―a structure of values and 
understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and 
non-state entities [which] appear to most actors as the natural order.‖  For Cox, a 
state‘s dominance is not sufficient to create hegemony without ―the acquiescence of 
the dominant social strata of other states‖ to the ways of thinking underpinned by the 
structures of power.
54
  Gramsci, too, eschews the kind of domination traditionally 
associated with empires, to argue that hegemony ―is a relation, not of domination by 
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means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is 
the organisation of consent.‖
55
   
Doyle, in contrast, denies that hegemony impacts upon the internal policies of states, 
arguing that hegemonic powers only control external policy of states.
56
  Yet Cox‘s 
neo-Gramscian perspective asserts the exact opposite, that the acceptance of 
hegemonic ways of thinking strikes right at the heart of the state.  Doyle‘s definition 
of hegemony stands with a school of thought that regards hegemony merely as a less 
complete form of the power of one state over others than empire.  In this reading 
hegemony utilises alternatives and more indirect forms of power than conquest.
57
  
Yet this is simply a definition of informal empire.  Alternatively, hegemony is a 
‗nicer‘ form of empire, acting in pursuit of its own national interest but also 
providing public goods or externalities for the international system as a whole.
58
  Yet 
the subjects‘ answers to the question ‗what did the Romans ever do for us?‘ were 
multiple.
59
  
Hegemony can and should be separated from empire, however, whilst admitting that 
the two are not mutually exclusive.  The neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony 
has its roots in political economy – it is about the expansion and infiltration of the 
ideas of capitalism as an answer to the historical problem of social change arising 
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from Marxist analyses.  Whilst it is extended to international relations more 
generally to describe the shared assumptions that underpin an international order, 
first among those are ideas about capital and the modes of production, followed by 
ideas about forms of states and world orders.
60
  This foundation in international 
political economy continued through the work of the likes of Charles Kindleburger, 
Stephen Krasner, and Susan Strange, who speak about hegemony primarily in terms 
of economic power.
61
 
Empires, in contrast, operate above that underlying hegemony on a political level, 
generating explicit rules for the governance of states and the interactions between 
them.  The rules of empires may be consented to, but they are nonetheless set – and 
enforced – by the dominant power.  Hegemony on the other hand reflects the 
prevailing system of rules, norms and constraints within which empires may operate 
– it is the zeitgeist of the international political economy.  Hegemony then is 
unconscious, a description of the historical progress of ideas of economic and social 
organisation; empires, in contrast, leave their mark on history.   
That is not to say that empires cannot impact upon and even come to define 
hegemonic structures, or that economic power is not a central component of 
imperialism.  It is simply that the two orders, and the two words, mean different 
things, and that their conflation and confusion is to the detriment of good 
scholarship.  The analytical concept ‗empire‘ is consequently worth reviving 
alongside a clearer and more restrictive version of hegemony that reflects its 
Gramscian heritage in focusing on the underlying maxims of international political 
economy.  In particular, empire can be differentiated by three aspects that 
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characterise the centre‘s relationship with its periphery: first, empires‘ political 
dissemination and enforcement of ethical norms and rules; second, the spread of 
cultural practices from the centre to the periphery; and third, what might be called 
the political necessity of empire, that in order for any major issue of international 
importance to be addressed the imperial polity needs to be engaged.  The modern 
United States, in exhibiting these characteristics, should therefore be properly 
conceptualised as an empire.  
Beyond Hegemony – The Nature of the modern American Empire 
As noted earlier the revival of the notion of ‗American empire‘ in the post-Cold War 
context did not take place until the second Bush administration dusted down the 
Defense Planning Guidance and concluded that in an age of global terrorism, 
America would have to prevent and pre-empt security threats, wherever they might 
arise and through whatever means.  You were either with us or against us, and by 
God, you didn‘t want to be in the latter camp.  The United States had an emperor, 
and this one wore cowboy boots.
62
  Yet despite such a stark shift in overt policy and 
rhetoric the debate over the concept of American empire was heated.  Michael Cox, 
who led the way in attempting to revive the analytical usefulness of empire was 
branded an ―old-fashioned‖ imperial apologist by one liberal American contributor 
to an academic journal‘s discussion of Cox‘s thesis.
63
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It was somewhat strange that Cox‘s contention should have been so controversial.  
The United States had been an empire since the inception of the Cold War, and 
following the demise of the Soviet Union it entered a second imperial phase which 
lasted throughout the 1990s.  This second American empire built on the 
achievements of the first, entrenching the assumptions of Cold War victory in the 
universal ideology of free market democracy that more than anything else defines 
American imperialism.  In actively creating and sustaining that ideological 
hegemony, the second American empire, dominant in each category of capabilities, 
has three central characteristics.  First, it is a system of largely informal authority, 
exercised in the main through international organisations built in America‘s image 
and which it is able to control.  Second, it is global in scope and integrative in 
nature.  Third, it is underwritten by the willingness to engage American military 
power.  
Imperial Antecedents and the First American Empire 
The United States has, in some ways, always been an imperial power.  Regarded by 
the Founding Fathers as an ‗empire of liberty‘, it was geographically expansionist in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and maintained an informal empire in Latin 
America under the guise of the Monroe Doctrine, particularly in its expanded 
Roosevelt corollary form, under which the United States intervened militarily in the 
region over 30 times in the first three decades of the twentieth century.
64
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However, it was not until after World War II America could truly be regarded as an 
empire.  The scale of American superiority in 1945 was unprecedented.  The 
American economy had grown by over fifty percent during the war and now 
constituted over half of the world‘s economic product, and the United States held 
over two-thirds of the world‘s gold reserves.
65
  Moreover, the United States had 
‗only‘ lost 400,000 men during the war and suffered minimal domestic damage, 
compared to the Soviet Union‘s 20 million dead and agricultural production cut in 
half.
66
  In the years between the end of World War II and the Korean War, the 
United States‘ industrial capacity outstripped that of every other nation, its national 
income doubled, and its trade surplus was so great that the world‘s current account 
deficit with the United States reached $35 billion.
67
   
America‘s economic strength underpinned its military dominance.  It had by far the 
strongest air force in the world, comprising over 3,000 heavy bombers, and its 
control of the seas was absolute, thanks to the US Navy‘s 1,200 major warships.  
The United States was also in sole possession of atomic weapons, even if there were 
very few in stock and their usefulness as a strategic weapon was disputed.
68
  It may 
have taken the Korean War to expose the weakness of America‘s British and French 
allies and convince the United States of the need to maintain a level of readiness 
commensurate with its superpower status, but that was not an indication, as one 
scholar had it, that the United States ―drifted into the Cold War between 1944 and 
1948 not as a superpower with overwhelming military might, but as a deeply 
insecure power‖, both unsure if it sought and unable to undertake conflict with the 
Soviet Union.
69
  Instead, as Kennedy notes, the United States‘ outward imperial 
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reluctance reflected a policy choice derived from America‘s longstanding antipathy 
towards standing armies rather than a lack of real military potential.
70
 
The United States was the strongest power in centuries, with a lead over its rivals in 
both absolute and relative terms that amounted to unchallenged American pre-
eminence.
71
  But American policymakers were beginning to see a challenge on the 
horizon in the Soviet Union‘s ideological antipathy, diplomatic intransigence and 
old-style imperial preferences.  For George Kennan, writing in 1948, America‘s 
―real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships that will allow 
us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national 
security.‖
72
   
That disparity was already functionally an empire.  As Harold Laski had written a 
year earlier: 
―America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its 
power nor Great Britain in the period of its economic supremacy enjoyed an 
influence so direct, so profound or so pervasive.  It has half the wealth of the 
world today in its hands, it has rather more than half the world‘s productive 
capacity, and it exports more than twice as much as it imports.  Today literally 
hundreds of millions of Europeans and Asians know that both the quality and 
the rhythm of their lives depend upon decisions made in Washington.  On the 
wisdom of those decisions hangs the fate of the next generation.‖
73
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The United States had plenty of decisions to make, but as John Ikenberry puts it, 
―the United States found itself in a rare position.  It had power and choices.‖
74
  The 
most pressing of those choices involved what to do about the postwar destruction in 
Europe and Japan.  In approving the Marshall Plan, the United States committed 
itself to the reconstruction of the socio-political bases of the major states devastated 
by the war, states which would provide the basis of international capitalist economic 
revival as a bulwark against communist expansionism.  The coordinated 
reconstruction of those economies was an investment in building an economic order 
that was open and interdependent, which held the United States at its centre, and 
effectively internationalised American modes of production.
75
 
The United States therefore picked up the baton the British Empire had laid down in 
1914 and took on the role of hegemonic guarantor of the international trading 
system.  In doing so it re-laid the foundations of an open economic hegemony that 
persists to this day, establishing the first pillar of what we might call the American 
system.
76
  The Marshall Plan was hardly a policy of American benevolence, or even 
a policy structured around a notions of the American national interest, although 
strings attached to the aid did aim to liberalise trade and encourage American 
investment, broadening and deepening the liberal economic order.
77
  Instead, it was 
a piece of empire-building that reflected the emerging ideas about the nature of 
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Stalin‘s Soviet Union and sought to tie Western Europe ever more closely to the 
United States.
78
   
The judgement was increasingly shared by America‘s European allies, who sought 
security guarantees from the United States to accompany their economic ties.  Now 
American economic hegemony would be overlain with American political 
preferences.  The social systems of Western Europe and the English-speaking parts 
of the British Commonwealth coalesced to form what came to be referred to as ‗the 
West‘ or ‗the Free World‘, but which was to all intents and purposes an American 
empire.
79
  Between 1945 and 1960 American economic hegemony came to be 
supplemented by a massive military empire, which by 1955 consisted of 450 bases 
in 36 countries.  Japan was to all intents and purposes an American colony, its 
foreign policy an extension of Washington, and the United States took on many of 
the commitments of the impoverished European colonial empires, filling vacuums in 
Greece, Turkey, South-East Asia and most significantly the Middle East, where the 
United States confirmed the reality of its imperial dominance by forcing the 
humiliation of its strongest ally at Suez.
80
   
The centrepiece of this military and political empire was the American commitment 
to defend Western Europe expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  The 
United States may have been invited to take on the tasks of European reconstruction 
and defense, but these were roles that the United States itself was already convinced 
it would have to be committed to – first in order to contain Germany, and later in 
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order to deter the Soviet Union.   Indeed, the process of creating NATO was 
cooperative, with the Americans agreeing to security commitments in return for 
French support for German revival.
81
   
Despite the extent of America‘s imperial commitments, states within the American 
sphere of influence were allowed considerable freedom, partly as a consequence of 
the United States‘ ideological commitment to political self-determination – 
―Americans still found it difficult to think of themselves as an imperial power‖ – and 
partly because it lacked the capability to administer a large formal empire itself.
82
  
American rule was therefore largely exercised indirectly, using the massive disparity 
in capabilities between the United States and each of its individual protectorates that 
rendered them dependent to induce collaboration rather than by imposing its 
dominance.  The United States therefore created the reality of empire without the 
conventional form of rule.
83
  Having said that, the United States was not afraid to act 
as a more traditional imperial power, intervening in the internal affairs of states both 
inside and outside its orbit.  Anticommunist containment and the ideas of domino 
theory may have provided the pretext, but the involvement by the United States in 
upwards of fifty foreign interventions and wars euphemistically grouped as ‗proxy 
conflicts‘ struck many as being no different from old-style colonialism.
84
 
This first American empire that extended during the Cold War might have arisen as 
much in response to external factors as it did from imperial design; it may have been 
invited, the result of processes of mutual cooperation in many areas; and most of its 
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extent might have only been informally ruled.  Yet its extent was global, and its 
maxims held sway both within and between its members, which included four of the 
six major power centres – the United States itself, Britain, Western Europe and 
Japan.  By 1970, the United States had more than one million soldiers stationed 
abroad, was committed to five regional defence alliances, was a leading member of 
53 international organisations and was furnishing military or economic aid to nearly 
one hundred nations.
85
   
However, the most important aspect of the first American Empire, and that which 
would form the basis of the second American Empire once the Cold War passed 
from the scene, was the extent to which the United States used its power to create 
and embed new norms of international relations within its half of the bipolar 
international system.  In a highly influential work, John Ikenberry argued that there 
were two postwar settlements – the one that created the containment order in 
response to deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, and the one that built a 
range of institutions based around ―economic openness, political reciprocity and the 
multilateral management of an American-led liberal political order.‖
86
  Whilst the 
claim that there are two distinct settlements overlooks the extent to which their 
origins were inextricably interlinked – in particular with regard to the ideological 
completion that characterised the Cold War – it does capture the difference between 
the instrumental and the structural components of the first American empire. 
What we might term the ‗structural power‘ of the American empire derived from the 
institutions that it constructed to manage the American system.
87
  Built in America‘s 
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own image to serve American interests, these institutions became features of 
international order that defined the rules by which relations between states were 
conducted.  Whilst the Cold War did not see American policymakers‘ detailed plans 
for the postwar world manifested exactly as envisioned – what William Appleman 
Williams called the ―benevolent Americanization of the world [that] would bring 
peace and plenty without the moral embarrassment and administrative distractions of 
old-fashioned empires‖ – the United States was certainly by no means reluctant to 
take on the imperial task of order-building.
88
   
Foremost among the institutions of structural power was the role of the dollar as the 
international reserve currency.  Not only did it provide the United States with the 
power to depreciate others‘ assets (as when the US unilaterally shut the gold window 
in 1971), it also meant that when the United States changed the direction of its 
monetary policy other states had no choice but to adjust their own domestic policy to 
such changes.
89
  For Susan Strange, America‘s monopoly on the creation of dollar 
assets which sustained its ability to run persistent balance-of-payments deficits was 
evidence of the structural power of the United States.
90
  Indeed, since when 
foreigners held dollars they provided the equivalent of an interest-free loan to the 
United States, the American empire was effectively being paid for by its subjects – a 
situation which reflected the currency blocs of the nineteenth century empires.
91
  As 
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many domestic economies, particularly in the third world, became ‗dollarized‘, not 
only were transaction costs of commerce between the core and the periphery 
reduced, generating closer ties, in addition, a hierarchy was created in which the 
dollar became ―a highly visible sign of elevated rank in the community‖ whilst the 
identity of second-order states was simultaneously eroded by their use of imperial 
currency.
92
  The structural power of the dollar thus created an aspirational economic 
imperium of which ancient Rome would no doubt have approved. 
American structural power was not limited to the universal convertibility of the 
dollar.  The United States‘ centrality in the international economic order meant that 
it dominated international economic organisations, institutions that it had itself 
created for the management of the economic order, and which reflected American 
beliefs in open markets and free trade.  The United States was the key driver in the 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which formed the bedrock of the capitalist 
economic order for the next fifty years.  American institution-building was extended 
to the political order, as collective security was rebuilt around the victorious powers 
in the United Nations Security Council, and as the Cold War stymied that 
organisation, through the various regional alliances that committed the United States 
to the security of the free world.   
The United States therefore created its empire in an ―almost hyperactive‖ spate of 
institution-building between 1944 and 1952, a rewriting of the rules of international 
relations that was historically unprecedented.
93
  It embedded American power within 
an order that was outwardly multilateral, but whose terms reflected American liberal 
ideology and interests.  Right from the beginning of American postwar planning 
there was ―a missionary zeal to remake the international system‖ that saw 
Roosevelt‘s Wilsonian Secretary of State Cordell Hull tell Congress that having laid 
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the groundwork for the United Nations, ―there will no longer be the need for spheres 
of influence, for alliances, for balance of power.‖
94
  That is not to say that the United 
States got exactly what it wanted out of its postwar institution-building – it didn‘t 
and had to compromise in significant areas.
95
  But getting one hundred percent of 
what the United States wanted in the short-term was not as important as creating, 
from its necessarily fleeting position of unparalleled strength, an order that 
combined American values with systemic durability.  Yet contrary to Hull‘s hopes 
for the abolition of spheres of influence, what the United States did in the postwar 
era was to create an order whose undergirding and future management its members 
were prepared to cede to the United States.  The institutions that would be the arbiter 
of right and wrong within the international system, and that would define the rules of 
conduct within and between states, were therefore an expression of American 
structural power, and the United States was the power principally responsible for 
defining their remit and which had been given responsibility for their maintenance.   
The ideas that the United States embedded in the postwar order were the ideas of 
liberalism – the economic promotion of free and open markets; the political 
promotion of individual liberty and self-determination.  Indeed, the very export of 
those ethical and political maxims of self-determination and human rights – what we 
loosely term anti-imperialism – may be held responsible for the rhetorical and 
theoretical replacement of empire with hegemony in the twentieth century.
 96
  Yet 
that should not lead us to conclude that the first American empire was simply an 
economic hegemony, limited to the nations of the free world.  The structural 
imperatives of the Cold War bound the ‗free world‘ together as a political, security 
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and economic unit, dominated by the leadership of the United States, leadership that 
was animated and legitimated by the shared commitment of the members of the 
American empire to anticommunism.   
Strategies of Empire – Retrenchment, Management and Dominance and the 
Establishment of the Second American Empire 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union the United States was left the sole remaining 
empire, global in scope and yet more limited in its capacity to exert its dominance 
than it had been during the Cold War absent the common threat that acted as the glue 
of America‘s informal empire.  The immediate post-Cold War system exhibited a 
striking imbalance – the economic order, whilst still structurally biased towards the 
United States, had become tripolar (United States, Europe and Japan) yet the 
military order was unipolar.  As Noam Chomsky was hardly radical in noting (Paul 
Kennedy might have said much the same thing) military power that is not backed up 
by a comparable economic base has its limits as a means of coercion and 
domination.
97
  Thus at the beginning of the 1990s, America might have been an 
victorious empire but it was an empire whose grip on its imperium had been 
loosened, by both its own relative economic decline (inevitable though much of it 
might have been) and – perversely – by its victory in the Cold War itself.   
Yet by the end of the 1990s the United States was an empire renewed, its dominion 
enlarged, its ideology unchallenged, its economy once again dominant, its military 
lead unsurpassable, its institutions revived.  Indeed, the transition from the first to 
the second American empire was remarkably smooth.  The strategies outlined in the 
preceding chapters were each addressed to the fact of American empire.  In drawing 
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on elements of each, the first Bush and particularly the Clinton administration 
established the terms of the second American empire, renewing its structural power 
and reconceptualising its legitimacy. 
The Empire of Money 
The most neglected of the post-Cold War grand strategies, neoisolationism or 
strategic retrenchment, recognised American empire for what it was and concluded 
from its realist underpinnings that its decline was inevitable.  The United States 
therefore needed to ensure its future prosperity by refusing to shoulder international 
burdens, since America could remain a great power only if it avoided the perils of 
overstretch.  Retrenchment then is best characterised as an imperial strategy in 
keeping with Hadrian‘s Rome – in recognising that America‘s future is imperilled by 
foreign commitments that extend too far, it seeks to retrain imperial focus on the 
core and in doing so maintain American strength in the longer term. 
The United States incorporated very little of the neoisolationist analysis into its post-
Cold War foreign policy.  That should not be so surprising, since although there was 
some neoisolationist sentiment among the public, the ideas were marginalised from 
the policy process, situated on the outside looking in at the foreign policy 
establishment.  The return of isolationism to the popular debate did have an impact 
however in demonstrating that in order for America to sustain an international 
foreign policy – let alone manage an empire – it was fundamental to bring about a 
revival in the American economy.  At the same time, the Clinton administration 
rhetorically succumbed to what one liberal internationalist advocate called the ―lure 
of minimalism‖.
98
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However, American economic revival would not be an internal matter, and whilst 
minimalist rhetoric might have been politically useful it did not mirror an inward-
looking strategic posture on the part of the United States, even at the very beginning 
of Clinton‘s administration.  As one commentator put it, in debunking the ―enduring 
myth‖ that Clinton came to power without a foreign policy, the new President 
―assumed office with a fairly clear view of the world and the sort of policies he 
would have to pursue in order to enhance American power... by linking the material 
aspirations of ordinary Americans to the pursuit of his wider economic goals, 
Clinton calculated that he would be able to counter any drift to isolationism.‖
99
  
Indeed, so strongly did Clinton link American foreign policy to domestic prosperity 
that critics viewed Clinton‘s economic team as nationalist trade warriors practising 
unilateral dollar diplomacy.
100
  Yet the effect of prioritising what Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher called ―economic security‖ was that the United States had a 
better decade than any of the other great powers thought potential challengers to its 
throne.
101
  Between 1990 and 1998, the US economy grew by twenty-six percent, 
compared with Europe‘s seventeen percent and Japan‘s seven percent.
102
  The long 
boom that came after 1992 even allowed the United States to eradicate its near three-
decades-old budget deficit.  One assessment ranked Clinton as the most successful 
President in economic terms Lyndon Johnson.
103
  Ironically fuelled by the demands 
of neoisolationists for a focus on the American domestic economy, the result of a 
decade of American revival was that having begun the decade as the world‘s only 
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superpower, by the turn of the millennium America‘s unipolar dominance was 
unquestioned.  The United States had turned into ―a unipolar global power without 
historical precedent‖: 
―Today the American economy is equal to the economies of Japan, United 
Kingdom, and Germany combined.  The United States‘ military capacity is even 
more in a league of its own.  It spends as much on defense as the next fourteen 
countries combined.  It has bases in forty countries.  Eighty percent of world 
military R&D takes place in the United States.‖
104
 
Yet even whilst accounting for around half of all world military spending, the United 
States was able to reduce its defense budget as a percentage of GDP in the course of 
the 1990s from over 5% at the start of the decade to 3% in 1999.
105
  As William 
Wohlforth pointed out, the reality of American preponderance was much more 
dramatic than implied by calculation ‗bipolar minus one equals unipolar‘.  The 
United States had been by far the most powerful state, with twice the GNP and 
manufacturing production, even as Ronald Reagan was urging increased defense 
spending in the early 1980s.
106
  In 1991 the only military competitor to the United 
States collapsed, and in the next few years the economic challenges that had been 
expected from Japan and Europe melted away.  The United States accounted for 
around one quarter of world GDP throughout the 1990s and remained the most 
technologically advanced major economy with expenditures on research and 
development nearly equalling the rest of the G-7 combined.  Only in the immediate 
postwar era had the United States been more economically dominant, and never had 
any nation combined such levels of economic and military dominance, a 
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symmetrical concentration of power resources that was unique among previous 
hegemons.
107
  
The second American empire was then arguably even more dominant than the first, 
particularly as it was now the leader of a single international system, communism as 
an organising principle of economic and political order having departed the scene.  
Yet there was more to this re-establishment of American economic empire than 
simple dominance, and more to America‘s post-Cold War foreign policy than the 
focus on out-competing potential rivals.  Here strategic ideas of liberal 
multilateralism provided the ideological foundation for another bout of institution-
building that reinforced the structural power of the United States.  Two major trade 
agreements, NAFTA and APEC, placed the United States at the centre of regional 
trade structures in North America and the Pacific.  Alongside these regional trade 
structures, the Uruguay round of the GATT served to integrate developing nations 
more fully into the international trading system, and gave birth to the more 
empowered World Trade Organization (WTO) with stronger enforcement powers 
and mechanisms for dispute settlement.  These integrative institutional structures 
were part of a broader strategy of empire that tied states to each other in multilateral 
regional frameworks as part of an open global economy, within which the United 
States retained structural advantages as both the ―system-maker and privilege-
taker‖.108   
This emphasis on the institutional integration of a truly global economy alongside 
American economic revival made Clinton the ‗globalization president‘, ever keen to 
embrace its inexorable logic of integration.  Yet globalisation remains a 
fundamentally unequal process, like the free market, in which strength begets 
strength.  Some therefore accused the United States of exploiting its unipolar 
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moment to drive through changes in the multilateral management of the international 
economy that amounted to a programme of forced liberalisation that allowed for the 
exploitation of the periphery by the imperial core.
109
  Indeed, the 1990s saw the 
United States rule over not only the economic relations between states, under the 
banner of globalisation, but also their internal policies, usually by means of 
organisations like the IMF, under the banner of neo-liberalism.  What became 
known as the Washington Consensus involved coordinated efforts to pry open 
banking, stock, and bond markets.  Even after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, 
the Clinton administration prescribed further liberalization (via the IMF) as the route 
to economic recovery.
110
  United States economic strategy was then nothing less 
than an attempt to universalise their economic empire, as one author put it, ―to ‗go 
global‘: in other words, to entrench the United States as the power that will control 
the major economic and political outcomes across the globe in the twenty-first 
century.‖111 
It has been argued against this view that the inexorable growth of globalization 
actually undermines American empire, highlighting as it does the role of markets, 
financial institutions corporations and private actors.  Thus since the height of 
American empire in the period after World War II authority in international relations 
has become increasingly fragmented, and America‘s ability to extract political 
outcomes from its capabilities reduced.
112
  In essence, globalisation is driving the 
‗hollowing out‘ of the American empire, a process which ―erodes the centre's 
capacity to steer the system – its capacity for governance.‖113 
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However, as Michael Cox has pointed out, governments still play a key role in the 
international economic system, and the huge resources of the United States invest it 
with a central role both in shaping ―the material environment in which we all happen 
to live‖ and in directing the policies of the organisations charged with managing the 
world economy, within which the United States ―gets its way more often than 
not‖.114  Quoting Joseph Stiglitz, he observes that ―IMF programmes are typically 
directed from Washington.‖115  Mastanduno concurs, noting that during the 1990s 
the United States was able to set about ―enlarging the liberal order geographically 
and deepening it functionally‖, establishing an economic order in which the 
American economy flourished while countries in Latin America, East Asia, and 
Central Europe moved from state-directed industrialisation to reliance on market 
forces.  Although ―the liberal project‖ was not complete, the second American 
empire had made remarkable progress on the achievements of the first after World 
War II.
116
 
Thus the United States conducted an imperial economic strategy throughout the 
1990s, using its dominant position and the ideas of liberal multilateralism to create 
and manage a global economic system largely for its own interests, and skilfully 
using the globalisation argument to link the demands of neoisolationism to such an 
internationally activist course. 
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Sanctions and War: Political Intervention in the Empire of Liberal Values 
Alongside the focus of economic integrationism, the largely successful goal of 
which was to globalise the American capitalist model, there was another set of ideas 
deriving from liberalism that governed the ethical norms of political conduct in the 
second American empire.  Ethical prescriptions that had been defined by 
anticommunism were now replaced by more positive notions of humanitarianism 
and democracy promotion.  On the one hand – as we have seen in both the ideas of 
liberal multilateralism and primacy – ideas of the peaceful nature of democracies 
and the proposition that peace and security were now indivisible intersected to 
compel democracy promotion as an imperial strategy of order maintenance.  On the 
other, humanitarianism was an assertion of the values of the second American 
empire, a global liberal vision in which political principles of individual liberty 
everywhere were guaranteed by American power. 
Moreover, this political component of the American empire, structurally 
corresponding to the American empire of capital, was creating an emergent global 
civil and political society reflective of the United States.
 
 For one author, the United 
States‘ encouragement of this ‗polyarchy‘ or ‗low intensity democracy‘ during the 
1990s created ―new modalities of domination‖ that stemmed not from the exercise of 
political power but from the possession of structural power.
117
  The extent of 
America‘s ideological reach in a globalising world was reflected in the worldwide 
dominance of its popular culture, from music to soft-drinks and movies to jeans.  
Often misrepresented as a feature of America‘s ‗soft power‘, this was instead an 
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expression of a cultural empire that was reminiscent of Rome and which contained 
within it the potential of empires ―to homogenize their populations‖
118
 
If the United States‘ position in an increasingly globalised system meant that its 
political ideas and values had global reach, its structural power meant that to address 
international issues American assent was always required, and more often than not, 
American activism was necessary.  As the British polemicist Christopher Hitchens 
put it, ―the plain fact remains that when the rest of the world wants anything done in 
a hurry, it applies to American power.‖
119
 
That power had unrivalled global reach.  The United States‘ economic and 
technological dominance allowed it to sustain military expenditures that meant it had 
command of the global commons as no other nation had done before, underwriting 
world trade, travel and global telecommunications.
120
  Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the United States combined both economic and naval dominance with 
the world system‘s lead army.   Historically, as William Thompson noted, ―the 
leading whale is not also the leading elephant‖ but the United States now occupied 
that hitherto unprecedented position.
121
  Moreover, the technological revolution in 
military affairs meant that the United States was now in a position to manage 
conflicts by remote control, to wage ―virtual war‖ in which military power could be 
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used to extract desired outcomes without endangering the lives of American 
personnel.
122
 
The new features of American military dominance meant that the arguments of 
liberal multilateralists and primacists coalesced to justify American intervention in 
the world to protect and promote the principles of democracy and norms of human 
rights.  The overwhelming force requirements of the Powell and Weinberger 
doctrines that had their roots in the Vietnam war were now being increasingly 
questioned by the availability of surgical strike airpower and the possibility of 
‗micro-interventions‘ to turn the tide of conflict decisively whilst maintaining a safe 
distance.
123
  During the 1990s the United States engaged military force to address 
ostensibly humanitarian concerns in conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans; 
whilst authorising and supporting the international coalition in East Timor.
124
  
Conducted largely with United Nations mandates, only in Rwanda was the new 
norm that placed imperial power at the service of humanitarian concerns overtly not 
upheld.
125
  It was here that the tensions of power and values in the second American 
empire were most clear, with one commentator seeing in the United States‘ 
commitment to humanitarianism ―all the contradictions of liberal good intentions in 
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a post-imperial era that wants to do good in faraway places without taking up the 
burdens of empire.‖
126
   
Yet at the same time as American military might was made available to the 
international community for humanitarian purposes, so it was also used against 
‗rogue regimes‘ that refused to accept the dominance of the American system and 
follow its rules of international behaviour.
127
  The clearest example was Iraq, where 
George Bush had asserted America‘s right to determine the strategic balance Middle 
East.  The United States swiftly came to regard it as unimaginable that Saddam 
Hussein would adhere to the United Nations‘ demands and followed up Saddam 
Hussein‘s ouster from Kuwait first with a covert CIA operation to bring about 
regime change authorised by George H.W. Bush, and then with consistent air-strikes 
throughout Clinton‘s time in office.
128
  At the same time, North Korea and Iran were 
also the target of the coercive force of American power in the form of economic 
sanctions in response to their WMD development programmes, although these 
policies were directed less at regime change (as in the Iraqi case) than they were at 
forcing engagement.
129
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Conclusion:  „Uni-Multilateralism‟: Rules and Enforcement in the Second 
American Empire 
By the end of the 1990s the terms of the second American empire were well 
established.  In realist terms ―American power, and the world that power helped to 
create, has not just been preserved, but in many important ways is now more 
complete than it was back in 1941 or even 1945.‖
130
  Paul Kennedy summed up the 
comprehensiveness of the American imperium: 
―Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing.  I have returned 
to all of the comparative defence spending and military personnel statistics over 
the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and 
no other nation comes close.  The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap, Britain's 
army was much smaller than European armies, and even the Royal Navy was 
equal only to the next two navies -- right now all the other navies in the world 
combined could not dent American maritime supremacy.  Charlemagne's empire 
was merely western European in its reach.  The Roman empire stretched farther 
afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. 
There is, therefore, no comparison.‖
131
 
A liberal view concurred that the United States ―stands at the centre of an expanding 
democratic-capitalist world order that is itself, 50 years after its creation, the 
dominant reality in world politics.‖
132
  Noting approvingly that United States 
―dominates world politics by providing the language, ideas, and institutional 
frameworks around which much of the world turns‖, John Ikenberry identified the  
institutional connections linking the United States to the other regions of the world 
as ―a sort of primitive governance system.  The United States is a central hub 
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through which the world‘s important military, political, economic, scientific, and 
cultural connections pass.
133
 
This situation had been actively built during the 1990s by American policies.  The 
two immediate post-Cold War presidents had pursued ―a largely consistent and 
effective policy of expanding the authority of the United States into new areas... to 
broaden and deepen its range of economic and security hierarchies.‖
134
  Bill Clinton 
in particular, by prioritising the creation of an integrated global economy, may be 
considered an empire builder par excellence, to be compared with the likes of 
Augustus and Palmerston.   
Above all, the fact that no state attempted to balance against the United States even 
as it augmented its preponderance during the 1990s reflected Clinton‘s success.  His 
imperial policy was tempered by the United States‘ willingness to involve and make 
concessions to others, particularly its Western allies, and by its preparedness to 
undertake humanitarian interventions and provide other international public goods.  
This ―democratic and anti-imperialist tradition‖ allowed others to see ―limited 
political ambitions at work‖ and the general commitment to multilateral means 
―granted other states a say over American policy and, more important, signalled a 
willingness to work within existing international norms.‖  Thus the United States 
was perceived as an ―authoritative rather than imperialist state‖.
135
 
This perception was far from universal.  As one commentator noted, the project of 
the second American empire reflected the United States‘ true historic goal to lead 
and integrate the world‘s nations into a liberal and peaceful world system.  This was 
though, he suggested, a ―revolutionary‖ vision of a world ―without a general balance 
of power‖ that would necessarily antagonise states that fear decline as well as those 
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that anticipate improvement, and that far from being perceived as a friend or 
benefactor of mankind America‘s ―unipolar fantasy‖ was certain to provoke 
resistance.
136
  First among the complaints about America‘s imperial management of 
a supposedly liberal order were accusations of hypocrisy, demonstrated by the 
incredulous anger of the French-Tunisian journalist Sophie Bessis, writing in early 
2001:  
―The paradox of the West lies in its ability to produce universals, to raise them 
to the level of absolutes, and to violate in an extraordinarily systematic way the 
principles that it derives from them, while still feeling the need to develop 
theoretical justifications for those violations... the West‘s inexhaustible capacity 
to dissociate what it says from what it does has long made its modernity both 
unintelligible and illegitimate for those it designates as others.‖
137 
  
America‘s post-Cold War project of political empire-building, of globalising the 
Western order, paradoxically drew most on the two strategies that at first sight 
appeared at odds with each other – primacy and liberal multilateralism.  Both are 
best characterised as strategies of and for empire, yet they envisage American 
empire in very different ways, with the former envisioning dominance through 
military predominance and the latter a cooperative multilateral order based primarily 
around an open international economic order, albeit one in which American 
leadership was indispensible.  Yet if the means of imperial management were in 
opposition, the notion that the ultimate end of the creation of a liberal empire was in 
America‘s national interest was fundamentally the same.  As Andrew Bacevich 
writes: 
―The Big Idea guiding U.S. strategy is openness: the removal of barriers to the 
movement of goods, capital, people and ideas, thereby fostering an international 
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order conducive to American interests, governed by American norms, regulated 
by American power, and, above all, satisfying the expectations of the American 
people for ever-greater abundance.‖
138
 
The result of this marriage of openness and military primacy was an approach to the 
second American Empire after the Cold War that might be best characterised as 
‗uni-multilateralism‘.  If a global integrative order could be created with others then 
the United States would work with likeminded allies to do so; where it met with 
resistance the United States would use its power to establish its will.  The second 
American empire was biased towards regulating international order through new and 
existing institutions and alliances and by means of ad hoc coalitions or ‗posses‘ in 
preference to unilateral action.
139
  At the same time, others were left in no doubt that 
the United States, like any imperial power, reserved the right to act on its own and 
for its own ends, as the principle of uni-multilateralism was summed up in the 
mantra of the Clinton administration: ―with others when we can, but alone when we 
must.‖
140
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CONCLUSIONS  
Epilogue:  9-11 and The Bush Doctrine 
Debate about American grand strategy in the post-Cold War world was abruptly suspended on 
September 11
th
 2001, as the American empire suffered ‗blowback‘ on home soil in the form of 
massive terrorist attacks targeted at the economic, political and military symbols of the second 
American empire.
1
  Sporadic resistance to America‘s imperial strategy had been encountered 
before, but had ―never quite risen above the level of nuisance.‖
2
  The response of the Bush 
Administration was to ‗unveil‘ the second American empire.  As Johnson later noted, 
September 11
th
 didn‘t so much change the world as it did the thinking of American leaders, 
who abandoned notions of self-binding and multilateralism to reach directly for an 
unashamedly imperial strategy in the democratic globalist variant of primacy.
3
  Constructing 
this change as ―a new kind of war‖, the United States committed itself to a sustained military 
engagement without deadlines, exit strategies, or fixed rules about how to deploy American 
troops.‖
4
 
This strategic shift on the part of the Bush Administration was significant, not only because it 
temporarily shelved the debate surrounding American grand strategy as US foreign policy 
executive – and, at least initially, the broader foreign policy discourse within the United States 
– coalesced around the unifying threat of Islamist terrorism.  It thus shifted the terms of the 
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post-Cold War debate, placing the question of security from terrorism at the centre of the 
American strategic thought.  The Bush Administration‘s approach, summarised in the 
National Security Strategy of 2002, also marked a shift in imperial management from uni-
multilateralism to unabashed unilateralism, and the means of American strategy became more 
obviously identified with its military capabilities than any other aspect of its power.
5
  
‗Globalisation‘ and ‗enlargement‘ gave way to the ‗war on terror‘ and ‗freedom‘ in America‘s 
imperial rhetoric. 
Thus September 11
th
 did change the world, precisely because it changed the thinking of 
American leaders.  This thesis has argued that domestic ideas make an important contribution 
when they intervene between systemic imperatives and state strategy.  It is not clear that the 
murder of three thousand American civilians in downtown New York constituted a change in 
the dynamics of the international system.  It may have changed – or brought home to leaders a 
change in – the systemic rules of the system, establishing concepts of asymmetry and non-
state-actors within the framework of international security.   But it had no clear affect on the 
structure of the international system – it did not alter the balance of power.  However, 
precisely because it caused a shift in ideas and perceptions at the unit level of the most 
powerful state in the international system, 9-11 precipitated systemic change.  If the strategic 
ideas of great powers contribute to the nature of relations between them, the strategies of 
global empires define the international order itself.   
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Summary Of Argument 
The end of the Cold War has been described as a postwar moment, comparable to the ends of 
other major wars and in particular the United States‘ efforts at order building in 1919 and 
1945.
6
  Yet the end of the Cold War was not like the aftermath of other major wars – as 
Ikenberry notes, the ―destruction of societies and political regimes resulted from the collapse 
of the Soviet empire and not from the violence of war.‖
7
  So although there was a ‗victor‘, the 
end of the Cold War‘s peaceful nature did not allow for a root and branch systematic 
restructuring of the international order.  There was no Versailles, no Bretton Woods, no Yalta 
at which the victorious powers met to decide the fate of their vanquished foe and impose a 
new vision of order upon the international system. 
Instead of a conference whose outcomes would constitute a new statement of order, the world 
looked to the United States‘ reaction as the world‘s sole superpower for a sense of vision.  
Given the extent of American power, it was the strategy of the United States that would define 
international order.  Yet as we have seen, the United States was unsure, divided, mourning the 
loss of the certainties that sustained its Cold War internationalism. 
The grand strategy debate that took place in the 1990s is not clearly defined, nor do the 
adherents of particular views hail from pre-existing political groupings or ideologies.  Instead, 
alignments in the new strategy debate were ad hoc, bringing political enemies together and 
dividing allies.  Republican nationalists united with dovish Democrats in a bid to retrench 
American international commitments, liberals united with neoconservatives to argue for 
American interventions in far flung parts of the world, and organisations as fundamentally at 
odds as the Heritage Foundation and the Rainbow Coalition joined forces to endorse cuts in 
military budgets.  The spheres of social, economic and foreign policy became blurred, and the 
established continuities of opinion across them disintegrated.  And it was, and perhaps 
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continues to be, a ―slow and messy‖ realignment process.
8
  Yet even as they denied the United 
States was an imperial power, at a fundamental level the major schools of thought were in 
unspoken, even unconscious agreement that the United States had the structural functions and 
power of an empire.  It may have been an empire in decline, an expensive danger to American 
security that needed rolling back; it might have been an invited empire of universal values 
organised by multilateral consent; or it could be thought an unfinished empire in which 
military power was sustained against the expansionism of others; but whichever conception 
was preferred, the fact of America‘s dominance over the rest of the world constituted the 
starting point for each grand strategy proposal. 
The argument made by this thesis is first and foremost that ideas matter in international 
politics, that human beings have the capacity to order the world we inhabit.  That the world is 
not wholly determined by the structural relations of material capabilities might not be 
controversial, but how ideas and power together create the international system certainly is.  
In seeking to better understand how ideas contributed to US grand strategy and international 
structure following the Cold War, the thesis makes two important moves. 
The first concerns the nature and content of ideas within the United States.  For forty-five 
years the doctrine of containment had harnessed the nature of bipolarity to mandate liberal 
universalism as the central tool of American national security, defined by the protection of the 
ideas of liberty that themselves constitute the United States of America.  It was therefore 
historically predictable that the persistent historical tensions  at the heart of American identity 
would resurface in the 1990s, as they had – with very different outcomes – in 1919 and 1945.
9
  
Thus a consistent theme in the post-Cold War grand strategy debate are the two competing 
imperatives that have caused the historical tendency of American foreign relations to swing 
between extremes of ―indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate 
internationalism or globalism.‖
10
  On the one hand, the protection of American liberty is seen 
in the neoisolationist impulse, the drive towards economic mercantilism and the deep 
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suspicion of both primacists and neoisolationists of the constraints on America‘s freedom of 
action implied by membership of multilateral institutions.  On the other hand, the commitment 
to liberty as a set of universal ideas of American identity drives the advocacy of democratic 
enlargement and underpins an implicit embrace of empire.  That the ideational competition 
within the United States‘ foreign policy establishment would take the form that it did after the 
end of the Cold War was therefore foreshadowed by the history of two hundred years of 
American foreign policy. 
The second feature of the argument is systemic.  Since neoclassical realism prioritises the 
structural imperatives that the system creates, it should expect a grand strategic outcome on 
the part of the United States to reflect its status as an empire.  In as far as each of the three 
ideal-type grand strategies identified in the course of thesis are best understood as strategies of 
empire the theory‘s expectations are fulfilled.  In order to discover which set of strategic ideas 
will emerge from the process of ideational competition as a foreign policy outcome 
neoclassical realism defers to the analysis of that domestic debate. 
Significantly, the fact that the ideas of primacy and liberal multilateralism – strategies that 
embrace the notion of imperial management – were more significant in US foreign policy 
during the 1990s than the alternative of retrenching the American empire, would indicate that 
there is an inbuilt systemic bias towards internationalism.  This might exist at the level of the 
state, within the foreign policy executive that arbitrates between strategic ideas, as 
neoisolationists suggest.  Alternatively, the bias may exist at the level of the international 
system, if anarchy does, as Mearsheimer claims, generate expansionary imperatives.  What is 
perhaps more important is that imperial strategies serve to embed particular ideas in the 
international system itself: in the norms and rules of international cooperation; in the 
institution of international order; in the agenda-setting capacity of international leadership; 
and in the underlying assumptions of international system that are a product of hegemony.  In 
its construction of the second American Empire during the 1990s, the United States thus 
enhanced and extended its structural power, ensuring that we continue to live in a distinctly 
American system. 
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Theoretical Implications 
In addition to the main argument that is specific to the historical period in question, the thesis 
suggests three more generalisable theoretical implications for the neoclassical realist 
framework presented here. 
1) International Structure Shapes But Does Not Determine 
The fact that the result of the grand strategy debate during the 1990s was a preference for the 
strategies of liberal multilateralism and primacy suggests that although international structure 
establishes the general form and shape of a state‘s grand strategy it does not specify or 
determine the particular type of strategy the state will choose.  A state‘s geostrategic position 
restricts the choice of strategic options that the foreign policy executive will consider.  The 
United States‘ position of overwhelming predominance determined that it would pursue an 
imperial grand strategy after the end of the Cold War, taking on the role of global leader.  
However, features at the system level cannot explain its choice of imperial strategy, which 
was determined by the balance of ideas within the state,  and within the foreign policy 
executive in particular.   
This perception is reinforced by the domestic rather than systemic sources of the alteration in 
imperial strategy after the events of 9-11.  That structure determines form but does not specify 
type of strategy might lead to generalisable expectations for neoclassical realist theory of state 
postures given particular international structures, whilst leaving the specific threat perceptions 
and policy choices to the balance of ideas at the domestic level. 
2) The Absence Of Threat – A Wicked Problem? 
In the 1990s, American leaders struggled to identify or construct either an agreed threat or 
animating concept around which to unify American grand strategy.  The strategies of the 
1990s produced such differing assessments of the strategic environment and the goals of 
American strategy that it is tempting to regard grand strategy formulation in the absence of 
threat as a wicked problem, that is to say that the problem cannot be understood until after the 
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formulation of a solution.  Thus each strategy, rather than assessing the strategic situation and 
responding to threats, approaches the strategic assessment from the United States position of 
strategic invulnerability and constructs threats to suit its own purposes.  Thus liberal 
multilateralism emphasises dangers to global interests such as the pressures of climate change 
in order to justify an institutional approach based on multilateral cooperation.  
Neoisolationism focuses on economic competitiveness as a means of casting the spotlight on 
the domestic sphere.  Primacy stresses the military threats of rogue states and rising powers to 
bolster the requirements for defense spending.   
3) Implications for Neoclassical Realism 
Neoclassical realism expects that when states are very powerful the international system 
imposes less constraints on their behaviour, increasing the role of ideas in forming strategy.  
Indeed, particularly in states like the United States with a relatively fragmented and 
institutionally diverse foreign policy structure, featuring a plurality of relatively weak 
ideational couriers, the use of ideas to create ‗clear and present dangers‘ around which a 
national consensus can be established is to be expected when international structure does not 
provide such threats. 
Classical realists would have warned against this kind of mutual constitution of threat and 
response, which eschews the rational, empirical investigation of the strategic reality and 
avoids what Morgenthau called the ―subtle distinctions, complex choices and precarious 
manipulation which is the proper sphere of foreign policy.‖
11
  The United States, despite the 
strains on its power in Iraq and Afghanistan and as a result of the financial crisis, and despite 
the loss of ideological self-confidence those travails have precipitated, retains an imperial 
superiority that means that it is little threatened in the world.  Although the Bush Doctrine 
may now seem to be an aberration, it should be remembered that it stands in line with both the 
debates of the 1990s that foreshadowed it and balance of power that followed it.  The 
structural power of the second American empire remains unchallenged – despite the economic 
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rise of China, there are no challengers to America‘s role as the political, economic and 
ideological leader of the international order.  America remains an empire whose strategy 
defines the nature of the world in which we live. 
What this thesis has tried to show is that ideas play an important role in the formulation of 
states‘ grand strategies, and that their role is both greater and more significant when they 
inform the strategies of empires.  The grand strategies of great and imperial powers are the 
building blocks of the international system that they define, and the ideas at the heart of them 
should be the focus of scholars of international relations.  This conclusion has a profound 
implication in the final analysis for neoclassical realists as inheritors of the classical realist 
tradition, since it entails that they should take on the classical realists‘ role of analysing the 
links between the international system and grand strategy, warning of idealism and 
counselling caution in American foreign policy.  The neoclassical realist project is therefore as 
much normative as it is descriptive, with a clear idea of the role of scholars within society.  
The purpose of neoclassical realists then, should be to provide policy advise and criticism, to 
identify the national interest in terms of power and highlight where ideological motivations 
may distort it, in short, to embrace Morgenthau‘s dictum and accept the responsibility to speak 
truth to power.  
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